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ABSTRACT 
 
Across New Zealand communities have identified the need to restore and rehabilitate 
damaged ecosystems in their locality. However, community conservation groups 
(CCGs) often face significant obstacles when undertaking activities to restore and 
rehabilitate ecosystems. Activities carried out by CCGs require the people managing 
them to have an understanding of a plethora of different regulatory and legislative 
instruments, such as regional and district plans, corporate law, health and safety 
legislation, and employment law. The land use regulation that applies to a particular 
restoration site also has the potential to significantly affect how effective a CCG can 
be by either restraining the impacts on the land by neighbouring land use practices 
that impact negatively on the site, or by creating a legal environment that facilitates 
legal protection for significant conservation areas and prevents development. All of 
these factors, and a large number of others, require CCG to have an understanding of 
the law.  
 
Many of the issues that CCGs face have not been dealt with adequately in legal 
writing in the past and are not well understood. Therefore further research and writing 
is necessary is this area to help CCGs undertake their work with minimal legal 
obstacles. To help address this gap this research paper will evaluate some of the main 
legal issues faced by CCGs and determine how these issues can be resolved by 
answering the question: 
What are the main legal barriers faced by Community Conservation 
Groups (CCGs) when undertaking ecosystem restoration projects and 
how can these barriers be removed effectively? 
To answer this question the two main methods of research that have been used are 
literature analysis and review, and semi-structured interviews with a range of CCGs 
and other organisations involved in ecosystem restoration. There are two main topics 
covered in this paper. Firstly, corporate issues for CCGs and secondly, land 
management issues for CCGs. 
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PREFACE 
 
This research is one of a number of research projects being undertaken as part of a 
larger study currently underway at the University of Waikato which is focusing on the 
restoration of urban ecosystems, and is being led by Professor Bruce Clarkson. My 
research has been funded by the Foundation for Research Science and Technology 
(FRST) through an objective based investment (OBI) scheme which required me to 
determine what legal barriers are faced when carrying out community restoration 
projects and to identify possible solutions to these barriers.
1
 
 
A major component of this research has been the use of semi-structured interviews. 
Prior to beginning the interview process it was necessary to apply to the School of 
Law Ethics Committee for approval to undertake research using human subjects. This 
process involved forming an outline of the research process, explaining the reasons 
for the research, and declaring how I would manage issues surrounding cultural 
sensitivities, informed consent, and privacy and confidentiality. I was required to 
formulate a letter, explaining the research, which could be given to those who 
participated, and to create a consent form for participants to sign before beginning 
interviews. Each interviewee has read my introductory letter, had any queries 
explained, and signed a consent form so that informed consent has been obtained 
before interviewing commences. Comments made by interviewees on an off the 
record basis have not been referred to in my research in any way that can be 
attributed to that person. 
 
I am aware of much good restoration activity for coastal and marine areas but the 
main focus of this thesis will be on terrestrial ecosystems. I would also like to point 
out that due to the limited scope of this paper a number of issues that were raised by 
interviewees are not mentioned in order to maintain focus on the key issues identified 
in the literature and through the interviewing process. 
                                                     
1
 University of Waikato, OBI project outline (2006) 1. 
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PART ONE: THE LAW OF ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION FOR 
COMMUNITY CONSERVATION GROUPS 
 
A. Introduction 
Aotearoa / New Zealand is a land of unique biodiversity and magnificent landscapes 
not present anywhere else in the world. Images of New Zealand‘s environment are a 
major element of how New Zealand is marketed on an international scale and 
contribute significantly to the New Zealand economy. However as a result of human 
impacts on the environment many of New Zealand‘s distinctive and delicate 
ecosystems are in a state of decline and require human intervention if important 
species of flora and fauna are to be maintained. Communities across the country have 
identified the need for intervention and have banded together to restore and 
rehabilitate damaged ecosystems in their locality. Much of the work that these groups 
are doing is to fill in the gaps where government agencies have been unable to take 
action. This work is essential as at present the Department of Conservation, the 
government department with the responsibility of managing New Zealand‘s large 
conservation estate, only has enough funding to adequately manage approximately 
five percent of the land that it administers.
2
 
 
However, community conservation groups (CCGs) often face significant obstacles 
when undertaking activities to restore and rehabilitate ecosystems. A number of these 
obstacles arise in relation to law. Activities carried out by CCGs require the people 
managing them to have an understanding of a plethora of different regulatory and 
legislative instruments, such as regional and district plans, corporate law, health and 
safety legislation, and employment law. Environmental law also plays a significant 
role in restoration projects and depending on the laws enacted may either facilitate or 
restrain restoration efforts. For example, the land use classification of a restoration 
site has the potential to significantly affect how successful a CCG can be by either 
restraining the impacts that neighbouring land use practices that impact negatively on 
                                                     
2
 J. Craig, S. Anderson, M. Clout, B. Creese, N. Mitchell, J. Ogden, M. Roberts, and G. Ussher, 
―Conservation Issues in New Zealand‖ (2000) 31 Annu. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 61, 62. 
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the site may have, or creating a legal environment that facilitates protection and 
prevents development.  
 
Many of the issues that CCGs face have not previously been dealt with adequately in 
legal writing in a context that is useful for conservation groups working at the 
community level. Therefore increased research and writing is necessary in this area in 
order to gain a greater understanding in what has been a little appraised area of the 
law and to help CCGs undertake their work with minimal legal obstacles. This thesis 
will help to address some of the main legal issues faced by CCGs and determine how 
these issues can be resolved by answering the question: 
What are the main legal barriers faced by Community Conservation 
Groups (CCGs) when undertaking ecosystem restoration projects and 
how can these barriers be removed effectively? 
 
To answer this question there are two major topics that this paper focuses on; (1) 
corporate issues for CCGs; and (2) land management issues for CCGs. These topics 
are the two areas that my research has identified as requiring the most substantial 
investigation. In the remainder of Part One I will introduce the concept of ecosystem 
restoration and the role of CCGs in restoration projects to provide the reader with a 
basis for understanding the significance of this research project. This leads to an 
explanation of how CCGs fit within civil society to provide the theoretical framework 
within which this research is grounded. Part Two evaluates the increasing impact of 
corporate law on CCGs. Two necessary components of this part are a critical 
evaluation of the main corporate structures used by CCGs and an assessment of how 
the law on conflicts of interest impinges upon members of CCGs in their varying 
work and voluntary roles. Part Three leads into an evaluation of the main land 
management issues affecting CCGs. In this part I also appraise some of the 
approaches that have been used overseas, and I put forward suggestions as to how 
some of these measures could be suitably applied in New Zealand. Finally in Part 
Four I will sum up my research findings and draw conclusions about the way that the 
law affects how successful a CCG can be in restoring indigenous ecosystems and 
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how New Zealand‘s legislative framework could be improved to help facilitate the 
work of CCGs.  
 
B. Ecosystem Restoration 
New Zealand has many exceptional landscapes and endemic flora and fauna that give 
this country‘s biodiversity a distinct character not present anywhere else in the world. 
Native plants and animals, such as the kiwi and the silver fern, have been embraced 
as New Zealand icons and represent our identities as New Zealanders both locally and 
internationally. However many of New Zealand‘s native ecosystems have been 
significantly affected by development in both rural and urban environments. Much 
land has been cleared for agricultural purposes, particularly areas of low lying plains, 
such as those that make up large tracts of land in the Waikato.
3
 Many of New 
Zealand‘s indigenous ecosystems have either disappeared or are extremely 
vulnerable.
4
 For some badly damaged or incomplete ecosystems, restoration is their 
only chance at long term survival and ongoing management of conservation areas in 
New Zealand is vital to ensuring our unique biodiversity is maintained for future 
generations to enjoy.
5
 
 
The Society of Ecosystem Restoration (SER) defines restoration as being ―the 
process of assisting the recovery of an ecosystem that has been degraded, damaged, 
or destroyed‖.6 Geoff Park further defines ecosystem restoration as:7 
[T]he process of repairing damage caused by humans to the diversity and dynamics of 
indigenous ecosystems. It begins with a judgment that an ecosystem is damaged to the 
point that it will not regain its former characteristic properties in the near future (say, 
two generations or about 50 years), and that continued degradation may occur. 
 
 The aim of ecosystem restoration is to return ecosystems to a state which is as close 
as possible to their form prior to human interference with the ultimate goal as 
                                                     
3
 A. Saunders, A Review of Department of Conservation Mainland Restoration Projects and 
Recommendations for Further Action (2000) 17. 
4
 G. Park, Nga Uruora: The Groves of Life: Ecology and History in a New Zealand Landscape (1999) 
15. 
5
 G. N. Park, New Zealand as Ecosystems: The Ecosystem Concept as a Tool for Environmental 
Management (2000) 7. 
6
 Society for Ecological Restoration International Science & Policy Working Group, The SER 
International Primer on Ecological Restoration (2004) 3. 
7
 Park, supra n 4 at 95. 
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restoring ecosystems to a level where they are able to function on their own without 
the need for additional inputs by people.
8
 This process involves a number of different 
steps including weed and pest removal, replanting of eco-sourced native plant 
species, and reintroduction of native animal species, many of which have legal 
implications.
9
  
 
In the past in New Zealand restoration and conservation activities have largely 
focussed on maintaining keystone species and scenic landscapes. More recently the 
focus has shifted to considering ecosystems as a whole and how they are linked 
within landscapes.
10
 This is significant as protecting ecosystems as a whole, as 
opposed to protecting a few isolated species, is more ―biologically sound‖ and means 
that any species that are yet unknown will also be protected.
11
 The Resource 
Management Act 1991 (RMA) has assisted communities and local authorities alike to 
begin to understand the importance of land management in ecosystem terms by 
recognising the intrinsic value of ecosystems in section 7. Similarly the Reserves Act 
considers the environment in ecosystem terms.
12
 The Environment Act defines 
ecosystem in s 2 as meaning ―any system of interacting terrestrial or aquatic 
organisms within their natural and physical environment‖. However the term 
―ecosystem‖ is not defined in the RMA, the Conservation Act, or the Reserves Act. 
In my opinion this is concerning as it leaves uncertainty as to how the term ecosystem 
will be construed when these statutes are interpreted in respect to ecosystem 
restoration activities. This is an issue from the point of view of groups whose focus is 
ecosystem restoration as it means that the legal status of their work is not clearly 
defined. As will be discussed issues like these warrant the amendment of New 
Zealand‘s key environmental legislation so that it provides for CCGs. 
                                                     
8
 Waikato Biodiversity Forum, Restoring Waikato’s Indigenous Biodiversity: Ecological Priorities and 
Opportunities (2006) 34; J. Ehrenfeld, and L. Toth, ―Restoration Ecology and the Ecosystem 
Perspective‖ (1997) 5 Restoration Ecology 307, 307. 
9
 Department of Conservation, Protecting and Restoring our Natural Heritage – A Practical Guide 
(2000) 33. 
10
 Park, supra n 5 at 14. 
11
 J. L. Brown, ―Preserving Species: The Endangered Species Act Versus Ecosystem Management 
Regime, Ecological and Political Considerations, and Recommendations for Reform‖ (1997) 12 J. 
Envtl. Law and Litigation 151, 221-222. 
12
 Reserves Act 1977, s 3(1)(b). 
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C. Community Conservation Groups and Participatory Ecosystem Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As highlighted by the above quote the management of ecosystems at the community 
level is an important aspect of ensuring successful conservation outcomes in New 
Zealand. Ecosystem restoration is an activity which is often initiated by members of 
local communities who have identified a need for a restoration project in their 
locality.
13
 It involves communities taking action, in close co-operation with local 
councils and government departments, to protect those species and ecosystems that 
help to make New Zealand special and that are treasured by New Zealanders. As 
stated in one DoC publication:
 14
 
Ultimately, the act of conservation is a proclamation of how highly we as New 
Zealanders value the outstanding diversity of treasures that still exist here. 
 
―Community‖ for the purposes of conservation work, can be defined as meaning ―a 
number of people who have a goal and decide to work together to do something about 
it‖.15 Community is an important concept for ecosystem restoration as successful 
restoration projects often require that there is co-operation between different groups 
within the community including landowners, businesses, regional and district 
councils, and CCGs:
16
 
Community-based conservation reverses top down, centre-driven conservation by 
focusing on the people who bear the costs of conservation. In the broadest sense, then, 
community-based conservation includes natural resource or biodiversity protection by, 
for, and with local communities. 
 
                                                     
13
 T. Young, ―Restoration Ecology and Conservation Biology‖ (2000) 92 Biological Conservation 73, 
77. 
14
 Department of Conservation, Conservation General Policy (2005) 7. 
15
 V. Forgie. P. Horsley, and J. Johnston, Facilitating Community-based Conservation Initiatives 
(2001) 6. 
16
 Ibid, 7. 
“Biodiversity is ultimately lost or conserved at the local level so government 
policies to promote conservation gains must be supported by local action 
and effective partnerships involving local government, business and 
community groups” 
 
V. Forgie, P. Horsley, and J. Johnston, Facilitating Community-based Conservation 
Initiatives (2001) 18. 
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Not-for-profit community environmental groups which, for the purposes of this 
research, I have termed community conservation groups (CCGs)
17
 are key players in 
the conservation and restoration of ecosystems. The efforts of CCGs in addition to 
public conservation activities significantly benefit conservation by providing a range 
of services that help to fill in the gaps where state services are lacking.
18
 These 
organisations often take innovative approaches to conservation work using 
community knowledge and experience to overcome environmental problems where 
perhaps more government-led approaches may not be as successful.
19
  
 
The people who make up these groups are enthusiastic and dedicated people who are 
devoted to the work that they do. Volunteers participating in ecosystem restoration 
activities usually become the ―backbone‖ of a project.20 They assist with everything 
from pest management and tree planting to administrative work. They contribute 
hundreds of hours of voluntary labour to restoration projects many of which, without 
volunteers, would not be possible.
21
 Finally, the restoration projects they initiate help 
to ensure that important New Zealand ecosystems are enhanced and maintained 
which in turn helps to protect New Zealand‘s biodiversity.22 In the Waikato region 
alone there are over 120 different CCGs undertaking work on both public and private 
lands and ranging in size from smaller informal groups made up of only a small 
number of individuals to large organisations such as Moehau Environment Group or 
Maungatautari Ecological Island Trust.
23
 
 
Lobbying by CCGs and other environmental non-government organisations, such as 
the Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society, has helped to shape New Zealand‘s 
                                                     
17
 The term ‗community conservation group‖ was chosen as opposed to term such as ‗landcare group‘ 
in an attempt to encompass as many community groups as possible. It was thought that referring to 
groups as landcare may fail to encompass restoration groups undertaking other forms of activities such 
as streamcare and lakecare. 
18
 G. Stoneham, M. Crowe, S. Platt, V. Chaudhri, J. Soligo, and L. Strappazzon, Mechanisms for 
Biodiversity Conservation on Private Land (2000) 32. 
19
 C. Binning and P. Feilman, Landscape Conservation and the Non-Government Sector (2000) 2. 
20
 M. Akuhata-Brown et al, Civil Society at the Millennium (1999) 29. 
21
 Waikato Biodiversity Forum, supra n 8 at 13. 
22
 Department of Conservation, supra n 9 at 8. 
23
 Environment Waikato, ―Threats to Native Plants and Animals‖ available at <www.ew.govt.nz> (last 
accessed 16/05/07). 
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environmental laws and ensures community input into the laws that affect them. This 
shows the impact that CCGs can have on policy.
24
 CCG participation in the 
development of laws pertaining to the management of ecosystems is therefore an 
important aspect of ensuring the maintenance of an active civil society, a point that I 
will cover in more detail shortly, and may help to ensure the long term effectiveness 
of environmental policies by ensuring community values are incorporated into 
management regimes.
25
 
 
Research commissioned by DoC into the relationship between the Department and 
CCGs identified ten key aspects which are important to CCG success:
26
 
… strong leadership, commitment, stability, specialist skills and knowledge, a vision and 
project plan, recognition of achievements, secure funding, an appropriate legal structure, 
a business approach, and good internal communication. 
 
Many of these ideas also recurred throughout the comments made by members of 
CCGs during the interviews I conducted. There are further legal considerations, 
which will be discussed throughout the course of this paper, that are also important to 
a group‘s success. As CCGs are mostly made up of volunteers who undertake 
restoration work on a part time and unpaid basis, and with limited financial resources, 
dealing with the legal requirements can be a hefty burden.  
 
D. Research Methodology 
There were two main elements to the research methodology I used for this project. 
First, much of the research for this paper involved primary library and online 
research, followed by literature analysis and review. The second element was 
qualitative research. This part of the research was conducted in the form of semi-
structured interviews with a range of different people involved in community 
restoration projects, from group co-ordinators from a number of different CCGs, to 
individuals working in a range of different government agencies who work with 
CCGs. The reason that I chose to conduct semi-structured interviews as opposed to 
                                                     
24
 Ministry for the Environment, The State of New Zealand’s Environment (1997) 140. 
25
 T. P. Duane, ―Community Participation in Ecosystem Management‖ (2007) 24 Ecology Law 
Quarterly 771, 779. 
26
 C. Wilson, Developing Effective Partnerships Between the Department of Conservation and 
Community Groups (2005) 20. 
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questionnaires or structured interviews was that by being loosely structured I was 
able to allow the interviewees freedom to speak openly about their experiences. I 
think that the semi-structured format was useful from this perspective as it allowed 
me to elicit information that I would not have been able to get had I followed a more 
structured interview or questionnaire. I also found that this was helpful as some 
interviewees raised ideas that I had not previously thought of and having a semi-
structured interview structure meant that discussion of these ideas was possible. 
 
In my initial discussions with Professor Barton we identified a number of key 
contacts who would be important to meet with for this research. To identify further 
people who would be useful to contact I conducted a number of online searches for 
CCGs in the Waikato Region. I also found a list of organisations in the Waikato 
Biodiversity Forum‘s publication ―Restoring Waikato‘s Indigenous Biodiversity: 
Ecological Priorities and Opportunities‖27 and another in Hamilton City Council‘s 
―Who‘s Who‖ guide28 which helped me to indentify further useful contacts. 
Throughout the interview process interviewees often made suggestions of other 
people to contact and this also assisted me with identifying key contacts. Once I had 
established a list of key contacts and their details I proceeded to phone or email 
representatives of the groups to ask whether someone from the group would be 
willing to participate in an interview. Most interviews were conducted on a face to 
face basis and ranged from about 30 minutes to two hours.  
 
Representatives from approximately 30 groups were interviewed as well as people 
from a number of government departments, councils, and other agencies involved 
with CCGs, such as the Waikato Biodiversity Forum. While I acknowledge that the 
small number of groups interviewed means that my sample is not representative of all 
restoration groups in New Zealand, or in the Waikato region, I interviewed a range of 
groups with different sizes and structures in an attempt to cover as broader range of 
scenarios as possible within the scope of this project. The interviews that I conducted 
                                                     
27
 Waikato Biodiversity Forum, supra n 8. 
28
 Hamilton City Council, Who’s Who: The Green Guide to Organisations Working to Protect the 
Environment (2003). 
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assisted me greatly in identifying legal barriers that affect the ability of CCGs to 
undertake restoration projects effectively in a way that would not have been possible 
through literature analysis alone. I am sincerely grateful to all those who gave up their 
time to participate in this research project. Their feedback has been invaluable.  
 
E. Theoretical Context: Community Conservation Groups as part of Civil Society 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
1. Introduction 
As may be observed in the above quotation from Newton and Sullivan successful 
management of environmental resources requires the existence of a strong civil 
society. Civil society is a sector of society which does not fit within the boundaries 
of the state, the family, or the market.
29
 It can include such ―non-state institutions‖ 
as the media, educational institutions, interest groups, churches and leisure 
groups.
30
 It is largely made up of associations of individuals who have actively 
responded to the needs and interests of the public, or a particular sector of the 
community, by creating organisations which fill the gaps of the modern state and 
provide services that are generally for the benefit of the public.
31
 This sector may 
more commonly be referred to using such terms as voluntary sector, community 
sector, third sector, not-for-profit sector, or charitable sector.
32
 It includes such 
organisations as social clubs, sporting organisations, social welfare groups, and 
public lobbying groups.
33
 ‗Civil Society‘ has been defined as being:34 
                                                     
29
 N. Deakin, In Search of Civil Society (2001) 1. 
30
 D. Schecter, Sovereign States or Political Communities? Civil Society and Contemporary Politics 
(2000) 3. 
31
 Akuhata-Brown et al, supra n 20 at 7. 
32
 C. Wilson, The Changing Face of Social Service Volunteering: A Literature Review (2001) 15. 
33
 Y. Hasenfeld and B. Gidron, ―Understanding Multi-purpose Hybrid Voluntary Organizations: The 
Contributions of Theories on Civil Society, Social Movements and Non-profit Organisations‖ (2005) 1 
Journal of Civil Society 97, 101. 
“A strong civil society makes good resource management possible, while 
the landscape and its needs provide an attractive context for social 
interaction, thus strengthening civil society.” 
J. Newton and W. Sullivan, ―Nature, Culture, and Civil Society‖ (2005) 1 Journal of Civil 
Society 195, 203-204 
10 
 
[T]he network of autonomous associations that rights-bearing and responsibility-laden 
citizens voluntarily create to address common problems, advance shared interests, and 
promote collective aspirations. As a legitimate public actor, civil society participates 
alongside – not replaces – state and market institutions in the making and implementing of 
public policies designed to resolve collective problems and advance the public good. 
 
It is a largely autonomous and independent sector which expands and contracts 
over time in response to community needs to fill the gaps where public services 
are lacking.
35
 CCGs are one of a multiplicity of organisations that operate within 
the civil society sector. Therefore theories of civil society form a conceptual 
framework within which this research can be grounded.  
 
While civil society is not part of the state sector, as a result of the restructuring of the 
state in the 1980s and 1990s and the ―retreat‖ of the state from the provision of public 
services, the civil society sector has significantly expanded and civil society 
organisations (CSOs) have increasingly been undertaking services that would be 
traditionally considered within the domain of the state.
36
 The traditional roles played 
by local councils have also changed with many of the services once provided by 
councils now being supplied by volunteer groups. A council is often now seen as the 
―community leader‖ whose role it is to help with the coordination of voluntary 
groups.
37
 New Zealand has been no exception to this trend with the number of CSOs 
increasing significantly since the 1980s and taking over some of the roles 
traditionally performed by the state.
38
 One sector of civil society which is having an 
increasing role in the provision of services for the public good is environment and 
conservation groups, with partnerships between government departments and CCGs 
being increasingly common in community conservation projects.
39
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The following diagram, adapted from a text on environmental land use planning by 
John Randolph, helps to explain the relationship between civil society and other 
actors involved in environmental management. In the centre is the natural 
environment. All of the other actors interact with the natural environment and in 
varying ways with each other. The diagram clearly shows how civil society can place 
pressure on government and market sectors as well as the opportunities available 
between the sectors for collaboration on environmental matters.
40
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2. Legal Environment 
Despite the fact that civil society can, in many instances, be seen as assisting the state 
in the provision of public services, the sector can either be restrained or enabled 
depending on whether or not a legal system is supportive of civil society. The state 
can either have a direct influence on the work of CSOs, through the provision of 
funding directly to these groups, or indirectly through aspects of the legislative and 
regulatory environment which impact affect CSOs.
41
 It can restrain the involvement 
of the community in resource management by preventing full public participation in 
decision making or can facilitate restoration by providing ―institutional incentives‖.42 
For example, one of the important considerations that the state must allow for in 
order to facilitate development of a successful voluntary sector is to create methods 
for community groups to become incorporated, so that those who form groups are not 
burdened with the possibility that they may have to accept full responsibility for the 
liabilities of the group.
43
  
 
The benefits conferred by the state, and the public funding of CSOs, mean that the tax 
(and rate) paying public expect these organisations to meet minimum standards of 
accountability and to achieve the goals that justify the benefits.
44
 Governments must 
learn to strike a balance between providing an enabling environment for CSOs and 
ensuring that there are adequate restrictions in place to make sure that they can be 
held publicly accountable.
45
 However, it is important that the sector is not over-
regulated otherwise the development and efficiency of CSOs may be restrained.
46
  
For example, Michael Edwards argues that the relationship between civil society and 
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the state is mutually constituted and that if the relationship between the two is severed 
―then the positive effects of one on the other can be negated‖.47 
 
In general states have been accepting of CSOs and have allowed a legal environment 
to form which is favourable to civil society. This has allowed these organisations to 
flourish.
48
 New Zealand has been no exception, and with a legal environment 
particularly well suited to civil society organisations the voluntary sector in New 
Zealand has become exceptionally large.
49
 While there is no formal register which 
records precisely how many voluntary organisations exist in New Zealand, in April 
2007 there were approximately 23,000 incorporated societies registered and 16,000 
charitable trusts.
50
 The total number of voluntary organisations is probably well in 
excess of this number as there are many civil society groups carrying out community 
work that are not incorporated. 
 
Two of the main statutes that my research identified as important to the effective 
functioning of the voluntary sector in New Zealand are the Incorporated Societies Act 
1908 and the Charitable Trusts Act 1957. The recently enacted Charities Act 2005 is 
also important and allows an organisation to register as a charitable entity in order to 
receive tax relief. A diverse array of other legal and regulatory requirements, ranging 
from health and safety regulations to tax obligations, also impinge upon civil society 
and restrict the ability of groups to be successful. The advantages and disadvantages 
of these legal requirements for CCGs will be discussed in detail in later chapters. 
 
3. Public Participation and Democratic Theory 
As alluded to earlier another important element of facilitating a successful civil 
society is that there are avenues available for active participation of citizens in the 
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management of natural resources.
51
 Participation in such matters is considered to be a 
cornerstone of democratic society.
52
 For CCGs their role is not solely in relation to 
activities directly related to restoration work, such as weed removal and tree planting, 
but CCGs also have in important role to play in challenging policies or activities 
which may counteract the work that they are doing. Therefore it is important that they 
are given ample opportunity to participate in the management of local ecosystems and 
in the development of local and government policies that may impede their 
management.
53
 
 
An important theory to take into account when considering public participation is that 
of ―civic republicanism‖. Civic republicanism advocates the political theory of 
deliberative democracy
54
 which can be defined as:
55
 
[A] school of political theory that assumes that genuinely thoughtful and discursive 
public participation in decision making has the potential to produce policy decisions that 
are more just and more rational than existing representative mechanisms. 
 
Civic republicanism is relevant for CCGs as it argues the importance of ―citizen 
deliberation‖, that is deliberation by members of the community and government 
bodies in a setting where each participant is able to voice their opinions and have 
them considered by others. An important part of this process is for participants to 
listen to what others have to say and to talk through the issues while learning about 
the needs of other community interest groups and trying to understand their points of 
view.
56
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While the major part of CCG work is delivering ecosystem services, participation in 
public decision making is also important. Through deliberative decision making made 
in collaboration with all relevant sectors of the community the needs of the 
community as a whole can be considered. The deliberative aspect means that 
members of the community are more likely to accept the policies as they have been 
able to consider the needs of other interest groups therefore should have a better 
understanding of the need for implementation of the law.
57
 Adopting such an 
approach to the development of law relating to the management of natural resources 
would be significant as it may reduce the conflicts between different factions within 
the community and result in better environmental management.
58
 For example 
policies made where farmers and conservationists have been able to discuss and 
understand each other‘s needs are likely to be more effective than policies developed 
in a top down fashion with little interaction between interested parties. 
 
For participation to be truly democratic citizens must be able to take part in decision 
making not just comment on policies that are already made. Citizens must be given 
the opportunity to effectively participate in local decision making if they are to 
believe that their input is worthwhile.
59
 Part of this is ensuring that members of civil 
society are provided with all the information that they need to make informed 
decisions.
60
 Participation by civil society groups in the development of laws relating 
to environmental management can lead to the formation of more efficient and 
effective laws than if legislation is developed without public participation.
61
 Barton 
argues that the experience of NGOs in environmental matters can assist the state in 
identifying issues that may otherwise be overlooked. Similarly Duane points out that 
participation must extend beyond ‗token‘ participation as development of policies 
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which do not take serious consideration of community input are unlikely to be 
successfully implemented in the long term.
62
 
 
The civic health of communities is also an important element of ensuring successful 
conservation.
63
 Without a healthy civic community, Shutkin argues, it will not be 
possible to achieve long term environmental results. As part of civil society CCGs 
can represent the viewpoints of citizens in public forums and when a number of 
different civil society groups work together on an issue to pursue joint goals then they 
can have the strength to have a powerful influence on the state.
64
 To facilitate 
increased participation of CSOs in resource management decisions governments must 
acknowledge the need for flexibility for CCGs and adapt their procedures 
accordingly.
65
 For example, Dr Michael Becker of Waitetuna Streamcare Group said 
that the fact that most council meetings are held during business hours can mean that 
members of CCGs are not able to voice their concerns at public hearings due to work 
commitments.
66
 To help facilitate participatory democracy councils should endeavour 
to hold public meetings at a time of day when members of the public are more likely 
to be able to attend. 
 
4. State/Civil Society Partnerships 
The success of some CSOs has led to governments in many countries choosing to 
contract with these groups for the provision of services.
67
 In the United Kingdom 
many voluntary groups that had previously received government funding through 
grants, are now choosing to enter into contracts with government agencies to provide 
public services in return for funding.
68
 This ‗contract culture‘ raises concerns about 
ensuring services are provided to the public in an efficient and effective manner and 
raises the bar of accountability for the voluntary group that agrees to provide the 
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services that would traditionally have been the role of the state or local authority. This 
means that voluntary groups are often now required to meet ―performance indicators‖ 
in a similar fashion to standards that may be expected between contract partners in 
the corporate sector.
69
 In other situations governments have formed successful 
partnerships with CSOs in order to tackle important public issues.
70
  
 
While there are requirements which must be fulfilled in order to receive funding in 
New Zealand, at present there has not tended to be the same type of contract culture 
that has emerged in the United Kingdom where the government has sought to create 
formal agreements, called ―compacts‖, with CSOs.71 The compacts are a form of 
agreement entered into between government agencies and CSOs that define how the 
relationship between the parties will work.
72
 These agreements are not contracts as 
such but provide the basis for a more formal arrangement in the future.
73
 While New 
Zealand has not yet created formal arrangements to facilitate contracts between the 
government and CSOs for the provision of conservation services this does not mean 
that there are not active and successful relationships occurring between the 
community and government sectors. In many areas successful partnerships have 
formed between government departments and CCGs as in some instances it appears 
these specialised groups have been better suited to identifying the needs in their areas, 
and are able to undertake provide services in a manner which is more effective and 
efficient than those provided by the state.
74
  
 
Partnership between local or central government and CCGs has the opportunity to 
significantly increase the success of a restoration project. The resources and labour 
provided by CCGs help to fill in gaps where government funding is lacking. The 
close relationship between CCGs and the local community can mean that CCGs hold 
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valuable information about sites which can be of assistance to government 
authorities.
75
 Being heavily involved in the community and independent from 
government also often means that CCGs can have better relationships with local 
landowners, and may be able to provoke wider community participation than a 
government-led scheme.
76
 In return government agencies supply CCGs with 
information, research, and resources which are often vital to a group successfully 
achieving its outcomes.
77
 In the context of community restoration projects in the 
Waikato, the relationship between CCGs and government agencies has largely been 
in the form of partnerships whereby groups work with DoC or Environment Waikato 
in order to get work done in the most effective means. The Department of 
Conservation‘s role in community-based projects varies depending on the individual 
project, ranging from a high level of involvement to more of an advisory role, with 
partnerships between CCGs and the Department being of particular importance where 
CCGs are carrying out work on DoC administered land.
78
  
 
However the emerging partnership between civil society and the state has led to 
controversy as there are doubts as to whether voluntary organisations are able to 
maintain their independence and autonomy when providing services on behalf of, or 
in association with, government agencies.
79
 There is concern that the pressure to fit 
within state requirements in order to secure funding is forcing voluntary organisations 
to conform to the norms imposed by the state rather than pursing their own 
objectives.
80
 To a certain degree CSOs contracting to the state can undermine their 
independence and may weaken the ideal of civil society as providing an alternative to 
the services offered by state and market.
81
 There is concern that the contract culture 
may cause a voluntary group to become dependent on the funding and resources of 
one particular public body which could make the group and its project vulnerable in 
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the event that the contract is terminated.
82
 Contracting may also reduce the ability of 
voluntary organisations to use their own innovation in undertaking their work by 
requiring them to operate within certain restrictions imposed under the contract. This 
can restrict the groups ―freedom to determine the direction of their work‖.83  
 
In relation to charities and societies with charitable status, Debra Morris argues that 
contracting with government agencies may make it difficult for groups to meet the 
standards required to qualify for charitable status.
84
 For example, she argues that in 
contracting to a local authority for example, a group must ensure that the contracts it 
agrees to do not exceed the group‘s objects or the activities may be ultra vires. 
Secondly, she argues that in entering into a contract groups must be careful not to 
restrict themselves to providing services to a restricted class of individuals or they 
may end up failing the public benefit test of charity law (discussed in detail in Part 
Two) and therefore risk losing charitable status.  
 
Ian Harden argues that contracts between public bodies and voluntary groups take the 
choice of selecting their favoured service provider away from the individual.
85
 This, 
he argues, modifies the traditional model of the market and means that supply of 
services is not necessarily connected to the demands of the public thus limiting 
―consumer sovereignty‖.86 In my opinion this argument does not apply well to CCGs 
as, in the communities where the CCGs I spoke to are located, the groups are made 
up largely from members of the community and there appears to be significant public 
support from other members of the community who may not be directly involved in 
the project. It is usually the CCG, as a representative for the community, who 
approaches public bodies for funding, not an organisation that is divorced from the 
community and its needs. While I believe that there may be other issues for CCGs 
choosing to contract with public bodies, such as maintaining their independence, I do 
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not think that consumer sovereignty is an issue for them in the sense argued by 
Harden. 
 
However it must be remembered that, without the partnerships between CCGs and 
government agencies, much of the work being undertaken by CCGs would not be 
possible because of the expertise and funding provided by the state.
87
 The 
relationship between the state and civil society has also led to higher levels of 
―professionalism and accountability‖ being required of the sector. This can have a 
positive impact on CCGs as it means that funding agencies feel more secure about 
providing them with resources and as a result CCGs gain better access to money and 
services.
88
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PART TWO: CORPORATE ISSUES FOR COMMUNITY CONSERVATION 
GROUPS 
 
A. Introduction 
The legal environment within which CCGs operate has become increasingly stringent 
in requiring bodies to be accountable to the communities that they serve and the 
government agencies that fund them. Community organisations have been expected 
to raise the bar in both a structural and managerial sense. Organisers and board 
members are often expected to meet similar standards to directors of companies even 
though, for many, their roles are undertaken on a voluntary basis. Issues such as 
director‘s liability and conflict of interest can create very real concerns for CCGs and 
their management committees and the high onus placed on people in these roles can 
discourage participation by some members of local communities who fear personal 
liability. 
 
Other key issues revolve around the corporate structure that groups choose to use and 
whether the structures that are currently available adequately provide for modern civil 
society organisations. To help overcome some of the structural issues many CCGs 
have taken on the experiences of those in the business world and have come to 
emulate organisations from the corporate sector.
89
 However the appropriateness of 
such models in the community setting is questionable and may not always meet the 
needs and expectations of local communities.  This section of the paper will outline 
the corporate issues faced by CCGs and the impact of corporate law on these groups. 
 
B. Corporate Structure 
Choosing an appropriate corporate structure is an important element of ensuring the 
success of a CCG. The structure chosen by a group can affect its legal status, 
opportunities for funding and tax benefits, and the potential for personal liability of 
group members. Yet many groups fail to understand the importance of choosing the 
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correct legal structure and how it can contribute to their success, particularly in 
respect to funding applications.
90
 There are a variety of different organisational 
structures that CCGs could use, although the two most common structures I 
encountered during the interview process were incorporated societies registered under 
the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, and charitable trusts under the Charitable Trusts 
Act 1957.
91
 Some of the groups I spoke to found that their group operated effectively 
as an unincorporated society. Other groups found that becoming incorporated has 
been a significant advantage for them. However at some point in the group‘s 
development incorporation may become a necessity as funding agencies often expect 
a group to be either an incorporated society or charitable trust before they will even 
consider their application for funds.
92
 Rachael Goddard of Te Kauri-Waikuku Trust 
says that questions about the trusts corporate structure are usually the first thing that 
they are asked when making funding applications.
93
 
 
The choices that a group makes in its initial stages about the legal structure that it will 
use and the way that the group will be managed will have a significant impact on 
whether it can successfully achieve its objectives. Therefore making an informed 
decision about which structure to use is crucial as the suitability of the different 
structures will depend on the size of the group, its activities, and the way that the 
community wants the restoration project to be managed.
94
 A formal legal structure 
can also help to ensure that a group is maintained in the longer term, whereas groups 
that have not used a formal structure may be less likely to maintain regular contact.
95
 
The structure chosen can affect the level of community ownership and involvement in 
a project. In particular, as noted by Carla Wilson, trust structures have the potential to 
be ―quite exclusive‖ and may limit community involvement.96 Therefore it is 
important that in becoming formally constituted groups do not become divorced from 
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the communities that initially formed them or they risk losing community support.
97
 
Finally, choosing to incorporate also means that groups will have to comply with tax 
legislation,
98
 reporting requirements under the Incorporated Societies Act and, for 
those who apply for charitable status, reporting requirements under the Charities Act 
2005. These requirements can all be quite onerous for groups which are often largely 
operated by volunteers.  
 
Some of the CCGs that I talked to during the course of interviewing spoke of the 
difficulties surrounding incorporation. Another issue was that the current structures 
tend to use a ―one size fits all‖ approach which applies the same requirements to 
groups with only a few members to the larger groups with many members and much 
greater resources.
99
 These issues suggest that the current legal structures do not 
adequately provide for civil society organisations such as CCGs. The Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908 is now almost 100 years old and the organisations that are now 
administered under the Act are often far different in form, and in size, than the clubs 
that existed 100 years ago. Aside from this point the Act is not a code as to what 
precisely becoming incorporated means or requires, and little guidance is provided as 
to how best to draft rules despite the importance placed on rules by the courts. The 
law surrounding charitable trusts is similarly vague and many of the principles now 
being applied to charitable trusts by the courts have arisen in contexts far removed 
from environmental activities of the 21
st
 Century. This makes it difficult to ascertain 
the outcomes should litigation arise. What all of this points to is that it may now be 
time for New Zealand to consider adopting models more suitable for use by a modern 
civil society. 
 
It is not possible to specify what structure will be best suited to all groups as the 
differing needs of groups will be determinative of what structure will meet the groups 
needs.
100
 However throughout the following sections I have tried to show some of the 
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advantages and disadvantages of the two main structures and have suggested some 
measures group members can take to ensure that the structure they choose works well 
for them and so that their project can run as smoothly as possible. Throughout the 
remainder of this section of the paper I will introduce some of the most common 
corporate structures used by CCGs and weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of 
these structures. I then will go on to discuss the experiences of CCGs with using the 
current corporate structures in practice, and the issues that some groups have had with 
the process of formalising their group structure. 
 
1. Unincorporated Society 
An unincorporated society is a group of individual members who form an association 
for a purpose other than to make a pecuniary gain,
101
 and is usually managed by a 
committee who administer the affairs of the society.
102
 It is not uncommon for groups 
carrying out community conservation work to be unincorporated societies and in 
2006 it was estimated that for every incorporated voluntary group there may be at 
least two groups that are unincorporated.
103
 For many groups the unincorporated 
society structure functions well. However when something goes wrong there may be 
implications for the members of unincorporated societies, which are not always 
considered by activity organisers and group members undertaking community work. 
 
One of the important things that members of unincorporated societies, particularly 
those managing activities, must be aware of is the potential for them to have personal 
liability for the obligations that the group has to third parties. In general, where debts 
are owing that the society is unable to pay, or legal action is taken against an 
unincorporated society, the members of the management committee may be held 
personally liable.
104
 This may include liability for ―debts, torts (negligence, nuisance, 
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occupiers‘ liability etc), and statutory obligations and offences‖.105 For example in 
Bradley Egg Farm v Clifford an action was taken against the executive committee of 
an unincorporated society when a servant of the society negligently carried out tests 
on chickens which resulted in the death of a large number of the birds. In that case the 
Court of Appeal found that the committee could be held liable because the servant 
was an agent of the committee:
106
 
It is the defendant committee who is liable as Gates‘ principals, and they are his 
principals, not because they are members of the society, but because they are the 
committee entrusted with the function of directing the activities of this unincorporated 
body and putting them into execution. 
 
Members of an unincorporated society will usually not be liable to pay monies to an 
unincorporated society beyond what they have agreed to pay in membership fees:
107
 
Clubs are associations of a peculiar nature. They are societies the members of which are 
perpetually changing. They are not partnerships; they are not associations for gain; and 
the feature which distinguishes them from other societies is that no member as such 
becomes liable to pay to the funds of the society or to anyone else any money beyond the 
subscriptions required by the rules of the club to be paid so long as he remains a 
member. 
 
However in limited circumstances members who have voted in favour of certain 
expenditure, particularly the management committee, may be liable for a share of the 
debt in the event the society is unable to pay.
108
 Alternatively if the society has rules 
and the rules provide that the members accept responsibility for its liabilities, or to 
indemnify the management committee, then the members can be liable for having 
accepted the society‘s rules.109 This also applies to incorporated societies. 
 
In the event that tortious liability arises for activities carried out by an unincorporated 
society, for example if a person is seriously injured as a result of negligent 
management of an activity, then the injured person may take an action in tort against 
the member of the society who was responsible for the tort occurring.
110
 Criminal 
liability may also arise for members of unincorporated societies organising events as 
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was demonstrated in the case of R v Andersen where a cycle race organiser was 
charged under s 145 of the Crimes Act for failing to properly advise cyclists of the 
fact that the road they were racing on was not closed to traffic.
111
 Although Ms 
Andersen was not convicted, as the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that her actions 
qualified as criminal nuisance, the case demonstrates the possible risks that activity 
organisers take if they do not take the necessary steps to protect themselves and in my 
opinion provides justification for groups to consider taking out insurance to 
indemnify group members in the event that a serious injury occurs. This is not to say 
that a victim of negligence may not still choose to take a personal action against the 
organiser of an incorporated society, possibly in conjunction with an action against 
the society. However the possibility is likely to be reduced as blame may also be 
apportioned to the society itself. This cannot occur in the case of an unincorporated 
society. 
 
Another of the major issues regarding unincorporated societies is their lack of 
separate legal personality. This has several implications for society members. One of 
the reasons why this is an issue is that an unincorporated society is unable to own 
property or borrow money in its own name,
112
 therefore any money must either be 
held by another organisation which is incorporated, or alternatively the property may 
be held on trust by members of the society.
113
 This concern was also raised in the 
interview process and was often one of the main motivations for a group to become 
incorporated. Secondly, lack of legal personality means that an unincorporated 
society is unable to take legal action or to be sued in its own name. This not only 
means that it is up to the members of the society to defend or pursue legal action of 
the society in their own names, but in the event of a judgment being awarded against 
them the committee members may be personally liable to pay any award made 
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against the group.
114
 Finally, lack of legal personality means an unincorporated 
society does not have perpetual existence beyond that of its members. This means 
that the life of the organisation may be limited to that of its members.
115
 
 
A further problem with unincorporated societies is that there is no legal requirement 
for such groups to have any type of constitution or rules as is required for societies 
incorporated under the Incorporated Societies Act. This means that many 
unincorporated groups either have no formal rules to determine how important 
matters will be dealt with, or the rules that the group has are vague or incomplete.
116
 
Therefore if a dispute arises between members of the society it is often not clear how 
the matter should be dealt with. For example, if there are no rules as to members 
rights and obligations it is difficult to determine what duties a member owes to the 
society. This may mean that the matter has to be referred to the courts for 
determination at considerable cost to all involved.
117
  
 
Because of the issues discussed above many funding agencies are reluctant to provide 
any significant amounts of funding to unincorporated groups, preferring to provide 
funding to more organised groups with formal legal structures in place and higher 
levels of accountability.
118
 To overcome the issues associated with unincorporated 
structures groups should consider the options available for incorporating. Some of 
these options are discussed below. 
 
C. Costs and Benefits of Incorporation 
Given the difficulties that may be experienced under unincorporated structures many 
groups have chosen to become incorporated with the two most common formal 
structures used by CCGs being incorporated societies and charitable trusts. 
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Incorporation not only limits the personal liability of group members but usually 
mean that the group‘s objectives and rules will be clearly defined. The process of 
incorporation requires a group to define its objectives, and shows that it is organised 
and serious about what it is doing
119
 which in turn makes the group more attractive to 
funding agencies.
120
 Importantly for conservation activities incorporation may also 
increase the ability of groups to participate in RMA processes:
121
 
[F]or example only a ‗body corporate‘ (which includes incorporated societies) can apply 
under the RMA to be a heritage protection authority. 
 
While there are significant advantages of incorporation there are, however, some 
general areas where groups can struggle to manage the obligations that formalisation 
requires. The financial requirements under the Incorporated Societies Act and the 
Charities Act can be quite onerous, particularly to the smaller groups run solely by 
volunteers,
122
 many groups struggle to successfully draft constitutions,
123
 and others 
can battle to put in place the internal management structures required to be 
successful.
124
 The next part of this chapter will discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of the corporate structures available under the Incorporated Societies 
Act and Charitable Trusts Act, and suggest some possible improvements to these 
structures with reference to literature and experiences in overseas jurisdictions. I will 
also briefly evaluate one of the other structures available in New Zealand that could 
possibly be used more often, umbrella groups. 
 
1. Incorporated Societies 
Incorporated societies, registered under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908, are the 
most common type of legal structure used by non-profit groups in New Zealand.
125
  
One of the reasons why this form of legal structure has been so popular is because it 
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allows individual members to have direct input into the running of the group, for 
example, through the group‘s Annual General Meeting (AGM).126 
 
The first step to forming an incorporated society is for the majority of group members 
to agree to becoming incorporated.
127
 It is then necessary to meet three minimum 
requirements. Firstly, in order to incorporate the group must have a minimum of 15 
adult members.
128
 Members may be either natural persons, or corporate bodies, 
however each corporate body will account for three natural persons;
129
 Secondly, 
under s 4(1) of the Incorporated Societies Act the society must be formed for a lawful 
purpose; and thirdly, the society must not be operated for the purpose of making 
pecuniary gain.
130
 This however does not prevent a society from making a profit 
provided the profit is used to further the group‘s objects and is not returned to the 
members of the society.
131
  
 
One of the significant differences between incorporated and unincorporated societies 
is that incorporated societies are required, under s 6 of the Incorporated Societies Act, 
to have rules and objects to guide the operation of the society spelled out in a 
constitutional document. The constitution is the key ―reference point‖ for those 
running an incorporated society and helps to determine how the society will be 
managed and decisions made.
132
 Section 6 of the Act sets out the minimum rules that 
an incorporated society must have, such as specific procedures on how people can 
become members of the society and how membership ceases. However, the rules are 
not limited to those specified in the Act and can include rules on other matters.
133
  
 
The rules of a society should be drafted in a manner which clearly sets out what is 
expected of the society and its members so to avoid difficulties of interpretation in the 
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event of a dispute. This is important because the rules create contractual obligations 
between the society and its members and if either party breaches the rules then the 
other party may be entitled to take legal action to have the rules enforced.
134
 The 
importance of drafting good rules and putting them into practice can be demonstrated 
by the case of Hawkes Bay and East Coast Aero Club Incorporated v Mc Leod.
135
 Mc 
Leod, a member of the club, had been injured in a plane crash and sought reparation 
for his injuries. The Aero Club, incorporated under the Incorporated Societies Act, 
had included in its rules two clauses that aimed to exclude the club from liability in 
the event that any member was injured during the use of its aircraft. The first clause 
stated that the club would ―not accept any liability for injury or damage‖ as a result of 
the use of the clubs facilities. However the second clause stated that the club would 
not be liable if the member had signed a disclaimer to exempt the club from liability. 
The court said that ―to exempt a person from liability, clear words should be used‖.136 
It was found that by reading the clauses together that the first rule became qualified 
by the second therefore because the club failed to get McLeod to sign an exemption it 
could be held liable for McLeod‘s injuries.137 
 
One of the important requirements of s 6 is that a society must state its objects in its 
rules. The objects of a society are the purposes for which the society has been 
established.
138
 Once the objects are registered it is expected that the society will 
follow them and a society that carries out activities which are beyond its objects can 
be found to have acted ultra vires.
139
 While incorporated societies are able to 
undertake actions which are reasonably necessary to the achievement of their 
specified objects, a society which has taken actions or entered into contracts which 
are outside of its objects or actions which would be reasonable to take to achieve the 
objects, then the actions may be declared void.
140
 In the event that a contract that the 
group has entered into is declared ultra vires then those committee members 
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responsible for the decision may be personally liable to the other party to the 
contract.
141
 Alternatively if the group has entered into a contract which is ultra vires 
the rules then they will be unable to enforce the contract against a third party that 
defaults.
142
 
 
Where a society intends to undertake a broad range of activities it is helpful if it keeps 
its objects broad to allow it to carry out all activities associated with the society 
otherwise members of the society or the public may be able to protest to the Registrar 
of Incorporated Societies who may request that the society refrain from the ultra vires 
activity.
143
 The Ministry of Economic Development suggests that it may be beneficial 
for incorporated societies to include in their objects a broad statement which specifies 
that the society may ―do anything necessary‖ in order to meet its objectives to avoid 
being unduly restricted by the rules if the activities of the society change.
144
 This is 
not to say that the rules of an incorporated society cannot be altered, s 21 of the 
Incorporated Societies Act specifically states that the rules may be altered in the 
manner provided by the rules and in accordance with the Act, however it is not 
uncommon for disputes to arise about whether or not the powers to alter the rules 
have been properly exercised.
145
 As will be discussed further in relation to trust 
deeds, it would be wise for incorporated societies to make it clear in the rules what 
powers the management committee have to alter the rules to try and prevent disputes 
arising in the future.
146
 
 
As alluded to above becoming incorporated helps groups to overcome many of the 
issues that members of unincorporated societies face; Firstly, it means that members 
of an incorporated society are generally free from personal liability for any contracts, 
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debts, or other obligations entered into by the society.
147
 Although this does not mean 
that the committee members will be entirely free from the possibility of legal liability, 
for example, committee members may still be liable if they enter into obligations that 
are outside of the group‘s objects.148 It is also likely that officers of an incorporated 
society will owe a duty of care to the society in a similar way to how directors of a 
company owe duties to the company.
149
 They may also owe duties to creditors of the 
society in the event that it is not able to meet its financial obligations.
150
 In this 
situation sections 297-301 and Part 17 of the Companies Act in relation to director‘s 
liability will apply irrespective of whether the committee members are paid for their 
efforts or not;
151
 Secondly, incorporated societies are entitled to enter into contracts, 
purchase and sell property, and take legal action in their own name;
152
 Thirdly, 
incorporated societies have perpetual existence which means that they will remain an 
incorporated society, beyond the involvement of particular members, provided that 
they are not removed from the register.
153
 One person I spoke to who has been 
involved in both an incorporated and an unincorporated CCG found that the 
requirements of the Incorporated Societies Act for groups to have meetings means 
that it can force a group to get together and take action whereas with an 
unincorporated group meetings may not occur on a regular basis unless there is 
someone devoted to organising them.
154
 
 
The Environmental Defence Society (EDS) advises groups it is involved with that 
before they take legal action in the Environment Court they should become registered 
as an incorporated society. There are three main reasons for this; firstly, it increases 
the credibility of the group; secondly, it increases the opportunities for the group to 
gain funding; and thirdly, if the group lose their case in the Environment Court then 
the individual members of the group are not personally liable if costs are awarded 
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against the group. Raewyn Peart of EDS said that they recommend groups become an 
incorporated society rather than a charitable trust because the incorporated society 
structure provides greater security for costs
155
 – according to Raewyn trusts fall 
somewhere in between unincorporated groups and incorporated societies and 
therefore there is greater potential for personal liability of trustees. 
 
While much of the literature I have cited, and the references I have made refer to the 
importance of incorporation, little has been said about the difficulties or challenges 
that may be encountered when a CCG moves from being unincorporated to becoming 
an incorporated society. The conversations that I had with members of some 
incorporated society groups suggested that the incorporation process itself is not at all 
plain sailing,
156
 and that once incorporated there are also increased accounting and 
management requirements for CCGs which can be quite onerous.
157
 This can be 
particularly difficult for small groups that are in the early stages of development.
158
 
Groups have to spend a significant amount of time, money, and resources to become 
incorporated due to the requirements to formulate rules, create a constitution, and 
organise a management structure. Several of the groups I talked to said that the time 
that it took for them to draft their rules and constitution was significant and slowed 
them in getting on with the restoration considerably, with one group taking 
approximately a year to debate the rules amongst the group and finalise them.
159
  It 
can also be difficult for groups starting out to be able to find the money to be able to 
pay the $100.00 fee for incorporation, and further funds to pay for a lawyer to check 
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over the documents.
160
 One CCG that I spoke to, Tui 2000, found it difficult to find 
15 members to be able to go ahead with incorporation as many of the volunteers that 
are involved in the group do not regularly participate in group activities.
161
 On the 
other hand, large groups can have difficulties with administration particularly if they 
have large management committees.
162
 
 
One of the other concerns that I had from the interview process was that there was a 
general misconception by groups incorporated under the Incorporated Societies Act 
that one of the major advantages of becoming incorporated as a society, as opposed to 
a charitable trust, was that incorporated societies were more democratic because 
members can have a direct input into the running of the group through meetings.
163
 
However it is debatable whether an incorporated society is truly ―democratic‖ in the 
sense that it was used by interviewees as decisions of the group are ultimately made 
by the management committee on behalf of the group
164
 and there is nothing in the 
Incorporated Societies Act that requires decisions to be made in a democratic way. In 
fact for some groups it is easier to manage the group without direct member input in 
decision making as this can be too time consuming. High levels of input by members 
in decision making has sometimes been found to hinder group progress because there 
can be ―too many people with too many agendas‖.165 However, Dana Brakman Reiser 
argues that internally undemocratic non-profit organisations go against what civil 
society is all about. She argues that if civil society groups do become undemocratic 
the strength of civil society is weakened and may threaten public support as a 
result.
166
 It seems that most societies are able to find a happy median between the two 
situations, however it is important to note that internal democracy is by no means 
guaranteed in an incorporated society unless it is provided for in the rules. 
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(a) Improvements 
In a meeting I had with representatives from Waikato Biodiversity Forum, 
Environment Waikato, and Biodiversity Advice Waikato, organisations that all work 
in close contact with CCGs, we discussed some of the issues that smaller CCGs have 
had with becoming incorporated. One point that arose was the lack of use of umbrella 
groups by New Zealand CCGs.
167
 An umbrella group is a group which is already 
incorporated that operates as a parent body and can receive property or funds on 
behalf of an unincorporated group. This arrangement provides some of the 
advantages of incorporation in that it may help an unincorporated group to secure 
funding and hold property without the cost of incorporation.
168
 Jan Hoverd of 
Biodiversity Adversity Waikato said that in her experience New Zealand CCGs use 
umbrella group structures infrequently and have little knowledge about this 
arrangement being available as an alternative to incorporation. She said that she 
thinks that it would be more appropriate for some of the smaller groups to use this 
type of structure, as an alternative to incorporation, as it would reduce costs and save 
the difficulties of having to find the 15 members required to incorporate.
169
 One 
example of where an umbrella group structure is being used effectively is in relation 
to Tui 2000s management of the restoration at Waiwhakareke. Tui 2000 is currently 
being used as the parent body for the project and is responsible for administering the 
projects funds on behalf of the other organisations involved. This has saved the 
parties from having to go through the process of incorporating a separate body to 
manage the project. Tui 2000 works in close contact will all of the other parties to 
ensure that the funds are being managed appropriately.
170
 Umbrella group structures 
have also been widely used in the United States by non profit groups with much 
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success.
171
 For example, the United States Land Trust Alliance (LTA) is an umbrella 
organisation of which many land American land trusts are part.
172
 
 
There are also examples from the Australian law on incorporated societies that may 
be useful to apply in New Zealand. For example, none of the Australian jurisdictions 
require that there be a minimum of 15 members for a group to become 
incorporated.
173
 In New South Wales an incorporated society need only to have five 
members to become registered.
174
 Similarly in Queensland only seven members are 
required.
175
 If New Zealand were to follow this example this would reduce the issues 
that some of the smaller groups, like Tui 2000, experience when trying to find 15 
members. It may also be helpful for there to be a set of model rules annexed to the 
Incorporated Societies Act which groups could adopt or modify for their purposes.
176
 
This would prevent every group from having to draft their rules from scratch 
therefore saving time and money and helping prevent groups from using poorly 
drafted rules.
177
 Some of the groups that I spoke with suggested that it would be 
helpful if there were a set of rules drafted specifically with CCGs in mind as general 
rules which may be appropriate for other societies often are not appropriate for 
environmental purposes.
178
 In some of the Australian states model rules are annexed 
to the statutes and groups can choose to adopt these rules in their standard form or to 
modify them to meet their needs. For example, the Queensland Associations 
Incorporation Act 1981 provides a set of model rules that can be used if the society 
does not chose to create its own rules.
179
 If New Zealand were to adopt such a model 
New Zealand CCGs would be greatly assisted through their early developmental 
stages. 
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2. Charitable Societies and Trusts 
The other main forms of corporate structure which can be used by CCGs are 
charitable trusts which can incorporate either in a trust or society form.
180
 Charitable 
trusts are formed for the purposes of providing a benefit to the public and in order to 
qualify as a charitable trust, and to receive the associated tax and other benefits, the 
activities of the trust must be shown to be charitable and for the ―public benefit‖.181 
Sections CW34 and CW35 of the Income Tax Act 2004, which provide tax 
exemptions for income of charitable entities, also specifically state that in order to 
qualify for tax exemptions the charitable society or trust must be established for 
―charitable purposes‖. However before any further discussion on how charitable 
trusts operate in New Zealand it is first necessary to consider some of the historical 
background to charitable trusts to help gain an understanding of how trusts work. In a 
later section I will also evaluate the implications of the recently enacted Charities Act 
2005. 
 
To date there has been no clear statutory definition in New Zealand of exactly what a 
charity is for legal purposes
182
 and current interpretations continue to rely on the 
Charitable Uses Act 1601 (sometimes referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth I or the 
Poor Relief Act 1601) for guidance as to what is charitable.
183
 In the case of Special 
Commissioners of Income Tax v Pemsel the House of Lords summarised the classes 
of charitable purpose from the Charitable Uses Act into four categories known as the 
four heads of charity:
184
 
―Charity‖ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of 
poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; 
and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the 
preceding heads.  
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To qualify as a charity groups must be able to fit within one of the above four 
categories of charity.
185
 The range of activities which can fit within this fourth head is 
quite broad and in most cases restoration groups who wish to incorporate as a 
charitable trust would qualify under the fourth head of charity, ‗other purposes 
beneficial to the community‘, as conservation activities are considered to have 
charitable purposes beneficial to the community.
186
 For example in Re Verrall a trust 
with the purpose of ―promoting the permanent preservation for the benefit of the 
nation of lands and tenements (including buildings) of beauty or historic interest, and 
as regards lands for the preservation of their natural aspect, features, and 
characteristics‖ was held to be charitable following Pemsel. 187 In the New Zealand 
case of Re Bruce the Court of Appeal held that a trust for the purposes of 
afforestation was valid as it could be considered to have a charitable objective.
188
 
Similarly in Kaikoura County Council v Boyd it was held that a trust for the 
improvement and protection of the Waimangarara River was charitable within the 
fourth head of Pemsel.
189
 In DV Bryant Trust Board v Hamilton City Council it was 
found that it is important that a certain degree of flexibility is maintained to allow 
new classes of activity to fit within the definition of charitable as the needs of society 
change.
190
 Based on the case law discussed above it is likely that trusts for the 
purposes of restoration can be valid charitable trusts, although as it appears that the 
charitable status of a restoration trust has not yet been tested in the New Zealand 
courts it is hard to say with certainty what approach will be taken. Guidance as to the 
possible interpretation of the New Zealand courts may be ascertained from the 
approach of other common law jurisdictions that have made favourable decisions in 
similar situations. For example, in the Australian case of Attorney-General (NSW) v 
Sawtell
191
 Holland J held, following the Charitable Uses Act and Pemsel, that a trust 
for ―the preservation of native wildlife, flora, and fauna‖ was beneficial to the 
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community and therefore could be upheld as a valid charitable trust.
192
 Similar 
findings have been made in the United Kingdom in Scott v National Trust.
193
 
 
The test of whether or not a trust is charitable does not end there however, and there 
are three further requirements that must be met for a charitable trust to meet the 
requirements of charity law:
194
 
These are: that the trust must be for a public purpose, that it must be for the public 
benefit, and that it must be capable of being controlled by the Court, if necessary. 
 
Activities which benefit a local community as a whole and fall within the ―spirit and 
intendment‖ of the preamble to the Charitable Uses Act are likely to meet the first 
requirement if they are for a public purpose and are not limited to a narrow class of 
individuals.
195
 The second test, the public benefit test, is harder to define as whether 
or not an activity is for the public benefit is determined by the courts on the facts of 
the case.
196
 For example in New Zealand Society of Accountants v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue the Court of Appeal held that the fidelity funds of the New Zealand 
Society of Accountants and the New Zealand Law Society were not charitable as they 
did not have objects beneficial to the community. The court felt that those who 
benefited from the fund were too narrow a group to meet the public benefit test.
197
 In 
Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commissioner of State Revenue the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal held that the Australian Conservation 
Foundation was ―serving purposes beneficial to the community by being devoted to 
the conservation of the environment‖.198 Further the Tribunal found that conservation 
of the environment was within the spirit and intendment of the preamble to the 
Statute of Elizabeth.
199
 Despite having ancillary political purposes the group‘s 
purposes were held to be charitable.
200
  
                                                     
192
 Attorney-General (NSW) v Sawtell [1978] NSWLR 200, 209, 214. 
193
 Scott v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1998] 2 All ER 705, 710. 
194
 N. Richardson (ed.), Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration (9th Edition) (2004) 119. 
195
 von Dadelszen, supra n 102 at 233; N. Richardson, supra n 194 at 121. 
196
 N. Richardson, supra n 194 at 123. 
197
 New Zealand Society of Accountants v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 1 NZLR 147, 153. 
198
 Australian Conservation Foundation Inc v Commissioner of State Revenue [2002] VCAT 1491, 
para 11. 
199
 Ibid, para 12. 
200
 Ibid, para 23. 
40 
 
 
One of the major advantages of charitable trusts as opposed to express trusts is that 
charitable trusts do not have to meet the ―three certainties‖ test.201 An express trust is 
a trust that has been made by a person who has shown an intention to create a trust 
(the testator or settlor) by gifting his or her property to another. This type of trust 
usually arises out of a will upon the death of the testator.
202
 To create an express trust 
it is necessary for all three certainties to exist; certainty of intention; certainty of 
subject matter; and certainty of objects.
203
 Charitable trusts are not burdened by this 
requirement therefore are not as easy to defeat as express trusts. Charitable trusts also 
overcome the rule against perpetuities which normally prevents a trust from lasting in 
perpetuity. This means that charitable trusts can last perpetually.
204
 These exceptions 
are made so that it is easier to manage charitable trusts and so that it is harder to 
defeat them.
205
 Because the common law position on whether or not CCGs are 
charitable in New Zealand is not clear it may be worthwhile for the position to be 
statutorily defined. 
 
Under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 there are two ways for an organisation to 
become registered. Firstly, under s 7 ―trustees of any trust which is exclusively or 
principally for charitable purposes‖ can apply to the registrar for the group to be 
incorporated as a charitable trust board. Secondly, ―a society which exists exclusively 
or principally for charitable purposes‖ may also apply to be registered as a charitable 
trust board under s 8 of the Act, provided it is not already incorporated under any 
other Act. The main structure chosen under the Charitable Trusts Act by CCGs was s 
7 charitable trust, although charitable societies are another option that groups could 
potentially use if they wish to use an alternative model with the benefits of the trust 
structure.
206
 It is important to note however that these two variations under the 
Charitable Trusts Act result in the creation of two rather different types of 
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organisation in the legal sense and groups must make a carefully reasoned decision 
about what structure will best meet their needs before choosing to incorporate as 
either a charitable society or trust.
207
As will be discussed in further detail below, it is 
also worth noting that incorporated societies may now apply for charitable status 
under the Charities Act 2005 in order to claim the income tax advantages associated 
with charitable status.  
 
Similarly to the Incorporated Societies Act, trust boards that choose to incorporate 
under the Charitable Trusts Act gain the benefits of perpetual succession and separate 
legal personality under s 13 of the Act. Therefore trust boards are able to hold 
property, to sue and to be sued.
208
 Under s 21 of the Charitable Trusts Act the trust 
board of the charitable trust hold on trust, and deal with the property of the group, on 
behalf of the trusts beneficiaries.  Section 19 also authorises the trust board to enter 
into contracts on behalf of the trust. The separate legal personality of the trust board 
may help to protect the individual members of the board from personal liability for 
the responsibilities of the board however this protection is not absolute and the 
trustees will remain liable in certain circumstances if the trust board is not correctly 
managed.
209
 Similarly, if a trustee has acted ultra vires then there is potential for him 
or her to be personally liable to the trust if the trust suffers a loss as a result of the 
ultra vires act.
210
  
 
Of the groups I spoke to that had incorporated as charitable trusts the majority found 
that the trust structure has worked well. The tax free status of charitable trusts was 
cited as a major advantage of this structure and similarly to incorporated societies 
formalising the group‘s structure as a trust has helped to secure funding.211 
Incorporating as a charitable trust or society may also be more suitable for smaller 
groups, and can help them to overcome the issues some groups face with finding the 
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number of members required to incorporate under the Incorporated Societies Act, by 
requiring groups to only have two trustees for a charitable trust or five members for a 
charitable society.
212
 There is also no fee to pay to the Registrar for a group which 
decides to incorporate under the Charitable Trusts Act so this may be one of the other 
benefits of choosing to incorporate under this Act, although as it is usual practice to 
have the trust deed or rules prepared by a lawyer there will remain to be some cost to 
this process.
213
 Trusts may also be cheaper to operate than some of the other forms of 
structure available and ―attract few formalities or administrative complexities‖.214 
 
Because of their charitable status charitable trusts are provided with a number of 
benefits under law.
215
 As part of the incorporation process under the Charitable Trusts 
Act s 10 requires the creation of a trust deed or similar document which sets out the 
rules of the group. However, unlike the Incorporated Societies Act, the Charitable 
Trusts Act does not provide any guidance as to how these documents should be 
structured. This could potentially create the difficulties described above in relation to 
rules of unincorporated societies, as groups may have difficulty defining their rules in 
a clear and effective manner. One group I spoke to has found that it has taken a 
significant amount of time to draft a trust deed due to the lack of guidance available 
and the sample trust documents available on the internet were described as ―lacking 
teeth‖.216 It is also important for groups to know that under s 61 of the Charitable 
Trusts Act alteration of the rules, or other founding documents, of a trust is prohibited 
unless it has been provided for by those documents or is ordered by the courts. In 
order to prevent disputes from arising in relation to the ability groups to alter their 
rules it is important for groups to be aware of this provision and make allowances in 
the rules so the rules can be altered at a later date if the needs of the group change.
217
 
 
                                                     
212
 Chapple, supra n 121 at 24. 
213
 von Dadelszen, supra n 102 at 225. 
214
 Dal Pont, supra n 186 at 365. 
215
 Watson, supra n 113 at 646. 
216
 Meeting with Nancy Jensen, Otorohanga Zoological Society, 17/05/07. 
217
 Agmen-Smith and von Dadelszen, supra n 92 at 31. 
43 
 
As is the case with incorporated societies it is vital that the trust deed of a charitable 
trust records in writing exactly how the trust is to be managed and to explain in detail 
the rights and obligation of the trustees. For example, in Manukau City Council v 
Lawson it was held that the trustees duties must be ascertained by interpreting the 
trust deed in the way that it would be understood by a reasonable person with all the 
background knowledge that the parties had when the trust deed was entered into and 
the interpretation must give effect to the natural and ordinary meaning of the deed.
218
  
A case which is also useful to mention here is Sherry v Attorney General.
219
 In Sherry 
the question was whether the trustees had authority to adjust the trust deed. The trust 
deed provided that the trustees could in limited circumstances amend the trust deed. 
The trust deed foresaw the potential that in the lifetime of the trust amendments of 
that nature would be acceptable therefore Harrison J approved the changes.
220
 This 
case highlights the importance of drafting a trust deed to meet the requirements of the 
group in two ways. Firstly, if those founding the trust wish to restrain the powers of 
trustees to alter the rules in the future then this must be made certain when the rules 
are drafted. Secondly, it shows that if rules are made flexible so that the trustees can 
easily amend them then in may be more straight forward for the group to amend the 
rules as its circumstances change without the need to refer the matter to the courts. 
 
One of the difficulties that have been described in the literature on charitable trusts 
incorporated under s 7 of the Charitable Trusts Act is that the trust board structure can 
be found by members of a group to be exclusionary as trustees are not required to 
answer to group members.
221
 It is believed that there is a general misunderstanding 
―that a trust is a body that can have a membership‖.222 However, trusts are not 
membership based but are managed by the trust board on behalf of the trusts 
beneficiaries. It is the trustees who make the decisions on behalf of the trust in 
accordance with the trust deed, or in the case of a charitable society its rules, not 
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members of a group.
223
 This does not mean that the trustees are free to make 
decisions for the trust as they please. On the contrary, the duties of trustees to manage 
the trust in accordance with the trust deed are onerous and in the event that the 
trustees breach their legal duties by managing the trust inappropriately then they can 
be personally liable for the breach and will not be protected simply because the trust 
is incorporated.
224
 Trustees managing charitable trusts are also bound by the law on 
trusts in the same way as trustees managing any other variety of trust, therefore 
obligations such as those under the Trustee Act 1956 also apply.
225
 It is important that 
new trustees are aware of their obligations under the law and have made themselves 
familiar with the objects of the trust and any other information relevant to the 
functioning of the trust.
226
 
 
3. Charities Act 2005 
The Charities Act 2005 was enacted as a means of assisting the government to 
maintain public trust and confidence in the charitable sector by requiring 
charitable entities to become registered and meet certain accounting requirements 
in order to gain the tax benefits conferred by charitable status.
227
 Section 8 of the 
Charities Act establishes the Charities Commission as the body responsible for the 
registering and monitoring of charitable entities, including societies and charitable 
trusts.
228
 Under s 10(1) of the Act the commission is given a broad range of 
functions including; promoting ―public trust and confidence in the charitable 
sector‖; encouraging and promoting the ―effective use of charitable resources‖; 
and educating and assisting charities in relation to ―matters of good governance 
and management‖.  
 
Registration with the Charities Commission is voluntary; however from 1 July 
2008 charitable entities must register with the Charities Commission in order to 
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continue receiving the tax benefits conferred by CW34 and CW35 of the Income 
Tax Act 2004.
229
 Section 13 of the Charities Act sets out the essential requirements 
that the charitable entity must meet to qualify for registration. This includes the 
requirement that the entity be formed for a charitable purpose. The 2005 Act 
expands the common law definition of ―charitable purpose‖ to include: 230  
[E]very charitable purpose, whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of 
education or religion, or any other matter beneficial to the community. 
 
However the activities of the group must also be able to meet the public benefit 
test.
231
 
 
There are two key reporting obligations imposed on groups registered under the 
Charities Act. Firstly, under s 40(1) a charitable entity must notify the Charities 
Commission if the details of the group on the register change, for example if the 
group decides to change its name or if its officers change. Secondly, groups are 
required by s 41 to file an annual return. Groups that I spoke to did not think that 
these requirements were too onerous and in many cases would not require the 
group to take any actions in excess of what they currently do to comply with the 
Incorporated Societies Act. However one group that I spoke to said that there was 
an excessive number of forms that have to be filled in as it is necessary to 
complete one for each board member. This involves much repetition as the 
information on each form is largely the same and as the forms have to be filled in 
by hand this was a waste of time.
232
 
 
D. Group Management and Planning 
Another theme that recurred in the interviews I conducted was the importance of 
groups having good management and a good leader. Successful groups usually have a 
few key individuals who help to hold the group together and ensure that the necessary 
work gets done. Leaders must also be willing to take into account the input of other 
group members and to involve them in the decision making process. This helps to 
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facilitate group support for decisions.
233
 Having a good management committee was 
also cited as one of the keys to success with several participants saying that it can be 
helpful for there to be people on the committee with a range of different skills, from 
accounts management to being able to write reports and funding applications. Others 
stressed the importance of having a good management plan in order to secure funding 
and to keep to the management plan so that the work the group does is strategic.
234
 
The literature on management structures reiterated the comments made by the groups 
that I spoke to. The general perception was that in order to ensure accountability to 
funding agencies management structures in the voluntary sector are increasingly 
being expected to be modelled on management structures from the government or 
corporate sectors.
235
 
 
Jan Simmons, who works for DoC as a community group advisor, finds that there are 
two approaches to group management that can be successful. Firstly, some groups do 
much of their strategic planning prior to beginning work. This can help the group set 
clear objectives and can be necessary for funding applications or if groups are 
planning on carrying out such activities as translocation of birds. However if too 
much time is spent on the planning phases then members of the community may lose 
enthusiasm.
236
 The second approach is to start working and then do the planning work 
as it becomes necessary. Jan said that there are some groups who get started and then 
realise that it will be necessary to undertake a certain amount of strategic planning as 
the project grows so that the group can determine where the project will go to next.
237
 
One way that management planning can contribute to group success is by providing 
clear guidance as to the future direction of the group.
238
 This helps to ensure that the 
CCG stays focused on their goals and achieve their objectives.
239
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Another interesting concern of some groups is planning for succession. Several 
participants commented that it can be hard to find replacements for committee 
members in CCGs, particularly for the role of group coordinator or chairperson.
240
 In 
smaller Waikato communities it can be hard for groups to find the people who are 
prepared to join the committee when other members leave.
241
 The groups that I spoke 
to thought that it would be wise to ensure that there is a secondary person who is 
knowledgeable in group matters who can step into the chairperson role if the 
chairperson has to leave the group on short notice.
242
  
 
E. Conflict of Interest 
Members of a group who serve on the management committee or trust board of a 
CCG are placed in a fiduciary relationship where by virtue of their position of trust 
and confidence duties are owed to the organisation to disclose any conflicts of interest 
that arise between other interests of the member and their duties to the group.
243
 In R 
v Gough it was held that the test for determining whether there is a conflict between 
interest and duty is whether ―there was a real danger of bias‖.244 This test has been 
accepted and applied by New Zealand courts.
245
 Liability can arise even if the trustee 
or committee member has not intended to act in bad faith.
246
 
 
The duties of trustees to avoid conflict of interest were explored in detail in Collinge 
v Kyd
247
 and the principles enunciated in that case are relevant to the trustees of 
CCGs. Mr Collinge was a trustee of the Auckland Energy Consumer Trust, Mr Kyd 
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was the trusts chairperson. Mr Collinge and his wife acquired a number of shares in 
the company Vector. A situation arose where Mr Collinge would be required to vote 
on a matter affecting Vector. The deed of the trust provided that a trustee must not 
vote on a decision in which he or she is materially interested. The question in this 
case was whether or not Mr Collinge should be able to vote on a trust decision that 
could potentially affect the value of his shares or whether his participation in the 
voting would constitute a conflict of interest. Patterson J stated that where a trustee 
allows his or her duties to conflict with his or her own interests a breach of fiduciary 
duty may occur, in particular that:
248
 
[A] decision maker should not be influenced or appear to be influenced, either 
consciously or unconsciously, by an interest which he or she may have.  
 
Accordingly the court found that the nature of Mr Collinge‘s interest in Vector meant 
that he was materially interested in the Vector decision therefore he should not be 
permitted to vote. 
 
In the recent case of Diagnostic Medlab Ltd v Auckland District Health Board Asher 
J stated that a conflict of interest will arise when ―a person carries out a particular 
function with two or more interests in conflict‖249: 
In administrative law, a conflict of interest exists when a person has a private interest in 
a decision where that person also has a public role. In such a case the person‘s public 
role and private interest are in conflict. The result can be a poor decision because private 
concerns that have nothing to do with the public duty have influenced the decision.
250
 
 
This means that a person who owes fiduciary duties to a particular organisation may 
not ―put himself or herself in a position where his or her interest and duty conflict‖.251  
 
Because New Zealand is such a small country it is often hard for people to avoid 
conflicts of interest arising between their work and community activities.
252
 In many 
CCGs there is a close relationship between the group and government departments. 
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For a number of groups staff from DoC, or a local council, are integral members of 
the group either because they are a member of the group‘s management committee or 
through the provision of advice, information, resources, and support. The danger that 
arises here is that there may be conflicts of interest between the persons role in the 
CCG and their role as a staff member of a government body, for example, if the 
member is required to act in the best interests of a charitable trust or society in 
conflict with his or her duties to a local council.
253
  
 
Of the people that I spoke to during the interview process the majority of people who 
saw conflicts of interest as being an issue thought that this was unfortunate due to the 
significant contribution that staff from government departments can make to the 
success of restoration projects.
254
 Many of the people that I spoke to said that the 
conflict of interest issue does not usually arise as staff and members generally 
understand the potential for conflict between their roles in the community and in their 
work, and will declare a conflict of interest or step down from the role in the event 
that there are any concerns.
255
 Therefore it is important to recognise that merely 
because a person has a role where there is potential for conflict of interest that an 
actual conflict of interest will not necessarily exist, particularly if the potential 
conflict is well managed. Justice Asher acknowledged this in the Diagnostic Medlab 
case: 
256
 
A conflict of interest can be benign where the person who is conflicted does not 
participate in making the actual decision and the decision-makers know about and 
understand the conflict. If the conflict is declared, the decision-makers can stand the 
conflicted person down in respect of certain matters, or consider input from the 
conflicted person while making appropriate allowances for the conflict. The ability to 
compensate for the conflict cannot extend to voting, however, where the conflicted 
person could directly influence the outcome or decision.  
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One of the key duties of a committee member whose work duties may conflict 
with their role on the board or management committee of a CCG is to disclose the 
interest to the other members of the board. This is not where the duty ends 
however and the member must also disclose the ―nature‖ of the conflict so that the 
extent of the conflict is clear to the other members.
257
 Once the conflict has been 
declared the group can then determine how it will be managed.
258
 
 
It is important for the success of CCGs that they maintain public support, both in 
order to secure funding, and to gain volunteer support. One of the important 
elements of maintaining public support is to ensure that the perception of conflict 
of interest does not damage the group‘s public image.259 Where there is a public 
perception that a conflict of interest exists this can potentially be as damaging to 
the groups reputation as if there was an actual conflict as the media and members 
of the public will often portray the conflict in a way that is far worse than the 
actual ―offence‖.260 The Nature Conservancy in the United States had an 
experience in 2003 where a perceived conflict of interest gave rise to significant 
media criticism that could have severely damaged the group‘s reputation. These 
criticisms led to considerable restructuring of the trusts practices in order to 
maintain its public credibility.
261
 
 
From the interviews I conducted there were also some examples from groups which 
show the potential for conflict of interest concerns to cause legal implications for 
CCGs. Firstly, Wayne Todd, the project coordinator for Moehau Environment Group 
(MEG), said that there were members of the community who suggested that there 
were conflicts of interest within MEG which compromised its independence. Wayne 
said that certain members of the community have a negative perception of 
government authorities and felt that the close relationship between MEG, 
Environment Waikato, and DoC meant that MEG was representing the interests of 
                                                     
257
 Ibid, 832. 
258
 Office of the Auditor-General, supra n 252 at 8. 
259
 K. Liegal, Avoiding Conflicts of Interest and Running an Ethical Land Trust (2006) 22. 
260
 State Services Commission, Walking the Line: Managing Conflicts of Interest (2005) 41. 
261
 Liegal, supra n 259 at 75. 
51 
 
the government rather that those of the local community. This has never been the 
case. Wayne said that MEG sees itself as an independent organisation representing 
the local landowners, but because of the close relationship between the group and 
these government bodies conflict of interest has been of concern to some members of 
the community who formed a group that successfully opposed a pest proof fence that 
MEG had proposed.
262
 This example shows how the impression that there is a 
conflict of interest can be damaging to a groups reputation and its ability to get work 
done. 
 
The second example, which can help to show an area where groups should be 
cautious, was from Pirongia Te Aroaro O Kahu Restoration Society. Clare St Pierre, 
the group‘s chairperson, explained a situation where a conflict of interest had 
potential to cause an issue for their group. She said that the person who does most of 
the pest control in the town of Pirongia, and also for the group, is a member of the 
groups committee. Clare said that the group is always cautious to declare the 
relationship between the group the pest controller when they make applications for 
pest management funding however a conflict arose when the group called for tenders 
for a pest management project they were planning. The group called for tenders for 
the project and set a cut off date. The committee member had failed to place a tender 
by the specified date so the time period was extended to allow him to place a tender. 
Another pest control contractor who had complied with the terms of the original 
tender, and who was also on the committee, complained and the group decided it 
should honour their original tender and give the complying tender the contract.
263
 
This situation highlights the possibility for conflicts of interest where members of a 
committee are also closely involved in conservation work through their employment. 
The issue in this case was resolved amicably and Clare said that it is unlikely that 
either tenderer would have taken legal action. However had this not been so there 
could have been considerable legal costs for the group. Clare also said that the group 
were mindful that if the situation was not dealt with carefully the group could have 
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lost credibility in the community and with contractors and that this could have 
tarnished the image of the group as a whole. She said that the group relies on the 
goodwill of the local community and that this could be lost if the community gained 
the impression that the society does not manage its business dealings properly.
264
  
 
To help deal with the conflict of interest issues in CCGs it is important that members, 
who are involved in the management side of the group, are aware what a conflict of 
interest means and what their responsibilities are under conflict of interest law.
265
 In 
New Zealand the Auditor-General has published a series of publications that provide 
guidance for members of local authorities
266
 and staff of public entities
267
 as to how 
they should manage potential conflicts of interest. The State Services Commission 
has also released a resource booklet into managing conflicts of interest.
268
 Both of 
these resources may prove useful for members of CCGs who also have a public role. 
Another measure that can be used to help overcome some of the issues associated 
with conflicts of interest is for a group to have a written conflicts of interest policy. 
This helps to make it clear exactly what is required by members of the group, when 
conflicts of interest should be disclosed, and how these conflicts should be 
managed.
269
 Where there is potential for a serious conflict of interest that is likely to 
be ongoing and may affect the credibility of the group then it is wise for a person not 
to be involved directly in the management committee or board or there may be 
damaging consequences for the group as a result of a negative public perception. In 
the United States the Land Trust Alliance has created an online tutorial on conflicts of 
interest and has made other resources on conflicts of interest available through their 
website so that its members can gain a better understanding of what a conflict of 
interest is and how to manage one.
270
 A similar resource would be beneficial to New 
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Zealand CCGs and perhaps could be produced by the State Services Commission in 
addition to the resources that are currently available. 
 
F. Conclusion: 
As has been shown by this part of my thesis corporate issues can create a very real 
concern for members and management committees of CCGs. The failure of New 
Zealand law to adequately take into consideration the needs of our smaller CCGs with 
respect to providing suitable corporate structures makes it necessary for us to 
consider alternative models for incorporation. This may be as simple as requiring 
fewer members for a group to become incorporated. It would also not require 
substantial revision of the current law for development of rules and trust deeds to be 
made easier by annexing model rules to the current statutes as has occurred overseas. 
 
Conflict of interest is a more difficult issue to erase from the list of CCG concerns. 
However if it is properly managed then it should not create serious concerns for 
groups. A substantial part of ensuring that a conflict of interest does not create an 
issue for a group is for the group to put in place policies that make it clear to the 
committee or trust board what a conflict of interest is, when a potential conflict 
should be declared, and that if it cannot be resolved then the member should stand 
aside from that decision. 
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PART THREE: LAND MANAGEMENT ISSUES FOR COMMUNITY 
CONSERVATION GROUPS 
 
A. Resource Management Act 1991 
Throughout the remainder of this paper I will be referring to a number of the different 
provisions of the RMA. This part of the paper is to introduce the RMA to provide the 
background for the discussions that will follow. As one of New Zealand‘s leading 
pieces of environmental legislation the RMA is one of the key statutes that must be 
considered in respect to ecosystem restoration. The key sections of the Act are 
sections 5-8. Other sections key to restoration are covered in detail in the discussions 
that follow. Section 5 sets out the purpose of the RMA as ―to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources‖: 
In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, development, and 
protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate, which enables people 
and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for 
their health and safety while— 
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and 
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the 
environment. 
 
Section 6 sets out a number of matters of national importance that must be considered 
by those exercising functions and powers under the Act. These include: 
(a) The preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment (including the 
coastal marine area), wetlands, and lakes and rivers and their margins, and the protection 
of them from inappropriate subdivision, use, and development: 
(b) The protection of outstanding natural features and landscapes from inappropriate 
subdivision, use, and development: 
(c) The protection of areas of significant indigenous vegetation and significant habitats 
of indigenous fauna: 
(d) The maintenance and enhancement of public access to and along the coastal marine 
area, lakes, and rivers: 
(e) The relationship of Maori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, 
water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga. 
[(f) the protection of historic heritage from inappropriate subdivision, use, and 
development.] 
[(g) the protection of recognised customary activities.] 
 
These matters are clearly of significance to the restoration of indigenous ecosystems 
in New Zealand and help to provide a basis upon which regulation to protect 
ecosystems can be justified. Section 7 covers other matters that decision makers must 
pay particular regard to when making decisions under the Act. Of particular 
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importance with regards to ecosystem restoration is s 7(d) which requires the 
consideration of the ―intrinsic values of ecosystems‖. Finally section 8, which will be 
discussed in more detail below, sets out how Treaty of Waitangi obligations should 
be considered. 
 
B. Legal Protection for Restoration Projects 
1. Introduction 
Within the vision of many of New Zealand‘s CCGs is a goal to help restore and 
conserve New Zealand‘s native biodiversity so that it can be enjoyed for future 
generations. A number of legislative and regulatory measures have been put in place 
to help ensure that significant natural areas on both public and private land are 
protected. However one of the issues that came up both in the interviews that I 
conducted and in the literature on ecosystem restoration was the fact that some CCGs 
are failing, for a variety of reasons, to gain protection for the areas of land that they 
are restoring. This part of this paper will explore the reasons why some groups are 
failing to acquire formal legal protection for their projects and will explain the 
possible implications of this. I will also provide a brief overview of the legal 
mechanisms currently available to provide protection for restoration projects and 
evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of these mechanisms. Finally, I will suggest 
some ways that the law could be modified to help ensure that restoration works can 
be legally protected for future generations. 
 
2. Protection on Private Land 
While a significant proportion of New Zealand‘s restoration activities take place on 
public land, there are also a large number of groups undertaking restoration work on 
private land. Ensuring protection of ecosystems on a wide scale requires legislative 
and regulatory instruments to consider a broader environment than just focussing on 
publicly owned lands but must also take into account the importance of ecosystems 
on privately owned land. Considering ecosystem management in a broader scale can 
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help to ensure the integrity of a wider range of ecosystem elements.
271
 Restoration on 
private land is an important factor in maintaining New Zealand‘s biodiversity as there 
are significant habitats on private land that are not necessarily represented within the 
public conservation estate.
272
 Small fragments of native bush on private land often 
provide linkages between larger ecosystems and can be important stepping stones for 
species travelling between larger ecosystems.
273
 Ensuring that ecosystems existing on 
private land are afforded adequate legal protection on a long term basis
274
  is vital to 
ensuring that the diversity of New Zealand‘s indigenous ecosystems is maintained 
because many important ecosystems are present on land that is not necessarily 
represented in public conservation lands.
275
  
 
To date co-operation between CCGs, landowners, and government agencies has 
already resulted in over 245 landowners in the Waikato region taking steps to legally 
protect areas of native bush on their land through such mechanisms as QEII open 
space covenants and nga whenua rahui kawenata.
276
 However significant areas of 
natural habitat exist on private land without any protection and some lack the 
maintenance required to ensure their long term viability. To increase the level of 
protection and restoration on private land Mairi Jay of Tui 2000 and Friends of 
Barrett Bush suggests that more should be done to encourage private landowners to 
get involved or to allow community groups onto their land to do the work.
277
 
 
A recurring theme in the interviews I conducted, and in the literature that I studied, 
was that in many cases protection of restoration sites is largely due to the goodwill of 
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landowners and their choice to informally protect native ecosystems on their land,
278
 
or because it has not yet been considered economic to develop the land.
279
 While the 
goodwill of a landowner in providing a licence for protection may ensure an informal 
safeguard during the tenure of that landowner, unless formal legal protection is 
sought also, then there is no guarantee that protection will be maintained into the 
future.
280
 In most cases the agreement is what can be described as a bare licence, ―a 
privilege granted by one person to another to do something which would otherwise be 
unlawful‖, which can generally be revoked at any time.281 A current or future 
landowner may withdraw the licence rights and therefore have a detrimental effect on 
the ability of a group to protect conservation areas. Therefore it is desirable for 
groups carrying out restoration projects on private land to take all available steps to 
facilitate the adoption of legal protection of the site. 
 
However, while legal protection may appear, prima facie, to be a simple solution to 
ensure that restoration plantings are maintained in perpetuity, closer examination of 
the current protection mechanisms shows that these instruments are not always easily 
accessible to CCGs and may prevent formal protection being sought. High 
implementation costs can discourage landowners and put protection mechanisms 
outside of the means of some CCGs.
282
 Many of the schemes currently available also 
lack the funding they need to be able to expand their activities to a broader scale.
283
 
 
3. Protection Measures for Private Land 
Studies of restoration activities on private land in different countries suggest that 
there is no one mechanism which can, in isolation, effectively ensure biodiversity on 
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private land is maintained, restored and managed.
284
 Rather what is required is an 
integrated approach which uses a mixture of policy instruments to ensure that there is 
a backup if some of the mechanisms have weaknesses and fail to achieve the 
expected outcome, without resorting to the ―kitchen sink‖ approach.285 The mixture 
must also include a combination of ―carrots and sticks‖, incentives and regulation.286 
Neil Gunningham and Mike Young have used the analogy of aircraft design to 
explain the need for an integrated policy mix to protect biodiversity on private 
land.
287
 
The logic is similar to that of aircraft design. Because of the consequences of the failure 
of a single system without backup would be catastrophic, aircraft design deliberately 
incorporates multiple systems to compensate for the possible failure of any one in 
particular. Generally, those mixes that involve more rather than fewer instruments are 
likely to be more effective in preventing irreversible loss. Put differently, emphasis on 
dependability and precaution means that the most effective instrument mix will include 
mechanisms and instruments that appear to be redundant because, from time to time, 
some are expected to fail. 
 
It is also important that consideration is given to how the range of instruments will 
interact with each other, as some instrument combinations will be complementary 
whereas others may be counterproductive.
288
 Gunningham and Sinclair propose that 
the range of instruments used should be sequenced. This means that where one type 
of instrument fails there should be a complementary method of protection available to 
back up the voluntary and less ―interventionist‖ mechanisms. For example, where 
protection by covenant fails, there should be regulations in place to ensure that there 
is a back up form of obtaining protection.
289
 
 
Landowners are unlikely to respond well to mechanisms that they consider as a threat 
to their economic well being, for example, mechanisms that require parts of their land 
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to be taken out of production or decrease the value of the land.
290
 Therefore in order 
to increase landowner acceptance of conservation mechanisms it is important to 
decrease the financial risks associated with their uptake. This is where financial 
incentives are important.
291
 Management is also an essential part of restoring 
biodiversity therefore in considering what instruments will be appropriate for the 
protection of conservation areas it is necessary to provide for the ongoing 
management of the protected area.
292
 To help facilitate on-going management it is 
important that when developing a scheme consultation is undertaken with the 
landowners who will be affected in an attempt to secure their support.
293
  
 
New Zealand has a variety of legal mechanisms in place which aim to ensure long 
term protection of biodiversity on private land. These instruments have some 
potential for protecting restoration projects carried out by CCGs on private land. 
However, while these measures have protected large tracts of native habitat and 
wildlife there are still significant gaps which decrease the effectiveness of the 
legislative and regulatory framework for biodiversity conservation and protection on 
private land. In this section I will evaluate the mechanisms currently used in New 
Zealand to protect conservation areas on private land. I will then move on to a 
discussion of some possible improvements to New Zealand law in this area with 
examples from overseas jurisdictions. 
 
(a) Conservation Covenants and other current mechanisms 
One method commonly used to protect conservation areas on private land is 
conservation covenants. Covenants are defined as being ―a promise made under a 
seal, that is, in a deed‖.294 Conservation covenants are voluntary agreements, entered 
into usually between a government agency or covenanting organisation, for the 
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protection and/or management of biodiversity on private land.
295
 Ownership of the 
property is maintained by the landowner while an interest in the land is provided to 
the covenanting body.
296
 Covenants for conservation purposes are available in New 
Zealand under the Conservation Act 1987, the Reserves Act 1977, the Queen 
Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977 (QEII Trust Act), and in some areas 
through the local authorities as a condition of subdivision consents.
297
 
 
While QEII publications generally state that covenants are registered on the title of a 
property, in a technical sense covenants are actually noted on the title of the property 
upon which the protected area is located to give notice to those who search the 
register of the covenants existence.
298
 With the exception of nga whenua rahui 
kawenata covenanting usually means that the area will be protected in perpetuity in 
accordance with the terms of the covenant agreement.
299
 This means that the future 
owners of the property will be bound to observe the terms of the covenant and 
therefore will, in the majority of cases, ensure that protection of the natural area is 
maintained.
300
  
 
A major barrier to the success of CCGs in securing conservation covenants on private 
land is convincing landowners of the need to use formal mechanisms in order to 
secure long term protection. Many landowners provide informal protection for areas 
of native bush on their land and consider that that is enough to protect the area, and 
that legal protection is unnecessary.
301
  Other landowners are simply unwilling or 
unable to provide protection and fear that formalising protection may either make 
resale of the property difficult or reduce the value of the land.
302
 Some landowners 
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also fear losing ownership and management rights over covenanted areas.
303
 However 
under QEII for example, landowners retain ownership of the covenanted areas and 
have to right to continue to manage the land provided they do so in accordance with 
the terms of the covenant.
304
 There is also no requirement for landowners to allow 
public access to covenanted areas and people wishing to gain access to covenanted 
areas on private land must gain permission of the landowner.
305
  
 
(i) QEII National Trust Act 1977 
Queen Elizabeth the Second Open Space Covenants (QEII covenants) are the main 
type of protection used on private land in New Zealand. QEII covenants are 
administered by the Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust (QEII Trust) under 
Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977 (QEII Trust Act). Section 22 of 
the QEII Trust Act empowers the trust to enter into covenant agreements with private 
landowners: 
Where the Board is satisfied that any private land, or land held under Crown lease, ought 
to be established or maintained as open space...the Board may treat and agree with the 
owner or lessee of the land for the execution by the owner or lessee in favour of the 
Trust of an open space covenant on such terms and conditions as the Board and the 
owner or lessee may agree. 
 
QEII covenants are voluntarily entered into by landowners with each covenant 
varying depending on the terms agreed between the parties. While most QEII 
covenants are in perpetuity the Act allows for covenants to be registered for a limited 
period of time depending on the status of the land upon which the covenant 
applies.
306
 Covenants which are not in perpetuity were a concern for some of the 
people that I spoke to as it means that there is no guarantee that the land will remain 
protected into the future therefore there are no guarantees that the work a group does 
will be protected indefinitely.
307
 In most cases the covenant will be in favour of a 
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small segment of land which requires protection, however in some cases the covenant 
will be for a whole property.
308
 To determine whether a property has characteristics 
worthy of protection a QEII representative will visit the site to evaluate it. Trust 
practice is to assess the land on the basis of the following criteria:
309
 
[E]cological and biodiversity value, naturalness, sustainability, existing or potential 
value as an ecological corridor, wildlife, geological features, landscape values, cultural 
and heritage values. There will also be practical considerations including: management 
needs, threats to site values, [landowner] motivation and potential sources of funding.  
 
However the criteria are not limited to those stated above and the QEII trust board 
can take into account other factors that they consider are relevant to whether or not a 
QEII covenant is justified. If the trust can be satisfied that the area in question meets 
the assessment criteria, the covenant will be approved, and once any fencing or 
surveying requirements have been completed, the covenant will be noted by the 
District Land Registrar on the title of the property concerned.
310
  
 
One of the concerns that I have with the criteria used to evaluate land under the QEII 
Trust Act is that it is not entirely clear what the threshold is for land to qualify for 
protection under the Act. In my opinion this may mean that there are restoration sites 
on private land that are deserving of QEII protection but which do not meet the 
criteria because they do not have the requisite ecological value described in the 
criteria. For example, it is not clear whether a restoration project that is redeveloping 
a site from scratch will be able to meet the covenant criteria used by the trust whereas 
it appears from s 22 of the Act that it probably should fit within the definition of 
―open space‖ provided in section 2 of the Act: 
Open space means any area of land or body of water that serves to preserve or to 
facilitate the preservation of any landscape of aesthetic, cultural, recreational, scenic, 
scientific, or social interest or value 
 
This is concerning as it may mean that if land that is being restored is to be sold to a 
less conservation minded landowner then there are very few options for ensuring that 
it is legally protected.  
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QEII covenants have, in most areas, been a successful mechanism for the protection 
of open space on private property,
311
 with 378 covenants having been registered in 
the Waikato region as of 1 February 2007, and a further 102 approved and awaiting 
registration. The total land area protected in the Waikato by QEII covenants totals 
approximately 15,000 hectares.
312
 Over the entire country there have been a total of 
2532 covenants registered, and 607 approved, protecting a total area of 99,773 
hectares.
313
 It is thought that the work of the trust has also helped to contribute to 
increased awareness of the need for legal protection not only by CCGs and 
landowners but also by local authorities.
314
 The trusts success can be partially 
evidenced by the fact that there have always been more landowners applying for 
covenants than what the QEII Trust is able to fund.
315
 However, while the Waikato 
Region overall has a relatively high number of QEII covenants registered in 
comparison to other parts of the country, Hamilton City is notably lacking in QEII 
covenant protection. By district Hamilton City appears to have the lowest number of 
registered covenants in the North Island.
316
 This is concerning as it is many of the 
ecosystems in and surrounding urban areas that are in most need of protection,
317
 
although there are numerous parks and reserves in council ownership in Hamilton 
city that may help to compensate for the lack of QEII protection. Another issue in 
relation to QEII covenants is the time that it takes for covenants to be approved and 
registered, for some covenants up to several years.
318
 While government funding of 
the QEII Trust has been on the rise so too has the demand for covenants and at 
present the trust is ―over-subscribed‖.319  
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To assist in the facilitation of QEII covenants the trust contributes towards the costs 
incurred by landowners as a result of entering into the agreement. This contribution 
may include costs for legal advice, fencing and surveying
320
 although survey and 
legal costs will not be covered if the covenant is being entered into in order to obtain 
subdivision rights.
321
 However the trust does not contribute to the maintenance costs 
of the area once the covenant is in place. While the trust covers a portion of the costs 
of covenanting there are often considerable costs to the landowner or conservation 
group seeking covenant protection. This can act as a deterrent to those who may 
otherwise seek QEII covenant protection.
322
 For example, the costs of surveying are 
not always met by the QEII Trust and landowners are often not willing or able to 
pay.
323
 CCGs working on private land generally will contribute to the costs of 
covenanting or maintaining covenanted areas however additional money to cover the 
costs surveying or fencing is often not available. This can restrict the ability of some 
groups to procure covenant protection.
324
 Under section 21(2)(e) of the QEII Trust 
Act the trust is also given the authority to pay rates on land which has been 
covenanted under the Act. However the trust has never used this power.
325
 
 
There is currently very little economic incentive for landowners to enter into QEII 
covenants
326
 and unless the economic balance is put more in their favour many 
landowners will continue to be discouraged by the cost of covenanting.
327
 The QEII 
Trusts limited funding means that they are not able to provide further support.
328
 
Therefore in order to increase the uptake of QEII covenants on private land costs 
either need to be reduced, or increased funding be provided to the QEII Trust so 
landowners and CCGs are not required to fund such a high proportion of the cost of 
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covenanting their land.
329
 Another way that the costs of covenants to landowners 
could be reduced would be to use a range of economic incentives which reduce the 
actual amount of expenditure that the landowner must make from their own 
resources.
330
 These mechanisms are discussed below in relation to possible 
improvements to New Zealand law. 
 
(ii) Enforcement and Monitoring of QEII Covenants 
For any mechanism to be truly effective it is important that enforcement and 
monitoring mechanisms are in place so that in the event of a breach of conditions 
occurring that the mechanism will be enforced against the breaching party. The QEII 
Trust usually monitors covenanted properties every two years
331
 however there is 
some concern that this level of monitoring is not likely to ensure that covenants are 
properly enforced and it would be more appropriate if the trust were to visit 
properties on an annual basis.
332
 Donahue, in her research on QEII covenant 
enforcement, found no record of any cases where the QEII Trust had sought to 
enforce a QEII covenant and that overall ―indications are that enforcement activity 
has been minimal‖.333 In my own research I likewise was unable to locate any cases 
where the QEII Trust had taken legal action to enforce covenants.
334
 In one case a 
QEII representative was recorded as saying the QEII Trust would sue a quarry 
developer whose activities may have an adverse effect on a nearby covenanted 
area,
335
 but it appears that there are no reported cases to evidence action having been 
taken. One reason which has been cited by Debra Donahue as to why the trust is 
reluctant to enforce covenants against landowners is that if they are seen to be too 
strict on enforcement then it is possible that landowners may be reluctant to enter into 
QEII covenants at all. Donahue also argues that one of the other major reasons for 
lack of monitoring and enforcement by QEII is a lack of resources both in terms of 
funding and staffing numbers. This problem is likely to increase over time, as the 
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number of covenants increase, unless the QEII Trusts resources are significantly 
increased,
336
 or alternative mechanisms are put in place to ease the burden on the 
trust. As will be discussed shortly conservation easements may be one such 
alternative.  
 
(iii) Conservation Act 1987 
Under the Conservation Act there are three mechanisms that can be used to protect 
restoration works on private land. These are conservation covenants, nga whenua 
rahui kawenata, and management agreements.
337
 Under s 27 of the Act conservation 
covenants may be entered into in favour of the Minister of Conservation over private 
land which is to be protected for conservation purposes. As with QEII covenants this 
type of covenant will run with the land and therefore is binding on successors in title 
to the property. Once agreed the covenant is also noted on the title of the concerned 
property.
338
 These covenants are similar to those used under the Reserves Act 
discussed below.  
 
Where Maori land is to be protected for conservation purposes the Minister of 
Conservation is given the authority under s 27A of the Conservation Act to negotiate 
with the owners of the land for nga whenua rahui kawenata, a form of conservation 
covenant, to be entered into for the land concerned. While nga whenua rahui 
kawenata may be entered into in perpetuity s 27A(1)(b) of the Act provides the option 
for the agreement to either be for a specified term or otherwise to be reviewed at 
interval of not less than every 25 years so that tangata whenua are given the option to 
modify or extinguish the agreement. Finally, under s 29 the Minister of Conservation 
is given the authority to enter into an agreement with the owner any land which is to 
be managed for the protection of a natural or historic resource. 
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(iv) Reserves Act 1977 
In most cases Reserves Act protection applies only to publicly owned land, however 
there are a number of exceptions which may allow a degree of protection provided 
that the landowner provides consent.
339
 Section 38 of the Act authorises the Minister 
of Conservation to enter into an agreement with a landowner for parts of their land to 
be managed under sections 17-23 of the Act and in accordance with a management 
agreement entered into between the landowner and the Minister.
340
 These agreements 
are between the parties and will not bind future landowners therefore will not ensure 
any long term protection.
341
 
 
Section 76 of the Reserves Act can also be used to secure reserves protection on 
private land through the formation of a protected private land agreement (PPLA). 
These agreements are entered into between a landowner and the Crown if the 
Minister is satisfied that the land in question deserves protection because of its 
―natural, scientific, scenic, historic, cultural, archaeological [or] geological‖ value.342 
It is also necessary for the landowner to ―satisfy the Department that they can 
maintain protection and that PPLA status is in the public interest‖.343 A benefit of this 
method is that like with conservation covenants. The agreement is registered on the 
title of the property and will be binding on future landowners.
344
 However, as with 
many of the other mechanisms the issue for CCGs is that unless they own the land 
that they are working on, the protection is subject to landowner action.  
 
The Reserves Act provides two other forms of covenant protection as an alternative to 
those offered under the Conservation Act and the QEII Trust Act. The first are 
conservation covenants under s 77. These covenants are similar to Conservation Act 
                                                     
339
 K. Booth, and M. Bellingham, ―Public Access and Protection on Private Land‖ in R. Harris (ed.), 
Handbook of Environmental Law (2004) 439. 
340
 Reserves Act 1977, s 38. 
341
 Ibid, s 38(1). 
342
 Ibid, s 76. 
343
 Booth, and Bellingham, supra n 339 at 439. 
344
 Reserves Act 1977, s 76(4). 
68 
 
covenants,
345
 can be entered into in perpetuity, or for a defined term, and once 
registered can bind successors in title.
346
 The second variation of covenant can be 
found in s 77A. Under s 77A provision is made for nga whenua rahui kawenata, also 
similar to those under the Conservation Act, to be entered into for the protection of 
conservation areas of Maori land. This section of the Act was inserted in 1993
347
 due 
to the dissatisfaction among Maori regarding the other protection mechanisms that 
were available.
348
 Kawenata help to ensure that biodiversity is protected on Maori 
land without unduly encroaching on tino rangatiratanga of future generations.
349
 
Kawenata can also provide for limited access to resources for customary cultural 
purposes.
350
 
 
(v) Local Authorities 
Local authorities are required, under the RMA, to put in place measures to ensure the 
―maintenance of indigenous biological diversity‖.351 It is important, that in 
developing planning instruments and allowing development activities under the 
RMA, that authorities find the correct balance between development and conservation 
to ensure that biodiversity is protected. 
 
Under the RMA councils are given the authority to place conditions on resource 
consents so that landowners who propose to develop a site, which is significant to the 
protection of biodiversity, would be required to make a financial contribution either 
to the protection of the area on their land or towards restoration activities being 
carried out in the district as a measure for countering the adverse effects of 
development.
352
 Under s 108(1) of the RMA, local authorities are given the authority 
to require persons applying for resource consents to comply with any conditions that 
the authority deems appropriate. Section 108(2) sets out a number of different 
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examples of what kind of conditions will be appropriate. For example, landowners 
who choose to subdivide or develop land can be required to make a financial 
contribution to the local authority as a condition of resource consent under s 
108(2)(a). Section 108(9) states that financial contributions can either be required in 
the form of land, or in money. Under s 108(2)(b) a bond may be required from a 
developer to ensure that a development is carried out in accordance with the resource 
consent.
353
 This enables a consent authority ―to carry out work that the consent 
holders ought to have done, and recoup their costs‖ but is not a suitable provision to 
use to protect vegetation through consent conditions. Section 108(2)(c) appears to 
have the potential to be particularly useful for biodiversity protection in that it can 
require, as a condition of resource consent:  
[T]he protection, planting, or replanting of any tree or other vegetation or the protection, 
restoration, or enhancement of any natural or physical resource. 
 
One of the key cases on s 108 is Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd. In that 
case Estate Homes had applied for a subdivision consent, and as a condition of 
granting consent Waitakere City Council required an arterial road to be built. Estate 
Homes objected to the condition and appealed the Council decision. On appeal the 
Supreme Court held:
354
 
In order for that requirement to be validly imposed it had to meet any relevant statutory 
stipulations, and also general common law requirements that control the exercise of 
public powers. Under these general requirements of administrative law conditions must 
be imposed for a planning purpose, rather than one outside the purposes of the 
empowering legislation, however desirable it may be in terms of the wider public 
interest. The conditions must also fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted 
development and may not be unreasonable. 
 
This case is significant as it limits the authority of a council to require development 
contributions while allowing them to request reasonable contributions. Reasonable 
contributions can include those that will protect native bush. For example, in Morgan 
v Whangarei District Council the Environment Court had to consider how s 108(2)(c) 
should be applied to an application for resource consent to develop land where native 
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bush was present. The approach that the court took is favourable to protection and 
restoration of native bush:
355
 
It seems to us that it is not hard to accept that conditions that have as their purpose the 
protection of existing vegetation, come within the words of the subsection “the 
protection...of any tree or other vegetation”. Neither does it seem to require any stretch 
to accept that the concept of weed and pest control would be covered by the words ―the 
protection, restoration, or enhancement of any natural...resource‖. 
 
Under s 108(2)(d) covenants in favour of the consent authority are another type of 
condition that councils may require in exchange for rights to subdivide. These 
covenants require landowners to put protective covenants in place in favour of a 
district council in order to be granted subdivision consent.
356
 A downside to this form 
of covenant, however, is that additional residential development close to conservation 
areas may lead to increased numbers of predators being brought into the area in the 
form of domestic animals such as cats.
357
  
 
There are, however, limitations on the extent to which a council can claim 
contributions under s 108.
358
 For the conditions to be enforceable by the council they 
must first comply with the tests established in Newbury District Council v Secretary 
of State for the Environment:
359
 
[T]he conditions imposed must be for a planning purpose and not for any ulterior one, 
and that they must fairly and reasonably relate to the development permitted. Also they 
must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable planning authority could have imposed.  
 
The first requirement was interpreted in Bletchley Developments Ltd v Palmerston 
North City Council (No1). The planning tribunal held that a council decision to 
require a developer to build a road was ―plainly related to the service of future 
development beyond the subdivision‖ and therefore was not a valid condition in 
accordance with the Newbury test.
360
 In relation to the second step the planning 
tribunal in Nugent Consultants v Auckland City Council held that to be relevant the 
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condition must ―avoid or at least substantially mitigate, any adverse effects on the 
environment‘.361 Similarly, in Woodridge Estates Ltd v Wellington City Council 
Treadwell CJ held that it was ―grossly inequitable and unfair‖ for the council to claim 
a maximum cash contribution for every cross lease within a subdivision.
362
 Finally, in 
relation to step three, the standard of unreasonableness is the Wednesbury standard, 
that is, that the council‘s decision must be ―so absurd that no sensible person could 
ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority‖.363 
 
Consent conditions as a method of biodiversity protection have the potential to be 
successful tools in New Zealand. This method of ensuring protection was 
successfully implemented at Barrett Bush where a significant portion of native bush 
on private land was transferred as a condition of subdivision under the Waipa District 
Plan.
364
 This has added to the size of Barrett Bush without the need for Friends of 
Barrett Bush to find additional funds to purchase an area which bordered on the area 
where the group has already undertaken considerable restoration work. Friends of 
Barrett Bush Coordinator, Mairi Jay, suggested that if other local authorities were to 
enact rules in their district plans which required conditions on subdivision consents in 
areas containing important areas of native bush then the work of CCGs could be 
aided significantly.
365
  
 
Under the Local Government Act 2002 (LGA) territorial authorities are provided with 
an alternative to s 108 of the RMA for gaining financial contributions from 
developers that can be applied to conservation purposes. Section 198(1)(a) of the 
LGA allows a territorial authority to request a development contribution when a 
resource consent is granted within the district. Under s 199 these contributions may 
be required if: 
[T]he effect of the development is to require new or additional assets or assets of 
increased capacity and, as a consequence, the territorial authority incurs capital 
expenditure to provide appropriately for: 
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(a) reserves: 
(b) network infrastructure: 
(c) community infrastructure. 
 
However before a council is able to require development contributions they must 
develop a contributions policy under s 102(4)(d) of the LGA.
366
 
 
Under s 200(1) of the LGA a territorial authority cannot claim a development 
contribution under the LGA if it has already ―imposed a condition on a resource 
consent in relation to the same development for the same purpose under s 108(2)(a) 
of the RMA or of the developer or another third party will provide funding for the 
―same reserve, network infrastructure, or community infrastructure‖. Under s 203(1) 
maximum development contributions for reserves must not exceed either ―7.5% of 
the value of the additional allotments created by a subdivision‖ or: 367 
...the value equivalent of 20 square metres of land for each additional household unit 
created by the development‖ and contributions received by the territorial authority for 
reserves must be used ―for the purchase or development of reserves within its district. 
 
 This can include making payments to the ―administering body of a reserve held 
under the Reserves Act 1977‖ or to secure an ―interest in perpetuity in land for 
conservation purposes‖.368 
 
In Neil Construction Limited v The North Shore City Council the Court held that the 
test for whether development contributions may be required is as follows:
369
 
Step 1 Is the subdivision or development a ―development‖, i.e. does it generate a 
demand for reserves or infrastructure? (s 197 definition) 
Step 2 Does the development (either alone or cumulatively with another 
development) require new or additional assets of increased capacity to 
provide for reserves or infrastructure which will cause the council to incur 
capital expenditure (s199(1)) or has already caused the council to incur 
capital expenditure for the development? (s199(2)) 
Step 3 Is there an alternative source of funding? (s 200). 
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The Court found in that case the lack of ―direct causal nexus between the 
―development‖ and the demand for infrastructure‖ meant that the council had not met 
this test.
370
  
 
(b) Improving Uptake of Conservation Measures on Private Land 
(i) Introduction 
At present many of the protection mechanisms available in New Zealand are 
voluntary and are heavily reliant on the goodwill of landowners.
371
 The onus and cost 
of protecting areas of native bush is also largely placed on landowners despite the fact 
that restoration and protection is for the public good.
372
 The problem with taking this 
approach to private land is that there will always be a portion of landowners, whose 
land has significant environmental features, who will not respond to voluntary 
mechanisms unless it is economically in their interests to do so.
373
 There are currently 
few economic or other incentives for encouraging landowners to protect areas of their 
land; in fact the costs of protection can be a significant deterrent.
374
 For example in a 
survey of landowners conducted in the Rodney Region, 75 percent of landowners 
who had sought covenant protection cited incentives, such as development rights, as 
being a significant factor in motivating them to enter into covenant agreements.
375
 
These examples demonstrate the need for improvements in the way New Zealand law 
manages conservation on private land. 
 
The difficulty with developing a range of policies and instruments to achieve 
protection on private land is that there is often a conflict between the use of land for 
private or production purposes and conservation. Therefore in order to secure 
protection on private land a balance needs to be struck between the need to conserve 
biodiversity for New Zealand as a whole and the rights of landowners to be able to 
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use their land as they please.
376
 It is also important that there be integration between 
the different organisations and agencies involved in conservation, particularly 
between local, regional, and central government policies,
377
 something which some of 
the examples from the interviews I conducted suggested may be lacking in some 
areas. At present there are a large number of different agencies responsible for 
different aspects of biodiversity conservation on private land with no one agency 
taking the lead.
378
 Whatever options the New Zealand government chooses to take it 
is important to remember that to gain optimal results for restoration projects it is 
necessary to use mechanisms that facilitate community involvement in restoration 
activities and in the development of the law that affects them. 
 
There is a significant amount of literature written on the potential for improvements 
in the protection of New Zealand‘s native biodiversity.379 There is also much written 
on the approaches overseas jurisdictions have taken, or are proposing to take, to 
increase protection of significant natural areas.
380
 For example, in the United States, 
Canada, and Europe, a range of market-based incentives and other mechanisms have 
successfully been used to encourage private landowners to participate in conservation 
and prevent damage to areas whose protection is in the public interest.
381
 Australian 
examples are also particularly relevant with many Australian states taking innovative 
approaches to conserving and protecting their indigenous biodiversity. Economic 
instruments have also been used in a number of states to increase the revenue the 
government has available to provide for conservation, through taxing negative 
activities, and increasing landowner buy in of conservation projects on their land by 
providing financial incentives.
382
 Economic instruments are discussed in detail below. 
Some of the approaches used overseas could be suitably applied in New Zealand, and 
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may not only help CCGs to be better involved in the legal protection of restoration 
sites, but have the potential to increase the opportunities for CCGs to have input in 
policy decisions that affect their projects. In the proceeding sections I will discuss 
some of the possible changes that could be used to improve New Zealand policy on 
biodiversity conservation on private land, and will further this with an analysis of 
some of the approaches taken overseas. 
 
(ii) Covenants 
While covenants are useful tools for ensuring that significant natural areas are 
protected in the long term they do not ensure that the area will retain its ecological 
quality. Many ecosystems, particularly in highly modified urban or rural 
environments, as in the Waikato, require ongoing maintenance if they are to retain 
their biodiversity.
383
 To ensure the quality of a covenanted area many sites require 
ongoing pest plant and animal management, fencing to protect the area from stock, 
and planting or translocation to replace species that have already been lost.
384
 Binning 
and Feilman suggest that one way to ensure that projects on private land can be 
maintained in the long term is to require that there be some kind of fund or trust 
created as a requirement of registering a covenant, which will provide funding to 
ensure that the ongoing management of a covenanted area can be maintained, 
although if this was to be made a requirement of entering into a covenant then it may 
deter further covenants becoming registered due to the need to have significant funds 
for such a requirement to be met.
385
  
 
Another option would be for the organisation responsible for registering the covenant, 
for example the QEII Trust, to fund the ongoing management of the covenanted 
area.
386
 The Trust for Nature in Victoria, Australia currently provides payments to 
landowners to cover management costs of covenanted areas, as well as compensation 
for loss of income on productive land. These management payments have helped to 
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ensure the success of Trust for Natures covenanting program.
387
 However at present a 
scheme like this is not possible for QEII as they are already extended to their limits of 
funding and it would not be possible for them to provide further funds to landowners 
without additional funding being provided to the QEII Trust by the government.
388
 
Evidence of the potential effectiveness of increasing funding for legal protection can 
be seen in the increased numbers of landowners seeking protection since funding for 
agencies, such as the QEII Trust, was increased in 2000. Since its funding was 
increased the trust has been able to respond to the requests of more landowners and 
therefore has increased the amount of land under protection.
389
 However as explained 
above there are still many landowners that the QEII cannot help because of their 
limited funding.  Binning and Young suggest that rather than providing the funding to 
landowners to conduct the ongoing management of ecosystems on private land it may 
be an option for covenanting groups like QEII to enter into arrangements with CCGs 
so that a CCG can be allocated an area of bush to maintain as an alternative to 
landowner management.
390
 This may help to spread limited funds further due to the 
fact that members of CCGs will often provide assistance for such activities on a 
voluntary basis. 
 
In parts of Canada conservation covenants are also used to ensure long term 
protection.
391
 Under s 3 of the Ontario Conservation Land Act 1990 landowners may 
enter into a conservation covenant with a ―conservation body‖ for the purpose of 
conserving, maintaining, restoring, or enhancing ―all or a portion of the land or the 
wildlife on the land‖.392 Non-profit groups, such as CCGs, that are registered charities 
qualify as conservation bodies under s 3(1) of the Act. There are three key ways that 
the Act helps to overcome common law barriers to covenants.
393
 Firstly, under s 3(4) 
of the Act a conservation covenant will be valid even if the CCG does not own land 
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appurtenant to the covenanted land and ―regardless of whether the easement or 
covenant is positive or negative in nature‖.394 Secondly, under s 3(5) the covenant 
will run with the land therefore is binding on successors in title. Finally, under s 3(6) 
the CCG is able to take action to enforce the covenant against the landowner and any 
successors in title. Providing that a CCG effectively monitors and enforces the 
covenant this form of protection can be significant in maintaining protection on 
private land.
395
 To date Canadian landowners have successfully implemented 
conservation covenants under this Act to protect land from subdivision and to prevent 
drainage of wetlands, construction of new dwellings and water takings.
396
 
 
One other potential downfall of conservation covenants is the possibility that they 
may be terminated by the courts at a later date when a landowner has either changed 
their mind about wanting a conservation covenant to restrict their land use rights or a 
new landowner who has purchased the land wants to use the land in a different way 
and their plans are hindered by the presence of the covenant. At common law the 
burden of the covenant did not run with the land and therefore could not bind 
successors in title.
397
 Statutes such as the QEII Trust Act, that have been brought into 
force to allow conservation covenants, modify the common law and therefore allow 
the burden of a conservation covenant to run with the land. However other forms of 
covenant protection that are not provided for by statute, under the Reserves Act or 
QEII Trust Act, are not secure as they can be challenged in accordance with the 
common law.
398
 Easements such as those used in the United States for conservation 
purposes are generally harder to challenge and therefore may provide protection on a 
more permanent basis.
399
 This form of easement is discussed in detail below and 
would provide a useful alternative to conservation covenants for the protection of 
restoration sites in New Zealand. 
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(iii) Management Agreements 
One way that significant natural areas on private land have been successfully 
managed in New Zealand and overseas has been through management agreements. A 
management agreement is usually an agreement between a government agency and a 
landowner, although there appears to be no reason in practice why a management 
agreement for conservation purposes could not be entered into between the landowner 
and a CCG.
400
 Despite provision for them in the Reserves Act and Conservation Act 
it appears that management agreements are rarely used in New Zealand, and there is 
little discussion about them in the literature on conservation on private land. There 
has been some reluctance by New Zealand landowners to enter into management 
agreements as they are concerned about the increased level of interference by 
government departments in the management of their land.
401
 To reduce these types of 
concerns it may be more appropriate for government to delegate some level of 
authority for negotiating agreements to CCGs because of the generally better 
relationship between CCGs and landowners.
402
  
 
One of the significant advantages of management agreements is that they can be 
negotiated to fit a particular site and any special circumstances that are unique to that 
site and help to ensure the long term maintenance of a project.
403
 They can also be 
negotiated to take into account the current land uses of the land and the needs of the 
landowner.
404
 If management agreements are to be successful it is important that the 
negotiated agreement clearly sets out the rights and obligations of each of the parties 
to the agreement, in particular it should be clear who is responsible for the ongoing 
maintenance of the site, for example, the landowner, a CCG or an organisation like 
QEII Trust.
405
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One example of a form of management agreement that has been used successfully in 
New Zealand is the Waiau Fisheries and Wildlife Habitat Enhancement Trusts 
Habitat Enhancement Agreement. These agreements are entered into between a 
private landowner and the trust for the retirement of pieces of private land that the 
trust considers important to the enhancement of the Waiau river catchment.
406
 The 
term of the agreements are 20 years and during this time the landowner is required to 
fence off the land subject to the agreement, to maintain the fences and to keep stock 
out of the fenced areas. In return the trust provides the landowner with financial 
remuneration. This payment is conditional on the landowner complying with the 
agreement and in the event that the landowner fails to meet the conditions of the 
agreement the trust can demand that the money be returned.
407
 According to Mark 
Sutton who works for the trust these agreements have been very successful and have 
resulted in the retirement of a large amount of private  land.
408
 This model is a useful 
example for CCGs as it provides a method that CCGs can use themselves to help 
increase protection of private land and although the protection is limited to only 20 
years there is potential for this to be extended at the end of the term or for further 
protection to be sought at a later date.  
 
An example of where management agreements between government and private 
landowners have been successfully implemented in Australia is the Victoria‘s Land 
for Wildlife Scheme. Land for Wildlife is a scheme implemented by the Victorian 
state government to encourage landowners to enter into voluntary agreements. These 
agreements allow land to be managed for the purposes of conservation while 
providing the landowner with the option of continuing the current land use on the 
property.
409
 Land for Wildlife provides landowners with information about how they 
can manage their land in ways that will sustain any elements of native biodiversity 
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which are present there,
410
 and often are run with collaboration between government, 
CCGs, and the landowners.
411
 While these agreements appear useful in principle they 
are non-binding therefore they provide no long term security of protection as a 
landowner may withdraw their property from the scheme at any time.
412
 Another 
disadvantage of these agreements is that it can be costly and highly labour intensive 
to negotiate each individual agreement on a case by case basis.
413
 However, the 
positive aspects of this scheme are that its voluntary and non-binding nature has been 
found to be attractive to Victorian communities and it has been well received.
414
 
Therefore these agreements can be used as a stepping stone to further conservation 
work and towards implementing binding and long term protection in the future as 
landowners adapt to the increased level of public input into the management of their 
land.
415
 Some elements of these agreements, such as those in respect to CCGs, could 
potentially be adopted into s 76 of the Conservation Act in order to increase the 
effectiveness of protected private land agreements. However one of the limitations of 
management agreements is that because they are not in perpetuity they must be 
renegotiated over time, either when the agreed term ends, or the land ownership 
changes. This means that there can be a lack of certainty about how long protection 
will last and a lack of continuity in the terms of the agreement in the event that the 
landowner wants to change the agreement upon renegotiation.
416
 
 
(iv) Regulation 
Governments have the authority to use their power to alter the behaviour of people 
within their state. There are two different forms of authority that may be exercised by 
government. The first being imperium, ―the deployment of force‖ and secondly, 
through dominium, ―the deployment of wealth‖.417 Environmental regulation in its 
varying forms is one of the key ways that policy makers exercise their authority to 
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help facilitate increased protection of biodiversity.
418
 Regulation can be used to alter 
the relative costs of biodiversity conservation so that policies are favourable to 
biodiversity protection rather than destruction or development:
419
 
Ways of increasing costs include taxes, and regulatory instruments like quotas, standards 
and simple prohibitions, whose breach carries the threat of fines and physical and other 
punishments. These instruments all fall within the category of imperium, in so far as they 
invoke, directly or at one or more removes, the resources of force that are at the 
disposition of government. Conversely, the main cost-reducing instrument...the 
consumer or manufacturer subsidy is an example of dominium.  
 
Ayres and Braithwaite argue that for regulation to be effective it needs to be 
responsive to the motivations of the regulated parties so that the best results can be 
achieved.
420
 They argue that what is needed when creating regulations is ―optimum 
stringency rather than maximum stringency‖421 and therefore voluntary mechanisms 
may, in the right circumstances, effectively deal with an issue.
422
 Many of the 
mechanisms currently used, and some of those I have discussed above require the 
voluntary action of landowners. Voluntary mechanisms are a form of regulation in 
that they involve the creation of rules about how a landowner can use their land that 
are brought into being by the landowner.
423
 However voluntary approaches alone are 
not enough and will not encourage landowners who are adverse to conservation to 
protect significant areas on their land,
424
 and where urgent action is needed
425
 or 
certainty is required regulation may be the most appropriate option.
426
 It is a 
dependable mechanism which, if monitored and enforced effectively, can ensure 
minimum standards are met.
427
 Regulation has been defined by Julia Black as 
being:
428
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[T]he sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to defined 
standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or 
outcomes, which may involve mechanisms or standard-setting, information gathering 
and behaviour-modification. 
 
To further protection of restoration projects it is necessary for there to be a strong 
regulatory framework in place which acts as a backstop to protect areas on private 
land that are important to the protection of biodiversity and cannot be protected by 
other means.
429
 It is also important that the public is adequately informed about the 
regulations otherwise there is unlikely to be a high level of compliance.
430
 In the past 
much reliance has been placed on allowing market forces to regulate environmental 
matters; however it cannot be assumed that in all situations market based incentives 
can be relied upon to alter landowner behaviour.
431
 In some situations even economic 
incentives will not be enough to encourage some landowners to comply with 
regulatory requirements.
432
 For example, the rate relief offered by many councils 
under the provisions of the Local Government (Rating) Act are not adequate enough 
to make a substantial impact on the amount of rates that landowners pay on their 
land.
433
  
 
Regulatory mechanisms, backed up by adequate penalties, have the potential to 
change behaviour of landowners who cannot be encouraged by other means.
434
 For 
example, restrictions may be placed on removal of native vegetation and supported by 
fines to discourage breaches of the regulation and to penalise those who do break the 
rules. This type of action is justified because the irreversible nature of biodiversity 
loss makes it necessary to protect biodiversity on private land for the good of all New 
Zealanders and ensure that it is not exploited by property owners at the expense of the 
public. However the fact that regulation affects the ways in which landowners are 
able to manage their land has led to debate as to what extent regulation can be used to 
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modify landowner behaviour towards conserving biodiversity and who should bear 
the cost.
435
 
 
Property rights advocates argue that to regulate land so that a landowner is not able to 
use it in the manner in which he or she intended constitutes a ‗taking‘ of land which, 
although it does not involved physically taking the land away, justifies compensation 
for the loss of the right to use the land as planned.
436
 The ‗takings issue‘ poses the 
question ―to what extent can regulations reduce the value of private property without 
compensation to the owner?‖.437 This issue has been hotly debated in the United 
States where the Fifth Amendment to the Bill of Rights restrains the ability of the 
state to ‗take‘ landowners rights without compensation.438 However in New Zealand, 
unlike in the United States, merely restricting the rights of a landowner to use their 
land in a particular way does not justify compensation.
439
 Section 85(1) of the RMA 
directly addresses the takings issue:  
An interest in land shall be deemed not to be taken or injuriously affected by reason of 
any provision in a plan unless otherwise provided for in this Act 
 
This is qualified, however, by sections 85(2), 85(3) and 85(4). Under s 85(2) a 
landowner who believes that a ―provision or proposed provision‖ in a plan would 
render an ―interest in land incapable of reasonable use‖ can either make a submission 
against the plan or make an application for a plan change in accordance with schedule 
1, clause 21 of the RMA.
440
 This provides landowners with a way of raising their 
concerns and challenging any provisions they deem to be unduly restrictive. Sections 
85(3) and 85(4) allow the Environment Court to initiate a plan change in the event 
that a provision in a plan renders land ―incapable of reasonable use, and places an 
unfair and unreasonable burden on any person having an interest in the land‖, 
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therefore providing an independent consideration of the issues if a landowner feels 
aggrieved with the council processes.
441
 
 
Determining how and to what extent interference with property rights justifies 
compensation is a difficult task. Landowners may lose rights through regulation but 
they can also gain benefits such as increased land value due to increased conservation 
value. Owen McShane argues that the RMA should be amended so that the extent to 
which councils can ‗take‘ property rights through regulation is made clear.442 
However in some cases landowners will suffer economic detriment for the benefit of 
the public.
443
 William K Jaeger of Oregon State University argues that it is a common 
misconception that property values will always decrease as a result of environmental 
regulation.
444
 He argues that there are two main situations where land values may 
increase. Firstly, through amenity effects and secondly, through scarcity effects. An 
amenity affect occurs ―when land-use regulations protect, enhance, or create 
amenities or services that benefit property owners‖ for example, through benefits that 
are provided to the community as a whole. Scarcity effects occur where the scarcity 
of land with conservation features increases its economic value.
445
 
 
Philip Joseph argues that, because New Zealand law does not provide compensation 
for regulatory takings, regulation that limits the extent to which a landowner is able to 
use his or her land in the way that he or she intended justifies the payment of 
compensation to offset the loss of property rights otherwise landowners unjustly bear 
the costs of environmental protection.
446
 Barton argues however that property rights 
should not be assumed to be protected above other aspects of the law and that there is 
a need for property rights to be balanced with environmental regulation in order to 
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―advance the overall good‖.447 In Falkner v Gisborne District Council the High Court 
found that ―The [Resource Management] Act is simply not about vindication of 
personal property rights, but about sustainable management of resources‖.448 This 
also infers that, in terms of the RMA, protection of the environment is not to be 
secondary to the rights of private landowners and that regulation of private property is 
justified if it helps to ensure the sustainability of New Zealand‘s environment. In 
respect to restoration, protection on private land can play a significant role in 
ensuring sustainability of biodiversity resources, particularly in areas surrounding 
towns and cities where few fragments of native bush remain.
449
 Kathleen Ryan argues 
that the ―key question‖ in respect to the taking of property rights through 
environmental regulation is ―to what extent society should impose disproportionate 
burdens on particular members‖.450 Recently there has been a trend of considering 
important environmental features on private land in terms of ―common property‖ that 
should be protected for the benefit of both present and future generations. Therefore 
private property rights are not necessarily absolute. However, where public rights 
interfere with private rights there is often a presumption that some form of 
compensation will be payable.
451
  
 
The literature that I have studied on this topic covers a diverse range of views about 
how to balance the rights of individual property owners with the need for 
environmental regulation. Finding the balance between ownership rights and the 
public good is a difficult task. However it is necessary that in the interests of 
biodiversity landowners make a reasonable contribution to protecting the 
environment. While it is not entirely fair that landowners should find themselves 
unduly burdened by the requirements of the RMA it is also inequitable for individual 
landowners to freely exploit New Zealand‘s biodiversity without reasonable restraint.  
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Regulation is not the best method in all situations, and if the regulatory measures 
used are too harsh then it may work against CCGs by decreasing the enthusiasm of 
landowners towards conservation.
452
 It has been suggested that is some situations an 
―engage not enrage‖ approach should be taken to regulation and that it may be more 
appropriate to use tools that facilitate landowner participation than to force 
landowners into reluctant compliance with regulation.
453
 In a 2004 report for the QEII 
Trust Maggie Bayfield cautions against the use of a ―strong regulatory approach‖ 
because of the likelihood of a negative reaction from landowners, citing as an 
example the negative reaction of landowners to a strong approach in the Far North 
District Councils draft district plan.
454
 In that instance DoC had been undertaking a 
process of identifying ―special natural areas‖ (SNAs) and encouraging councils to 
regulate to protect these areas. Far North District Council embraced DoCs advice and 
chose to develop regulations in its proposed district plan to ensure that the SNAs 
were protected.
455
 Guy Salmon argues that there were four key factors that caused the 
demise of the Far North District Councils proposed plan. Firstly, the areas of SNAs 
would have restricted the economic use of a large portion of land in the district; 
Secondly, the protected areas were in some cases more than half of a particular 
property; Thirdly, the SNAs were developed without consultation with landowners; 
and fourthly, the SNAs were not an entirely accurate record of the locations of 
important natural areas with some boundaries being inaccurately defined by the plans. 
These issues led to the proposed plan being withdrawn.
456
 Strict regulatory policies 
are also costly, in the sense that they require significant resources to be applied to 
enforcement and monitoring to ensure that people are complying with the law and it 
may be more productive to use incentives based measures to encourage farmers to 
participate in habitat protection.
457
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Gunningham and Young suggest that to prevent negative reactions from landowners 
and to encourage them to improve bush rather than purely to retain it, it may be 
helpful to use economic incentives parallel to a regulatory scheme.
458
 Gunningham 
and Sinclair argue that rather than using long term compensation payments it may be 
more appropriate to use ―circuit breakers‖ to help encourage compliance with 
regulation during the early phases of implementation. Circuit breakers are short term 
measures that help to make stronger regulation policies more palatable until the 
public becomes more accepting of the policy. Once the policy becomes more widely 
supported the circuit breaker is withdrawn.
459
 Such a scheme has been successfully 
implemented in South Australia to encourage acceptance of a ban on land 
clearance.
460
 Use of this type of economic instrument to ease landowners into 
accepting regulatory mechanisms is also commonly used in Europe.
461
  
 
In the United States two different mechanisms have been introduced by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service to help balance property rights with regulation and encourage 
increased landowner acceptance of regulation. These are ―safe-harbour agreements‖ 
and ―habitat banking‖. Safe harbour agreements allow landowners to continue 
existing activities therefore provide landowners with some form of security that they 
will be able to use their land effectively. This helps to encourage landowners to enter 
into agreements on their land.
462
 United States habitat banking is similar to that used 
in Australia and creates credits that can offset development permits.
463
 Regulation 
without at least limited forms of compensation to encourage landowners to protect 
areas of native vegetation on their land may be inefficient and are likely to result in 
high costs to enforce.
464
 This does not mean that incentives should be offered in all 
situations that can be classified as a taking.
465
 However there will be circumstances 
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where compensation will be appropriate, for example, to reimburse landowners for 
increased management costs.
466
  
 
As discussed in detail above, one regulatory mechanism provided for under sections 
108 and 220 of the RMA is to require areas in a development to be set aside for 
conservation purposes as conditions of subdivision consent.
467
 Resource consents 
must also be applied for before landowners are able to remove large areas of bush 
from their land.
468
 From the perspective of CCGs regulatory measures like these are 
beneficial as they have the opportunity to make submissions, either on district or 
regional plans while the plans are progressing through the plan change process, or 
otherwise to make submissions on proposed developments.
469
 
 
Conclusions 
While New Zealand‘s regulatory framework has made some inroads into protecting 
biodiversity on private land there is much more that can be done. Overseas 
experiences show that regulation, if applied correctly, can be one of the most 
effective means of protecting private land and balancing the interests of the public 
with the ownership rights of private landowners. New Zealand‘s regulatory 
framework could be greatly improved by adopting at least some of the examples from 
Australia and the United States that I have discussed above, particularly where 
landowners are not negotiable to change by other means. 
 
(v) Economic Instruments 
In literature I reviewed and in the interviews that I conducted, one of the main 
deterrents for private landowners in becoming involved in conservation work is the 
cost. The cost is a deterrent not only in the sense that many landowners do not have 
the financial resources to invest money in conservation, but also because there is a 
perception by some that conservation work is a public good and therefore should be 
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paid for with public money.
470
 Economic instruments are an alternative form of 
regulation that can be used to encourage environmental objectives.
471
 By providing 
economic incentives the government is exercising its power of dominium.
472
 
 
 Through economic policies government has the power to distort the market and 
manipulate landowner behaviour in a way that is favourable to the environmental 
policies that they wish to pursue.
473
 Economic instruments that reduce the costs to the 
landowner are measures that may help to encourage landowner participation and 
increase the effectiveness of community conservation projects, particularly if the 
costs of management are to be ongoing.
474
 These measures allow the costs to be 
shared between landowners, government, and the community and can therefore have 
the effect of making landowners more accepting of conservation activities on their 
land.
475
   
 
Gunningham and Grabosky suggest that by providing adequate economic incentives 
governments can help landowners to see the value of biodiversity conservation. They 
argue that once protection has an economic value landowners are more likely to 
protect the land as it has an economic value to them personally.
476
 Incentives are also 
likely to make landowners more receptive to managing their land for the purpose of 
conservation as they are not having the rights to use their land restricted without any 
recompense. This may help to overcome the arguments surrounding undue restraint 
on individuals‘ property rights.477 Incentives can also be used to target properties or 
localities of high conservation value.
478
 One way that economic incentives could be 
used to facilitate protection of valuable areas would be for there to be a program in 
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place for the funding of conservation of land along biodiversity corridors where 
species pass through to get to larger habitats.
479
 This targeted from of economic 
incentive could help to ensure that there is efficient use of limited funds. 
 
However the balance needs to be struck, when determining what the value of 
economic compensation should be, between the duty of care owed by landowners as 
stewards of the land to protect significant features on the land, and providing 
equitable levels of compensation to balance out landowner rights with public benefits 
of conservation on private land. It is important in this respect the landowners are not 
being overcompensated for ―fulfilling their landownership responsibilities‖.480 This 
can make it difficult to determine what level of compensation is fair.
481
  
 
Whatever form economic instruments take it is essential that they are adequate to 
encourage participation by landowners in a productive manner, as inadequate 
incentives may not appease landowners and as stated by David Farrier, ―Disgruntled 
landowners make poor conservationists‖.482 Farrier suggests that one possible way 
that payments schemes could be structured would be for them to be managed by a 
private body that is ―locally based‖ such as Forest and Bird. This would help to 
reduce the negative perception that some landowners can have of schemes directly 
administered by government agencies.
483
 It is also a way to assist CCGs to encourage 
landowners to enter into agreements for the restoration and protection of native bush 
on their land. 
 
Incentive Payments and Subsidies 
Incentive payments are a means by which landowners can be encouraged to become 
involved in conservation.
484
 They can also provide a means for assisting landowners 
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who are sympathetic to the need for conservation on their land.
485
 Payments could be 
made in the form of progress payments for goals achieved, for example, if a there is a 
certain size area replanted.
486
 Binning and Young suggest that there are a number of 
different types of payments that could potentially be used to encourage landowners to 
do conservation work on their land. The first incentive suggested is compensatory 
payment for loss of land use rights. Binning and Young argue that this type of 
payment could be made to landowners to compensate them for the loss of income 
from turning potentially productive land into a conservation area in perpetuity. 
Secondly, they suggest that it may be appropriate in some circumstances to provide 
landowners with an upfront payment to cover future management costs such as 
fencing.
487
 Farrier also argues that forward looking payments such as these are 
appropriate ways of encouraging landowner stewardship.
488
 This type of payment 
could be a significant way of encouraging landowners to participate as ongoing 
management costs, particularly fencing costs, are one of the major points cited in the 
literature as to why farmers are often reluctant to enter into management agreements 
or covenants for conservation.
489
  
 
Binning and Young also recommend that funding should be provided to cover at least 
a portion of the fencing costs of landowners who enter into agreements, they 
recommend that 100 percent of fencing costs should be paid for those who enter into 
in perpetuity agreements such as covenants.
490
 QEII has found that in their experience 
with private landowners, even small contributions towards the remaining fencing 
costs by local government authorities has increased the number of covenants 
registered in a region and the speed at which the process takes.
491
 
 
Subsidies are another form of economic incentive that can be used to encourage 
positive environmental activities by rewarding landowners who achieve set 
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environmental outcomes.
492
 This form of incentive can be used to help achieve 
targeted conservation outcomes and can assist in overcoming the reluctance of 
landowners to participate in conservation works on their land.
493
 This could be 
helpful in increasing the success of community projects by increasing landowner 
participation. For example, Wayne Todd, Project Coordinator for Moehau 
Environment Group (MEG) has found that where there is increased landowner 
participation projects are far more likely to be successful. Wayne cited an as an 
example, a rat eradication project that MEG has been involved in at Port Charles in 
the Coromandel Peninsula. He said that in that specific project they group had the 
support of 100 percent of landowners in the community and as a result achieved a 
zero rat population in the area over an 18 month period.
494
 This example shows the 
potential for increased successes where there is greater participation of private 
landowners.  
 
One of the advantages of these mechanisms is that they can often be more cost 
effective than regulation. The fact that landowners must meet specific standards in 
order to receive money encourages them to comply in order to gain the financial 
benefits, whereas in the case of regulation the responsible government department is 
likely to have to continually monitor and enforce the regulations at a considerable 
cost.
495
 This will not always be the case however, and in some situations there will be 
high monitoring costs to determine whether the landowner is meeting the conditions 
of the agreement.
496
 Another concern that has been expressed about these types of 
schemes is that it may lead to landowners, who would have done and paid for the 
work themselves, competing for funds with landowners who would not be involved 
in conservation work were it not for funding.
497
 There also is likely to be a high cost 
to maintain these types of schemes as they are reliant on local authorities being able 
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to come up with the funding to sustain them.
498
 One of the final reasons why 
subsidies may not be the best remedy is that they may give the impression that the 
landowner has a right to degrade biodiversity on their land if payment is not 
received.
499
 
 
Tax Incentives and Rate Rebates 
Taxes and rates have the potential to act as a disincentive for landowners considering 
conservation work.
500
 Under s 102(5)(a) of the Local Government Act 2002 a local 
authority is granted the ability to make a rates remission policy. This policy must 
meet two requirements (1) it must state ―the objectives sought to be achieved by the 
remission‖ of rates (2) it must set out ―the conditions and criteria to be met in order 
for rates to be remitted‖.501 Once this policy is in place the local authority has the 
option to choose to offer rates remissions to the properties that are owned, either 
entirely or in part, for conservation purposes.
502
 It appears that in many instances 
local authorities are providing rate relief to land which has had a QEII covenant 
registered on the title in accordance with the provisions on the Local Government 
(Rating) Act.
503
 However, due to the low rateable value of much of the private land 
that qualifies for rate relief there is often little incentive effect provided through rate 
relief and it is unlikely to substantially motivate landowners to enter into conservation 
covenants or agreements. In some cases the value of the rate relief offered may not 
even cover the costs to the landowner of protecting the land, such as fencing costs.
504
 
 
One of the issues with using a rate relief scheme is that it is often the areas where 
there are small rate paying populations, in rural areas, that have the highest need for 
biodiversity protection on private land. This means that if a rates rebate scheme was 
to be introduced it may take funds away from a council who already has low 
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accessibility to funds through rates.
505
 While some councils, particularly those with 
smaller rate paying populations, may be reluctant to introduce a scheme that would 
see the amount of revenue they are able to generate decrease, it is likely that the 
overall decrease in revenue for councils of a rate rebate scheme for conservation areas 
would be small as generally the rebate would only be for the small parts of private 
properties that are actually covenanted rather than the entire property.
506
 It is also 
likely that the cost of providing rate relief to private landowners to facilitate their 
involvement in conservation work would be less than if the government was to 
manage and maintain such areas of land themselves.
507
 Binning and Young suggest 
that to counter the effect of lost rates on local councils it may either be necessary for 
rates for other rate payers in the district to be increased to spread to cost of 
conservation across all members of the community or otherwise for there to be 
increase funding of conservation at the local level from central government.
508
 
  
One way that the tax law could be amended to allow costs of conservation works 
carried out on private land to be tax deductible. Binning and Young argue that by 
placing a conservation covenant on the title of their property a landowner is 
effectively ‗donating‘ that area of land for the purposes of conservation therefore they 
should be able to claim tax relief for these ―donations‖ in much the same way that tax 
can be claimed back for donations to other charities.
509
 Tax incentives can also help 
to motive companies to participate in conservation activities.
510
 In the United States 
tax relief offered to companies by the state has resulted in the protection of vast tracts 
of native forests owned by private companies. By offering tax relief to companies the 
United States government has been able to convince them not to clear and develop 
native forests but to sell them to state for a reduced price. Because of the tax relief 
offered the company received similar profits on the sale of the land than what they 
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would have gained if they had sold the land to a developer, and the region gained a 
significant piece of conservation land that is now protected in state ownership.
511
  
 
Revolving Funds 
One possible method for CCGs to use to secure long term protection of conservation 
areas on private land is with revolving funds. A revolving fund is a fund which allows 
an organisation to purchase property, place a covenant on the title to ensure that any 
significant areas are protected on the terms that the group specifies. The land is then 
resold with a covenant registered on the title.
512
 A fund of this kind has been 
successfully implemented by the Trust for Nature in Victoria, Australia. The Trust for 
Nature purchases land, covenants, and then resells, managing the land themselves in 
the interim period between purchase and resale.
513
 The benefit of this type of scheme 
is that it allows conservation groups to buy land and ensure that any significant areas 
are protected on the terms, or management requirements, that suit the needs of the 
area as the covenant is entered into by the group and not an independent land 
owner.
514
 This type of short term land purchase can also be beneficial as it allows for 
efficient use of limited funding as the group is not committing all of its funds to one 
specific land purchase but, as the name implies, once the land has been covenanted 
and resold the money from the sale goes back into the fund and can be used to 
purchase further properties.
515
 In the case of the Trust for Nature, part of their funding 
is conditional on the land purchased under their revolving fund being resold with a 
covenant in place.
516
 A further benefit of covenanting and selling through a revolving 
fund is that in many cases the person who eventually buys the covenanted land is 
often likely to be more conservation minded so it is likely that the management of the 
covenanted area on the land will be maintained once sold.
517
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Another benefit of this approach is that it acts as a backstop method for protecting 
private land where landowners are unwilling to enter into a conservation covenant 
with the trust. Where the trust has identified a need for protection on a piece of 
private land and the landowner has declined to participate in the scheme the trust can 
wait for the property to be offered for sale and then purchase the property with the 
revolving fund.
518
 However, a disadvantage of this approach is the time it may take 
for desired land to be available for purchase.
519
 This may be beyond the timeframe 
possible for some CCGs and would be more appropriately managed by a larger 
organisation such as QEII Trust similar to how the Trust for Nature revolving fund 
operates in Victoria. One body which may be worthwhile considering to operate a 
revolving fund would be the New Zealand Native Forests Restoration Trust. The trust 
is one of New Zealand‘s longest standing restoration groups having been established 
in 1980 and its track record suggests that it would be an ideal candidate for running 
such a program.
520
 
 
Gunningham and Grabosky also suggest that a revolving loan scheme that offers low 
interest loans to community groups could be an effective way of encouraging 
conservation work. Such a scheme could potentially benefit groups working on both 
public and private land. This type of scheme would operate by central government 
providing a loan fund that CCGs could apply to for money to be used in their 
projects. As the group fundraises and receives grants they are able to pay their loan 
back therefore the loan fund is recycled and can be used to assist other groups.
521
 
 
Competitive Bidding for Conservation: An example from Victoria, Australia 
While the mechanisms mentioned above such as subsidies, tax relief and rates rebates 
are all ways of encouraging increased landowner participation in conservation work, 
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they have often been criticised for their lack of economic efficiency.
522
 It is not easy 
for governments to determine the true costs to landowners so to provide the 
appropriate level of compensation for decreases in property values or costs for 
maintaining conservation areas. Likewise it is difficult to determine how much tax or 
rate relief will act as an incentive to encourage biodiversity conservation and 
restoration.
523
 In Victoria, Australia, an innovative approach to funding conservation 
and maintaining biodiversity has been adopted called ‗Bush Tender‘. Bush Tender 
aims to overcome the difficulties of valuing the cost of conservation work to private 
landowners by requesting for landowners to bid for conservation funds through a 
competitive auction process. The principle is that through the auction process the 
market is used to determine the minimum price that landowners will accept to do 
conservation work on their land.
524
 The competitive nature of the bidding process 
helps to drive down the price that the government is required to pay landowners 
therefore is thought to be more cost effective than the government estimating what 
could be the true cost.
525
  
 
Under Bush Tender the lowest price bid will not necessarily be accepted but those 
bidding must submit a proposal of the work that they intend to undertake under 
contract with the Victorian Department of Sustainability and Environment which will 
be evaluated by the Department in terms of conservation gain for the amount of 
money spent. The bids are then compared and the contract will be awarded to the best 
value offer.
526
 Funding is provided to cover the costs of management as agreed 
between the landholder and the department in accordance with the landowners bid 
and is usually paid at a rate ranging between $127-475AUD per hectare.
527
 The 
department regularly monitors properties to ensure landowners are complying with 
their agreements and reporting requirements mean that landowners must provide 
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annual progress reports to the department.
528
 However as with other forms of 
incentive payments there is concern that landowners already undertaking 
conservation work at their own cost will bid for funds.
529
 
 
(vi) Information Mechanisms 
Information is one of the keys to ensuring successful restoration on both public and 
private land.
530
 Increasing public awareness about the issues of conserving 
indigenous biodiversity and the potential for protecting and restoring biodiversity can 
help to ensure the successful implementation of environmental policies as the 
community is likely to have a better understanding of why the changes are 
required.
531
 Access to information about the law and the way that CCGs should 
manage the legal requirements was one of the major concerns cited by many of the 
groups that I interviewed.  
 
Gunningham and Grabosky argue that information and education instruments are 
vital to successfully overcoming environmental issues. They argue that by providing 
education to individuals and groups involved in environmental work governments can 
help to overcome the barriers to successful management of natural resources.
532
 
Through provision of adequate information community awareness of the 
environmental issues at hand, and how the range of policy instruments work, can be 
increased. This can assist in improving the uptake of protection mechanisms and may 
help to reduce enforcement and monitoring costs by helping the community to 
understand the need for regulation and what is required of them under the law.
533
 
Information measures can also be essential to ensuring the uptake of protection 
mechanisms by private landowners as landowners who have little awareness and 
understanding of the costs and benefits of a particular scheme are unlikely to be 
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interested in implementing such actions on their land.
534
 Because of their educational 
qualities information mechanisms are complimentary to all other forms of action that 
may possibly be taken. Therefore it is helpful if information is provided to the public 
in association with all of the other mechanisms I have discussed.
535
 
 
(vii) Monitoring and Enforcement: 
There will always be a number of landowners who will not comply, even with 
regulatory mechanisms, unless there is a serious risk of enforcement therefore an 
important factor in ensuring the success of mechanisms for protection of conservation 
areas on private land is to have a system in place for enforcing the covenant or 
agreement against the landowner, and for this system to be used in the event that 
there is a breach so that others who have such agreements in place know that there 
will be consequences in the event that they break the agreement or some of its 
terms.
536
 Enforcement can be defined as ―any action or intervention taken to 
determine or respond to non-compliance‖537 and includes:538 
Monitoring, inspecting, reporting, gathering evidence to detect violations, and 
negotiating with individuals…to develop mutually acceptable methods for achieving 
compliance. As a last step to compel compliance, enforcement includes recourse to legal 
action or dispute settlement. 
 
Without enforcement the regulatory mechanisms put in place can lose their ―deterrent 
effect‖.539 By enforcing breaches of the law the state shows that the mechanisms used 
have more credibility, therefore is likely to result in higher levels of compliance by 
others as they realise that if they breach the law or agreement action will be taken to 
enforce it against them. Where enforcement is low there is likely to be lower levels of 
compliance as people will not take the threat of enforcement seriously.
540
 Ensuring 
that those who have seriously breached the law have legal action taken against them 
                                                     
534
 Kabii and Horwitz, supra n 290 at 13. 
535
 N. Gunningham and D. Sinclair, ―Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental 
Protection‖ (1999) 21 Law and Policy 49, 54-56. 
536
 Binning and Young, supra n 400 at 71. 
537
 L. F. Duncan, ―Enforcement and Compliance‖ in E. L. Hughes, A. R. Lucas, and W. A. Tilleman, 
Environmental Law and Policy (Second Edition) (1998) 326. 
538
 Ercmann, supra n 531 at 1216. 
539
 Gunningham and Grabosky, supra n 416 at 45. 
540
 S. Ercmann, ―Enforcement of Environmental Law in United States and European Law‖ (1996) 26 
Environmental Law 1213, 1216. 
100 
 
is also an essential part of ensuring effective enforcement and maintaining 
credibility.
541
 Binning and Young suggest that in some cases enforcement may mean 
that it is necessary to provide assistance to landowners who genuinely find the 
requirements of the agreement too onerous and in some cases may be necessary to 
renegotiate the terms of the agreement so that the obligations of the landowner are 
more manageable.
542
 
 
Another key factor in ensuring a mechanism is successful is monitoring. This is 
important as monitoring helps to determine whether or not a project is meeting its 
objectives and whether any changes are required to the scheme to increase its 
effectiveness.
543
 Without good monitoring it is also not possible to determine whether 
or not the mechanisms that are being used are the most cost effective measures 
available for a particular project.
544
 It is essential to most of the above mentioned 
schemes that the agency responsible for their implementation undertakes ongoing 
monitoring to ensure that the proposed outcomes are being achieved and that the area 
is being managed in a way that will ensure it remains ecologically healthy.
545
 CCGs 
have a role to play in the monitoring process and because of their constant and direct 
involvement on sites and with landowners they can act as stakeholder watchdogs by 
reporting to the relevant organisation or government agency if landowners are not 
complying with their part of the bargain.
546
 If there is an element of an agreement or 
that which is shown by monitoring to be ineffective then it may be necessary for the 
terms to be renegotiated so that the objectives can be achieved, therefore it is 
necessary for there to be a certain degree of flexibility.
547
 In relation to the flexibility 
of management plans for covenanted land it has been suggested that it is better for a 
management agreement to be annexed to the covenant in a schedule rather than being 
registered on the title as part of the covenant document so that in the event that 
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monitoring shows that it is necessary to alter the management plan for the area it can 
be done relatively quickly and easily.
548
 
 
Research by Ericksen et al has been critical of the monitoring provisions in Regional 
Policy Statements issued by Regional Councils under the RMA. They describe the 
policy statements as ―lightweight‖ and lacking in ―indicators for tracking the 
performance of the policies within them‖.549 They were also concerned about the 
effectiveness of monitoring provisions in district plans and found that in general 
monitoring provisions were weak.
550
 Monitoring can also be expensive and time-
consuming and this can discourage departments with limited funds from undertaking 
enforcement in an adequate manner.
551
 
 
(viii) Conservation Easements: 
In the United States one of the most common mechanisms for protecting private land 
is the conservation easement, with over 1.4 million acres of land currently protected 
using conservation easements.
552
 This form of easement operates in a similar fashion 
to most forms conservation covenants used in New Zealand in that they are 
voluntarily entered into and are binding on successors in title.
553
 The easement can be 
negotiated between a landowner and a CCG to meet the specific needs of the site and 
the landowner. The landowner maintains ownership of the land but agrees to certain 
limitations being placed on their use of the land.
554
 As will be discussed in detail 
below the approach taken to conservation easements in the United States is sui 
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generis and is very different to easements in the sense that they are applied in New 
Zealand. To help demonstrate the differences between the two forms of easements I 
will first introduce the way that easements operate in New Zealand and then move on 
to an evaluation of the conservation easements used in the United States. 
 
Conservation Easements: An Introduction  
At common law there are three main forms of easement; positive, negative and in 
gross. A positive easement provides the owner of the dominant tenement, that is, the 
land whose favour the easement is for, with a right to undertake certain activities on a 
neighbouring property known as the servient tenement.
555
 At common law the owner 
of the servient land was generally not required to take any action.
556
 However, under 
the section 294 of the Property Law Act 2007 an easement can be enforced against 
the owner of the servient land if they do not undertaken any actions required by the 
easement.  
 
Negative easements on the other hand require the owner of the servient land to refrain 
from certain activities and if the servient owner does not comply then the dominant 
owner has the right to enforce the easement against the servient owner.
557
 A 
conservation easement is a generally negative easement in the sense that it prevents 
the landowner from being able to use their land in a certain way.
558
 At common law 
there only a narrow range of negative easements were allowed. These included, 
―certain water rights, rights of support for buildings, and rights to light and air‖.559 
The third form of easement, an easement in gross, can be distinguished from the first 
two forms as does not have to attach to a separate piece of land but can attach to the 
land of the covenantor.
560
 Because a conservation easement has no dominant 
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tenement it is an easement in gross.
561
 This means that it has a perpetual existence 
and is ―not limited to the life of the grantee‖.562 
 
As New Zealand does not have a conservation easement statute like the United States 
Uniform Conservation Easement Act the Property Law Act 2007 and the common 
law continue to apply to easements entered into in New Zealand. If New Zealand 
CCGs were to use the current mechanisms to negotiate easements for conservation it 
is unlikely that they would be successful. Firstly, in New Zealand there is a very 
limited class of negative easements, such as the right to the support of buildings and 
the right to light and air.
563
 Because the class of negative easements available in New 
Zealand is so limited it is unlikely that conservation easements would be upheld in 
the courts. Secondly, because positive easements generally require no action on the 
part of the servient land owner it would be hard for a CCG to negotiate a successful 
conservation easement as in many cases landowners need to be involved in the 
management of a conservation easement. 
 
Another reason that the current easement law in New Zealand would not provide 
adequate protection is because section 317 of the Property Law Act 2007 also allows 
easements (and covenants) to be extinguished by the courts if satisfied that: 
 (a) the easement or covenant ought to be modified or extinguished (wholly or in part) 
because of a change since its creation in all or any of the following: 
(i) the nature or extent of the use being made of the benefited land, the burdened land, 
or both: 
(ii) the character of the neighbourhood: 
(iii) any other circumstance the court considers relevant; or 
(b) the continuation in force of the easement or covenant in its existing form would 
impede the reasonable use of the burdened land in a different way, or to a different 
extent, from that which could reasonably have been foreseen by the original parties to 
the easement or covenant at the time of its creation; or 
(c) every person entitled who is of full age and capacity— 
(i) has agreed that the easement or covenant should be modified or extinguished 
(wholly or in part); or 
(ii) may reasonably be considered, by his or her or its acts or omissions, to have 
abandoned, or waived the right to, the easement or covenant, wholly or in part; or 
(d) the proposed modification or extinguishment will not substantially injure any person 
entitled. 
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This would make easements for conservation vulnerable to termination. Therefore if 
New Zealand CCGs are to obtain the benefits that conservation easements can 
potentially have it would be necessary for the New Zealand government to enact 
legislation similar to that of the United States. 
 
Conservation Easements: The American approach to protection on private land 
Conservation easements such as those used in the United States can be valuable 
mechanisms for protection because they help to overcome the common law barriers 
to easement use. The United States Uniform Conservation Easement Act 1981 
(UCEA) specifically modifies the common law on easements to ensure that it cannot 
be used to weaken an easement in the same way that may occur with some forms of 
covenant in New Zealand. The UCEA provides:
564
 
A conservation easement is valid even though: (1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in 
real property; (2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder; (3) it is not of a 
character that has been recognized traditionally at common law; (4) it imposes a negative 
burden; (5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the 
burdened property or upon the holder; (6) the benefit does not touch or concern real 
property; or (7) there is not privity of estate or of contract. 
 
Once a conservation easement is in place it can be enforced against the owner of the 
land in the event that the owner decides to take action which is not in accordance with 
the easement agreement.
565
 Most easements are entered into in perpetuity which 
means that long term protection is usually guaranteed.
566
 Where easements are 
perpetual it also helps save money in the long term as is it generally not necessary for 
the easement to be renegotiated.
567
 This protection can often exist beyond the life of 
the CCG that entered into the agreement as it is possible for the easement to be 
passed on to another land trust in the event that the holder of the agreement is wound 
up.
568
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A conservation easement is a generally negative easement in the sense that it prevents 
the landowner from being able to use their land in a certain way.
569
 However, 
conservation easements are not restricted solely to negative easements and it is 
possible for easement terms to require that a landowner also takes positive actions, 
although it can be helpful for the conservation easement statute to state specifically 
that positive acts are enforceable. This restricts the possibility that the easement will 
be challenged in the courts.
570
 
 
One of the significant advantages for CCGs of this method is that the group is able to 
directly negotiate the agreement with the landowner and has direct responsibility for 
ensuring the agreement is enforced. This means that a group does not need to rely on 
a third party to negotiate, monitor and enforce the agreement, and the terms of the 
agreement can be specifically negotiated to meet the needs of the landowner, the 
CCG, and the local community.
571
 However the effectiveness of the easement is 
dependent on the CCGs ability to monitor and enforce the agreement.
572
 It is also 
important that a good relationship is maintained between the landowner and the CCG 
responsible for enforcing the easement.
573
 CCGs can help educate landowners about 
easements and assist them through the process of donating or selling an easement on 
their land.
574
 It can also be easier for a group to obtain an easement over a property 
than for the group to buy a property themselves as then the group does not have to 
purchase the property outright and is not hindered by other ownership 
responsibilities.
575
 Having agreed to one easement in an area CCGs may find that 
their work has a flow on effect and that by raising the awareness of the availability of 
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such mechanisms other landowners may also choose to provide the CCG with an 
easement over their property.
576
 
 
In the United States the key piece of legislation regarding conservation easements is 
the UCEA. This statute provided a model for each state to base its easement 
legislation on and helps to overcome the common law restrictions on the use of 
easements.
577
 The UCEA limits what kinds of organisation can hold a conservation 
easement to either:
578
 
(i) a governmental body empowered to hold an interest in real property under the laws of 
this State or the United States; or 
(ii) a charitable corporation, charitable association, or charitable trust, the purposes or 
powers of which include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or open-space values 
of real property, assuring the availability of real property for agricultural, forest, 
recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or enhancing 
air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, or cultural 
aspects of real property. 
  
All but one state in the United States have adopted an easement statute in varying 
forms.
579
 However not all states have adopted the UCEA is its original form and the 
different interpretations can affect the effectiveness of the conservation easement as a 
tool for biodiversity protection.
580
 Each states statute provides rules on who can be 
the holder of a conservation easement, but in most states the holder of the easement 
will either be a government body or a CCG.
581
 Some states require that a CCG has 
been formed for a minimum of two years or more in order to ensure that the group is 
stable enough to be able to enforce a conservation easement.
582
 The CCG negotiates 
the easement with the landowner and once the agreement is registered it is the 
responsibility of the group to enforce the agreement against the landowner if the 
terms of the agreement are breached.
583
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Easements can be defined as ―limited interests in real property held by individuals 
other than the principal owner, or by the general public‖.584 Julie Gustanski defines 
conservation easements as ―a legally binding agreement that permanently restricts the 
development and future use of the land to ensure protection of its conservation 
values‖.585 The UCEA defines conservation easements as being:586 
[A] nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or 
affirmative obligations the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, 
scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, 
forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, maintaining or 
enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical, architectural, archaeological, 
or cultural aspects of real property. 
 
However the flexibility of easements means that to encourage landowners to protect 
their land the group can agree with the landowner for certain limited development 
rights such as the right to build an additional building on the site in a specified 
location at a later date. This can help to reassure the landowner that they will not lose 
the right to undertake all developments on their land.
587
 
 
The easement document sets out the terms of the access arrangement between the 
parties. It is registered on the title of the property concerned and therefore will be 
binding on future owners. This helps to ensure access and/ or protection in the long 
term. The landowner retains legal ownership of the property, in much the same way 
as occurs with conservation covenants in New Zealand, but confers on a public 
agency or approved CCG the right to enforce restrictions upon the land as set out in 
the easement agreement. These often involve restricting development on the land to 
prevent adverse impacts on significant natural areas.
588
 In a traditional sense agreeing 
to an easement means that the landowner will provide a right of access onto their land 
to a third party whose entry to the property would otherwise be considered 
trespassing unless some other form of licence had been given by the landowner. In 
the case of a conservation easement access is not always provided, however the 
                                                     
584
 Platt, supra n 399 at 104. 
585
 Gustanski, supra n 552 at 9. 
586
 Uniform Conservation Easement Act 1982, § 1(1). 
587
 Brewer, supra n 172 at 146. 
588
 Platt, supra n 399 at 104-105. 
108 
 
easement agreement will rather confer on the easement holder a right to enforce the 
conditions of the easement agreement against the landowner, for example, to prevent 
the landowner from cutting down trees in the area covered by the easement.
589
 Where 
possible it is helpful if easements are drafted in more general terms as terms that are 
too specific may make the easement easier to break by a future landowner and may 
raise the issue of enforcement for the CCG involved.
590
 
 
As with other mechanisms the effectiveness of conservation easements is only certain 
if there is monitoring and enforcement to ensure that the terms of the agreement are 
being met.
591
 It is important that CCGs are aware of the potentially high costs of 
enforcing easements in determining whether they have the capacity to take on an 
easement of a certain scale otherwise the purpose of entering into the agreement may 
not be fulfilled.
592
 Where land changes ownership then it is possible that action may 
have to be taken to enforce the easement. This may lead to a group having to take or 
defend an action in the courts in order to have the terms of the agreement upheld.
593
 If 
an easement holder fails to enforce the rights that they have under the agreement then 
this may be considered abandonment and may allow the courts to terminate the 
easement at the request of a landowner.
594
 This highlights the importance of ensuring 
that a conservation easement is enforced. Adam Draper argues that in order to ensure 
that there is long term protection, even if the holder of the easement fails to enforce it, 
it is desirable for there to be a right of ―third-party enforcement‖ so that another 
conservation organisation or public body can take an action to enforce the easement 
against the landowner if the CCG who negotiated the agreement does not have the 
capacity to defend it.
595
 One way that this could be done would be for a government 
authority to be given third party enforcement rights.
596
 This would be within the 
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scope of the UCEA.
597
 However, as discussed above, without a statute such as those 
used in the United States conservation easements are often hard to enforce.
598
  
 
It is up to a landowner to determine whether or not they want to enter into a 
conservation easement therefore it is likely that where there are incentives offered to 
encourage easements then there will be a higher uptake.
599
 In the United States 
landowners are provided with significant tax benefits for agreeing to a conservation 
easement. They can be used to help motivate reluctant landowners to become 
involved with CCGs or to assist those landowners who would not otherwise be able 
to afford protection on their land to seek the protection that they would like.
600
 Tax 
deductions are offered for the difference in value of private land before covenanting 
and the value afterwards. A tax rebate is available for the difference.
601
 Unlike some 
overseas jurisdictions, like the United States, where landowners entering into open 
space covenants are afforded significant income tax reductions, New Zealand 
landowners are offered ―no income tax advantages‖ to encourage them to enter into 
an agreement to covenant their property,
602
 and as discussed above, little in the way 
of rate relief. The development of a tax relief scheme may be beneficial in 
encouraging increased conservation on private land in New Zealand. Such a scheme 
would be most effective in securing long term protection if the tax advantages were 
only to be offered to landowners who choose to protect the native bush on their land 
in perpetuity with a QEII covenant for example.
603
 However some landowners in the 
United States found that rather than their land values decreasing when surrounding 
properties entered into conservation easements property values actually increased.
604
 
In some cases easements will be one of the methods that landowners wishing to 
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develop their land can use as a way of mitigating the adverse effects of development. 
These kinds of easement are called exacted conservation easements.
605
  
 
One of the advantages of conservation easements that has been cited in the literature 
is that they are an efficient way of conserving land as they do not require government 
agencies or CCGs to purchase a property in order to protect land but they are able to 
acquire an easement either by donation from the landowner or by purchasing an 
easement from the landowner.
606
 However there is debate as to whether conservation 
easements are an efficient means of protecting land when the high costs of enforcing 
and monitoring them can mean that over time the costs of protecting the land may 
have meant that it would cost little more to buy the land outright.
607
 In my opinion 
this will not be an issue in a large number of situations, and as with all mechanisms 
groups can use for protecting restoration sites, there will always be occasions when 
there is another method of protection that may be more suitable. Another concern 
regarding easements as long term methods of protection is that they can be 
terminated. They can also be modified ―in accordance with the principles of law and 
equity‖.608  
 
Pidot argues that in order to overcome any issues with uncertainty regarding the 
termination and amendment of conservation easements it is important that the law is 
clear about when an easement can be terminated or amended. He argues that there 
must also be allowances made in the law so that in the event that the agreement needs 
to be changed to meet the changing needs of the group or the land it is clear what 
processes should be followed.
609
 In order to ensure that easements are harder to defeat 
Richard Brewer recommends that groups who use easements should take all efforts to 
ensure that the owners of the land who agree to the easement are well informed about 
how the easement work and that this is recorded preferably in a video tape form so 
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that there can be no doubt in the future that the landowners understood what they 
were agreeing to.
610
 
 
4. Protection on Public Land 
New Zealand has one of the largest publicly owned conservation estates in the world, 
with about 30 percent of the country being protected in public ownership.
611
 The 
Department of Conservation alone is responsible for the administration of 
approximately 8.5 million hectares of publicly owned land,
612
 including 83 percent of 
New Zealand‘s indigenous forests.613 According to the Auditor General‘s 2006 report 
on DoC administered land approximately 55 percent of that land is administered 
under the Conservation Act, 36 percent under the National Parks Act 1980, about 8 
percent under the Reserves Act, and less than one percent under the Wildlife Act 
1953.
614
 In the Waikato region a large proportion of the land where restoration 
activities are likely to take place is on public land. Approximately 45 percent of 
native bush in the Waikato is protected for conservation purposes under the 
Conservation Act, National Parks Act, or Reserves Act.
615
  
 
One of the most significant ways that CCGs can contribute towards the conservation 
of biodiversity is to assist with the management of publicly owned land. It not only 
means that the group can pursue goals on public land that the Department cannot, or 
compliment activities that government departments already undertake, but that they 
can contribute to preserving biodiversity without having to find the money to 
purchase the land themselves. It is usually already protected by its public 
ownership.
616
  However, in choosing to allow CCGs to undertake activities on public 
land DoC must be mindful of its obligations under the law, as well as considering 
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what goals the Department has for a particular site and how these might differ from 
the goals of a CCG.
617
 
 
One of the main statutes relevant to the management of publicly owned land is the 
Conservation Act 1987. Section 6 of that Act sets out the functions of DoC. These 
functions include managing ―for conservation purposes, all land, and all other natural 
and historic resources, for the time being held under this Act‖ and preserving natural 
and historic heritage for future generations.
618
 Each of the different statutes that 
publicly owned land is administered under set out a range of different ―roles and 
responsibilities‖ for DoC to meet.619 However since its inception DoC has been 
under-resourced to manage New Zealand‘s conservation estate.620 
 
The Reserves Act is one of the other main statutes administered by the Department of 
Conservation under which public conservation land may be classified. One of the 
significant advantages of classification under the Reserves Act is that reserves status 
is hard to overturn.
621
 The purpose of the Act is:
622
 
(a) Providing, for the preservation and management for the benefit and enjoyment of the 
public, areas of New Zealand possessing— 
(i) Recreational use or potential, whether active or passive; or 
(ii) Wildlife; or 
(iii) Indigenous flora or fauna; or 
(iv) Environmental and landscape amenity or interest; or 
(v) Natural, scenic, historic, cultural, archaeological, biological, geological, 
scientific, educational, community, or other special features or value: 
(b) Ensuring, as far as possible, the survival of all indigenous species of flora and fauna, 
both rare and commonplace, in their natural communities and habitats, and the 
preservation of representative samples of all classes of natural ecosystems and landscape 
which in the aggregate originally gave New Zealand its own recognisable character: 
(c) Ensuring, as far as possible, the preservation of access for the public to and along the 
sea coast, its bays and inlets and offshore islands, lakeshores, and riverbanks, and 
fostering and promoting the preservation of the natural character of the coastal 
environment and of the margins of lakes and rivers and the protection of them from 
unnecessary subdivision and development. 
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Under s 16 of the Act the Minster of Conservation must classify reserves according to 
their principal or primary purpose as defined in sections 17-23. These classifications 
include; recreational reserves, reserves for the purpose of protecting historic heritage, 
scenic reserves, nature reserves, scientific reserves and finally reserves for 
government or local purposes. As will be discussed below the reserves status of the 
land can affect how the land is to be managed and can have varying impacts on 
CCGs. 
 
(b) The Issues 
One of the first issues that are important to address is that when the statutes cited 
above were drafted it was probably not considered that community groups would be 
managing crown owned land. As a result community management of resources has 
not really been considered in the legislation.
623
 Dr Bruce Clarkson, who has been 
heavily involved in Waikato restoration projects including the large scale restoration 
occurring at Waiwhakareke in Hamilton, suggested that it would be of assistance if 
these statutes were amended to incorporate community co-management with 
government land managers into conservation legislation. Nancy Jensen of 
Otorohanga Zoological Society also said that the legislation needs to make it clearer 
who is responsible for consultation with tangata whenua as planning documents and 
Statutes often specify the need to consult with tangata whenua but do not make it 
clear whether this duty is to be placed on groups or on the government agencies 
administering the Acts.
624
 
 
Another of the major issues with publicly protected land is that much of the land that 
has been set aside in public reserves and parks is that it is not representative of New 
Zealand‘s full range of natural ecosystems. Much of the land was not reserved 
because of its high ecological value but because it was not suitable for farming. This 
means that many of New Zealand‘s pristine ecosystems are those in highly 
mountainous areas.
625
 By failing to ensure that the conservation estate is 
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representative of the full range of New Zealand ecosystems the Department of 
Conservation and the New Zealand government are failing to give effect to section 3 
of the Reserves Act which provides that the ―original‖ character of New Zealand‘s 
ecosystems should be preserved.
626
 Also in some areas the classifications of 
protection that have been allocated to certain areas by DoC do not adequately 
represent the conservation value of the area.
627
 The Auditor-General recommends that 
in some places it would be beneficial for DoC to review the classifications they have 
allocated to the land and to upgrade them accordingly.
628
 
 
One of the other issues identified during the interview process was how the statutory 
designation of land impacts upon the ability of a group to successfully restore an area. 
Dr Bruce Clarkson said that there are a number of ways that the status of the land can 
affect groups. Firstly, it is not always clear what authority a group has when they are 
working on a particular project. For example, at Maungatautari the land is designated 
under the Reserves Act and there is a formal acceptance that Maungatautari 
Ecological Island Trust is to be the main group restoring the mountain. However it is 
not clear whether this gives the group jurisdiction to tell other groups, who may wish 
to undertake restoration on the mountain, what to do. Clarkson suggests that it would 
be useful if there was more clarity in this respect so that it is clear exactly how the 
status of the land affects what a group can do.
629
  Diane Campbell-Hunt of Orokonui 
Ecosanctuary in the Otago Region said that in order to make management clearer 
their group has entered into an agreement with DoC which allows the group to 
manage the land. However Diane is concerned that even though they have agreed 
with DoC that Orokonui is responsible for managing the land at present the fifty year 
lifespan of the agreement means that there may be uncertainty in the future when the 
agreement has to be renewed.
630
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Land status can also affect funding. Where land is crown owned and managed there is 
a presumption by some funding agencies that the group should be funded by the 
agency responsible for the land. For example, both Hakarimata Restoration Trust and 
Te Kauri-Waikuku Trust have experienced difficulties in obtaining funding because 
of the presumption that groups working on DoC land should be DoC funded.
631
 Keith 
Thompson and Rachael Goddard of Te Kauri-Waikuku Trust said that the reserves 
status of the land that they are working on has majorly limited the amount of funding 
that they are able to get as sources such as the Sustainable Management Fund will not 
provide funding to groups working on DoC administered land. Similarly Diane 
Campbell-Hunt from Orokonui Ecosanctuary said that the scenic reserve status of 
their land has limited the ability of the group to generate funds because the group 
cannot charge entry fees to the public to help recoup their costs.
632
 Because of the fact 
that DoC is unable to manage its estate without CCG assistance it would be helpful if 
these funding barriers like these were to be removed. 
 
One final issue that I would like to address in relation to groups that undertake 
restoration work on public land is consultation with the tangata whenua of the area 
for whom the land may have cultural and historical significance. Section 4 of the 
Conservation Act requires that the Act should be ―interpreted and administered to 
give effect to the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi‖. This requirement also applies 
to the other legislation administered by DoC.
633
 Section 4 of the Conservation Act is 
the strongest provision for the recognition of Maori interests in New Zealand 
environmental legislation as it requires that the Act be interpreted and administered to 
―give effect to‖ the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.634 Therefore the 
consideration of Maori interests is of great importance when groups are conducting 
work on land that is administered under the Conservation Act. 
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Under the RMA provision has also been made to ensure that Maori interests are taken 
into account in activities concerning the management of natural, physical and cultural 
resources. Section 5 of the Act requires resources to be managed in a way that allows 
―people and communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural 
wellbeing‖. Section 6(e) considers ―the relationship of Maori and their culture and 
traditions with their lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga‖ to be a matter 
of national importance. Section 7 requires ―persons exercising functions and powers‖ 
under the Act to ―have particular regard to‖ Kaitiakitanga. Under s 8 ―persons 
exercising functions and powers‖ under the Act must also ―take into account the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi‖. In New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney 
General the principles of the Treaty were defined as meaning ―the underlying mutual 
obligations and responsibilities which the Treaty places on the parties‖ .635 One of the 
principles of the Treaty is that of partnership. This principle reflects the idea that the 
treaty was to create a partnership between Maori and the Crown and ―requires that the 
Crown and Maori act towards each other reasonably and with the utmost good 
faith‖.636 
 
Nancy Jensen of Otorohanga Zoological Society says that it can sometimes be hard 
for groups to determine whether it should be DoC or the CCG carrying out the work 
that should be responsible for consultation.
637
 It appears from my research that most 
groups err on the side of caution choosing to consult with Maori. Most of the people 
that I spoke to in the course of interviews thought that consultation with local tangata 
whenua was an important consideration when undertaking restoration projects and 
had either undertaken consultation or attempted to. One of the key points that several 
of the people I spoke to made was the importance of consulting tangata whenua early 
on in the project, preferably as part of the planning phases. Consulting Maori early in 
on the process helps to ensure that the group maintains a good relationship with 
tangata whenua and Judy van Rossem, of Environment Waikato, says that in most 
instances Iwi are happy to see groups getting on with the work provided they have 
                                                     
635
 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [1994] 1 NZLR 513, 517. 
636
 New Zealand Law Commission, Maori Custom and Values in New Zealand Law (2001) 80. 
637
 Meeting with Nancy Jensen, Otorohanga Zoological Society, 17/05/07. 
117 
 
been consulted first.
638
 Wayne Todd of Moehau Environment Group said that one of 
the issues that they had in dealing with local Maori was that their group went to speak 
to the Hauraki Maori Trust board when they had already developed their plans for the 
project which led some in the Maori community to feel that the majority of the 
decisions about the project had already been made without any Maori input.
639
 Bruce 
Clarkson said that there was an issue for Maungatautari Ecological Island Trust 
which resulted in them having to develop two enclosures on Maungatautari as they 
had chosen to consult with Iwi on one side of the mountain and not the other.
640
 This 
shows the importance of taking into account all Maori interest groups. 
 
C. Conclusions 
While New Zealand‘s current legislation provides limited protection for restoration 
sites on private land there is much to be learnt from the experiences of overseas 
jurisdictions which, if applied in New Zealand, could greatly strengthen the 
protection provided on private land. As can be seen from the innovative approaches 
taken in Australia limited funding can be wisely used by either funding protection 
through revolving funds or by requiring landowners to compete for funding in a 
market situation so that conservation is achieved for an economically competitive 
price. Rethinking the mechanisms currently used could also significantly improve the 
fate of biodiversity on private land and may help to make the legal environment more 
favourable for CCGs. One of the key mechanisms which I believe would be 
extremely valuable in the New Zealand context are conservation easements. In my 
opinion the experiences of United States CCGs demonstrate the value of statutory 
conservation easements to CCGs and the results that CCGs in these countries have 
achieved on private land speak for themselves. New Zealand would be wise to adopt 
legislation similar to the United States Uniform Conservation Act if we are to 
facilitate increased CCG participation in the management of private land to reduce 
the burden on already oversubscribed organisations such as QEII Trust.  
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In relation to publicly owned land the Department of Conservation is currently only 
able to manage a small percentage of New Zealand‘s total conservation estate. CCGs 
provide significant assistance to DoC by undertaking additional work on parts of the 
conservation estate where DoC is currently unable to undertake the necessary work. 
However despite the fact that CCGs are providing a significant amount of assistance 
to the Department the current legal framework does not make is easy for CCGs to 
manage the publicly owned land. To assist CCGs in their work it is necessary for the 
status of their management powers on public land to be defined and for provision to 
be made so that groups are able to gain access to additional funding to help them 
cover the costs of the work that they do. This may be as simple as providing groups 
with authorisation to charge entry fees to the public when they visit the restoration 
site. 
 
D. Local Authorities, Policies, and Plans 
 
Local authorities have a key role to play in assisting the facilitation of successful 
community conservation projects and under the RMA a significant proportion of the 
responsibility for managing environmental policies has been shifted from central 
government to district and regional councils.
641
 The councils can assist directly by 
providing funding, assistance, and advice, or indirectly through the creation of 
policies and plans that are favourable to community based conservation. As the level 
of government closest to the community local authorities are also in a better position 
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to judge the needs of the local community and to identify environmental issues in 
their locality.
642
 
 
Regional and district councils are one of the key policy making bodies that exert 
influence over land in a way that can affect the management of restoration projects 
through regulation. Under s 30 of the RMA regional councils are required to 
establish, implement, and review ―objectives, policies and methods to achieve 
integrated management of the natural and physical resources of the region‖. 
Similarly, s 31 empowers territorial authorities to manage ―the effects of the use, 
development and protection of land‖. In pursuance of the objectives of the RMA and 
the objectives and policies of their plan regional councils are given the authority to 
make rules.
643
 Similar powers are given to district councils under s 76.
644
 On this 
basis it is clear that it is well within the jurisdiction of both regional and territorial 
authorities to regulate changes to landowner behaviour in a way that allows for 
increased protection of biodiversity on private land. This power, however, is not 
absolute, and is limited by both s 32 of the RMA and the first schedule. Schedule One 
of the RMA sets out the conditions that an authority must abide by in the ―preparation 
and change of policy statements and plans‖. These include the requirement that 
authorities receive submissions on a proposed plan and undertake public 
consultation.
645
 Section 32 also limits the ability of councils to regulate under the 
RMA by requiring authorities to consider ―alternatives, benefits and costs‖ before 
notifying the plan. These requirements mean that the local authorities are not given an 
unfettered jurisdiction to make plans however they see fit but that there is ample 
opportunity for the interests of the public to be considered throughout the plan 
making processes.  
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Section 9 of the RMA states that ―No person may use any land in a manner that 
contravenes a rule in a district plan or proposed district plan‖. Use is defined in s 9(4) 
as including: 
... (c) Any destruction of, damage to, or disturbance of, the habitats of plants or 
animals in, on, or under the land. 
 
Section 9 is important as it means that local and regional authorities have a significant 
ability to limit negative impacts on biodiversity within their locality.
646
 For example, 
councils can make provision in their plans for the protection of areas of significant 
vegetation which allows specific sites to be protected under a plan.
647
 However on the 
other hand s 9 also means that there is a presumption that any use of land that is not 
prohibited in a plan is allowed.
648
 
 
Another important role is in the establishment of regional biodiversity forums, such 
as Waikato Biodiversity Forum, which help to ―make local participation possible‖.649 
The two main forms of local authority in New Zealand are local councils (territorial 
authorities) and regional councils. Regional council boundaries in New Zealand are 
catchment based therefore regional authorities usually have the responsibility for the 
management of waterways. They are also responsible for the management of air and, 
to a certain degree, land. Because of their closeness to the local community local 
councils have been given the responsibility of regulating for subdivision and land 
use.
650
 
 
1. The Issues: 
While the majority of groups have said that their relationship with local authorities 
such as Environment Waikato, Waikato District Council, and Waipa District Council, 
have been positive, there have been some instances where groups have found 
elements of their relationships with the local authorities to be difficult. One of the 
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criticisms of local authorities was that there is often a lack of consistency from 
council staff. Some groups have found that the answers can change depending on 
who they speak to at the council and this can make it hard to determine what groups 
can and cannot do on the land they are working on.
651
 Pirongia Te Aroaro O Kahu 
Restoration Society has found that on a number of occasion‘s submissions or 
applications prepared according to the instructions of one council employee have not 
been satisfactory to others. This has meant that documents have had to be rewritten 
and resubmitted which is time consuming and frustrating, particularly as the majority 
of CCG members are working for the group on a voluntary basis.
652
 Groups also find 
it frustrating and time wasting having to re-explain their activities every time staff 
members in government departments and councils change.
653
 It would be helpful for 
groups if all councils and government authorities involved with CCGs had one 
specific person dedicated to working with a particular group so that groups would be 
able to have continuity in their dealings with public bodies.
654
 It is also important that 
there are better policies in place for the handing over of information when staff 
change so that new staff are brought up to speed on the activities of groups that they 
will be dealing with. This would help to overcome the issues groups currently have 
with having to re-explain their activities.
655
 
 
Keith Thompson of Te Kauri-Waikuku Trust said that difficulties can also occur 
when councils change and new board members are not environmentally conscious. 
He said that such as issue has arisen in the Waikato. Environment Waikato previously 
had a board that was knowledgeable in environmental issues and under that board 
good environmental management had occurred. He said that when the new council 
board was elected six out of seven board members were chosen from the rates relief 
group. The issue with this has been that in order to reduce rates council expenditure 
has had to be cut. This has meant that the amount of money available for 
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environmental management has been reduced. Secondly, the board has needed to be 
educated on environmental matters and this means that in the meantime it has been 
difficult for good environmental management to occur. He said that this had 
significantly set back environmental management in the Waikato region.
656
 Keith said 
that from an ecological point of view ―see-saws‖ in politics, such as those that have 
been occurring in the Waikato region in relation to Environment Waikato, can be 
devastating for ecological restoration projects as for restoration to be successful there 
need to be consistency. 
 
Staffing levels in councils also affect the quality of district and regional plans. Some 
councils in New Zealand are significantly understaffed and under resourced therefore 
are unable to create plans of the quality that was intended when the RMA was 
enacted. In research by Ericksen et al it was found that low planning staff numbers in 
councils throughout New Zealand means that the quality of many district plans is 
quite low. For example, several of the district plans in the Waikato region, including 
South Waikato, Waikato, Otorohanga, and Matamata-Piako scored less than 50 
percent in the study‘s plan evaluation. Evaluation criteria included the inclusion and 
effectiveness of monitoring provisions, integration with other planning instruments, 
and clarity of purpose.
657
 In the study respondents from local councils said that they 
were ―at the limits of what could be achieved‖ with the resources they had.658 In an 
interview that I conducted with an environmental policy analyst from Hamilton City 
Council I made similar findings.
659
 In addition to this a lack of resources in councils 
means that community consultation does not always occur at desirable levels 
therefore it can be hard to councils to adequately plan for community needs.
660
 
Linking this back to the theories that I discussed earlier on deliberative democracy 
and public participation it can be argued that by failing to undertake adequate 
consultation councils are failing to adequately provide for civil society in their 
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planning. Part of ensuring successful local government involvement in ecological 
restoration and in the creation and implementation of land use planning that takes into 
account biodiversity issues is to ensure that local government has an adequate 
resource base. To ensure local councils are achieving their obligations under the 
RMA central government needs to provide additional support to councils which are 
struggling to create plans of a standard that will achieve good environmental 
results.
661
 
 
Another issue is the lack of integration between councils. Regional and territorial 
councils are required, under sections 30 and 31 of the RMA, to manage natural and 
physical resources in an integrated way. The RMA also requires cooperation between 
councils in the development of their plans as ecosystems are not always confined to 
political boundaries but may cross regional and territorial authority boundaries.
662
 
Under s 66(2)(d) regional councils are required to ensure that there is consistency 
between their plan and those of adjacent regional councils. Similarly under s 74(2) 
territorial authorities are required to ensure that their plans are consistent with those 
of neighbouring territorial authorities. Therefore the lack of integration between the 
councils in some areas means that local and regional authorities are failing to comply 
with the duties placed on them by the RMA and further cooperation between councils 
is required to prevent groups having to deal with conflicting planning instruments on 
restoration sites that lie on the border of one or more territorial or regional 
authority.
663
 However the Act itself provides no mechanisms for ensuring that the 
approaches of neighbouring councils are consistent therefore the provisions of the Act 
are also to blame in this respect and amendment is necessary if integrated resource 
management planning is to be achieved.
664
 Increased interaction between different 
levels of government would result in better overall management of biodiversity. Keith 
Thompson of Te Kauri-Waikuku Trust, who is also a retired ecologist, said that 
collaboration between the different levels of local government is especially important 
                                                     
661
 Ericksen, Berke, Crawford, and Dixon, supra n 549 at 17. 
662
 Ministry for the Environment, supra n 283 at 20. 
663
 Klein, supra n 646 at 31. 
664
 Ibid, 30. 
124 
 
in relation to wetlands which are somewhere between the jurisdictions of both 
regional and district councils because of the combination of water and land 
management factors that affect wetland management.
665
 
 
One other important change that needs to occur in order to achieve better restoration 
results is for local government bodies to undertake environmental planning on a long 
term scale. At present planning occurs on short time frames, often only four to ten 
years. Ecological time scales are long term, decades and centuries. Keith Thompson 
said that from an ecological point of view the current time scales used for 
environmental planning are not suitable and to achieve better environmental results it 
is necessary for legal systems to be altered to take better consideration of ecological 
timescales.
666
 
 
Submission writing and attendance at council hearings was another area which some 
groups were concerned about. Several interview participants cited the importance of 
groups being active in making submissions to councils in respect to long term council 
community plans (LTCCPs), district and regional plans, resource consent 
applications, and other management plans, as not only may groups be able to impact 
upon the planning process through submissions
667
 but there is also potential for them 
to have the groups needs recognised in local planning instruments or prevent actions 
being taken that could negatively impact upon the group‘s activities.668 Making 
submissions to local authorities can help to raise the groups profile in the area and if 
submissions are well drafted it can help to show the group is organised therefore 
raises their credibility to those in the council who will be making the decisions 
affecting a group.
669
 It is important that groups are able to have input into the public 
planning process so that they are able to make their needs known to the local 
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authorities,
670
 and if groups make submissions at the planning stage it is easier to 
have their interests considered than once the relevant policies are in place.
671
  
 
However, it can be difficult for groups to be able to grasp the content of plans and to 
be able to make effective submissions against them;
672
 it is also hard for groups to 
know how to go about writing submissions against resource consent applications 
which are contrary to the group‘s activities.673 It was suggested in the course of 
interviewing by several participants that it would be of great assistance to groups if 
there was a service where groups could go to get low cost advice about how to best 
go about writing successful submissions.
674
 Another issue in relation to the council 
planning processes was the fact that in order to be able to make submissions and 
attend council hearings, group members need to be able to find the time in addition to 
their employment to do these activities and that this can restrict the amount of time 
that they can spend on this.
675
 Council hearings are also usually during working hours 
which means that in many cases group members either must take time out from their 
work or are unable to attend.
676
 
 
Raewyn Peart of the Environmental Defence Society (EDS) said that in her 
experience CCGs often only get involved in RMA processes when a development 
threatens their work, either because the group was not formed under after the regional 
or district plans were put in place, or because groups do not have knowledge about 
the plan making process. This can mean that certain activities, which are contrary to 
restoration, are permitted under the plan and there is little that a group can do about it. 
Often the policies that affect a group have been put in place years before the group is 
affected by them. If groups become involved during the plan making process they are 
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able to have a greater impact on the way that the rules are made and have better 
standing to oppose them if the plan is approved and they have made submissions 
against it.
677
 
 
2. Land Use Zoning 
Another area where there is potential for increased protection through regulation is in 
relation to land use planning by local councils. It is possible for local councils to 
place rules in plans about the protection of certain areas of vegetation, or to re-zone 
certain areas in a district specifically for the purposes of conservation.
678
 Restoration 
activities can be incorporated into planning by local authorities. For example, 
provision could be made in council planning to zone certain areas for restoration. In 
Hamilton City a gully restoration zone has been created with the aim of protecting 
Hamilton‘s significant gully system from development. While this zone does not 
provide the level of protection that may be achieved by covenanting or reserves status 
it does help to protect the gullies from development to a certain extent.
679
 
 
Where land uses exist that are incompatible with restoration it can restrict the 
activities of CCGs in a way which can limit the effectiveness of their restoration 
project. Urban encroachment into areas significant to biodiversity protection, 
including restoration sites, is a significant threat, particularly as Hamilton City and 
other New Zealand towns and cities continue to expand. The desire of many city 
workers to live on the periphery of cities places increasing threat on nature as housing 
development begins to encroach on native habitat close to urban areas. Land use 
planning is an important part of protecting native habitats in this respect as it can help 
to ensure that development is located away from areas that require protection.
680
 
Good land use planning can help to facilitate biodiversity conservation and ecological 
restoration. For example, through the provision of green corridors in long term 
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development planning green spaces can be preserved and greenways can be allowed 
to develop so that plant and animal life can move between larger ecosystems even as 
development of urban areas expand.
681
 This can help to ensure that habitats of native 
flora and fauna do not become too fragmented and can help to ensure their long term 
survival.
682
 
 
Agricultural land uses surrounding restoration sites can lead to increased nutrient 
input into a site and affect a projects success by increasing the presence of weeds and 
degrading waterways.
683
 For example, in Waipa District there have been difficulties 
in achieving effective restoration of peat lakes because the current land use zoning is 
not compatible with the restoration activities.
684
 Land use controls could be used to 
protect these areas from development by restricting what activities can occur on the 
land surrounding conservation areas.
685
 For example, in Brisbane City some areas 
were rezoned to restrict the amount of development that can occur in areas deemed to 
be important for conservation purposes.
686
 To help ensure protection of restoration 
sites land-use zoning must be modified to be sympathetic to the needs of regenerating 
ecosystems.
687
  
 
3. Applying for Resource Consents 
One of the issues identified during the interview process was the difficulty and 
expense of obtaining resource consents for community projects. Don Scarlet, who is 
involved in the National Wetland Trust and Waikato Catchment Ecological 
Enhancement Trust, provided me with a useful example of a situation where resource 
consent conditions have hindered a project proposed on private land. He said that the 
farmer involved is enthusiastic and is willing to put his own time and money into the 
project but has become frustrated because of the consent process that he has had to go 
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through to implement the activity. Don said that under the Waikato regional plan 
there is a requirement that an engineer design and supervise the construction of a 
series of small dams that need to be constructed as part of the project. He said that the 
farmer always intended doing the work this way and he feels cheated that he has to 
now pay the costs of the engineer. Don said that this has not been the first time that 
he has come across issues like this and that this is a problem as it can have the effect 
of discouraging landowners‘ goodwill. Don said that this example shows how 
regional plans could be altered to be more efficient and make restoration projects run 
more smoothly. He said that Environment Bay of Plenty‘s (EBoP) has a useful model 
that may be a good template for Environment Waikato to use in considering changes 
to its regional plan because EBoP makes allowances for community projects by 
reducing the levels of bureaucracy that they need to comply with.
688
 For example, 
Rule 1D of EBoP‘s Proposed Regional Water and Land Plan states that ―Earthworks 
and vegetation disturbance on coastal margins and sand dune country for coast care 
works‖ is a permitted activity where the formal approval of EBoP has been sought.689 
 
Jim Mylchreest of Maungatautari Ecological Island Trust said that while their 
resource consent applications were dealt with efficiently by Environment Waikato, 
there were high costs associated with gaining resource consents for the building of the 
pest proof fence surrounding the sanctuary, for poison drops, and for building 
culverts and streams. Jim said that in the case of CCGs councils should be prepared to 
waive fees because the work being done is in the public benefit.
690
 Clare St Pierre of 
Pirongia Te Aroaro O Kahu Restoration Society said that some councils do waive 
fees for resource consents however they often do not tell groups this when they apply 
for resource consents.
691
 
 
Again these examples show how New Zealand law is failing to provide for CCGs. 
Without substantial modification to planning instruments and council policies on 
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resource consent applications the consent process could be made significantly simpler 
for CCGs. This is important as, as is shown by the examples from Don Scarlet and 
Jim Mylchreest, current approaches of councils can discourage groups who are 
ultimately trying to do work that should be being carried out by councils or 
government departments. 
 
4. Conclusions 
As the level of government closest to the community local authorities have the ability 
to work closely with CCGs to ensure the success of restoration projects. By 
modifying council approaches to land use planning and resource consent processes as 
discussed above councils could greatly improve the ability of CCGs to undertake 
work in their localities. In my opinion it would be wise for council planning scales to 
be extended to take better consideration of ecological time frames as suggested by 
Keith Thompson. It is important therefore, that there is consistency even when 
council boards change.   
 
Another point that I think that it is also important that there is greater integration 
between different councils within a region as ecosystems are not confined to political 
boundaries but are spread over larger areas. Without increased levels of interaction it 
can be hard to manage ecosystems in a comprehensive way. Finally, it is important 
that local councils are provided with the resources that they require to undertake good 
management planning as, as explained above with reference to the study of Ericksen 
et al, without adequate resources the planning instruments that manage the use of 
natural resources may be poorly drafted and therefore may fail to provide for local 
ecosystems properly. 
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PART FOUR: CONCLUSIONS 
 
A. Introduction 
As a sector of civil society CCGs not only help to represent New Zealand 
communities in environmental issues but they also play an increasingly important 
role in restoring and rehabilitating damaged ecosystems throughout the country. As 
has been shown throughout the course of this thesis CCGs have often stepped in to 
fill the gaps where the state has been unable to provide environmental services. Their 
tireless efforts have contributed to the protection of numerous habitats for native 
animals and plants and help to maintain New Zealand‘s distinctive biodiversity. 
However despite their best efforts legal barriers continue to restrain groups from 
reaching their full potential.  
 
My research has shown there to be somewhat of a failure on the part of the New 
Zealand government to adequately provide for civil society organisations, particularly 
CCGs. While some provision has been made for civil society groups in law, such as 
creating means for groups to become incorporated, in many ways the needs of civil 
society have not been properly considered in the development of policy and 
legislation, particularly that dealing with environmental matters. At the central 
government level statutes, such as the Reserves and Conservation Acts, have failed to 
recognise the important role that CCGs play in the management of publicly owned 
land and therefore have failed to provide for CCGs in a legal sense as can be 
demonstrated by Bruce Clarkson‘s example regarding the management status of 
groups working on publicly owned land.
692
 In a similar manner local government also 
often fails to adequately provide for CCGs despite arguments that as the level of 
government closest to CCGs it should be best attuned to understanding CCGs 
needs.
693
 Common law barriers continue to exist both with regard to corporate 
structures and also in relation to potential protection mechanisms such as easements. 
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Overall this paper has aimed to evaluate how the law applies to and affects 
community conservation groups undertaking ecosystem restoration with particular 
reference to the experiences of CCGs in the Waikato Region. What has been achieved 
has been an assessment of the legal issues experienced by CCGs and identification of 
areas where the law can be improved to help facilitate improved restoration. I have 
also endeavoured to highlight some of the successful measures that have been used 
overseas to facilitate community based conservation in an attempt to provide 
guidance as to the direction that New Zealand legislative and regulatory policy must 
follow if CCGs are to thrive. As these overseas examples have shown there is much 
more that the New Zealand government could do to facilitate ecological restoration 
by CCGs. This final part of the paper will draw conclusions based on my research 
findings as explained in the previous chapters. 
 
B. Discussion 
1. Corporate Issues 
As I have shown in Part Two the corporate structures that are currently available and 
which groups are widely advised to use do not always meet the needs of community 
based conservation groups. The law in this area requires modification so that it 
provides more appropriate mechanisms for use by civil society organisations.
694
 
Many of the statutory and common law principles that apply to CCGs were 
developed over 100 years ago and are in a number of situations no longer suitable for 
use by a modern civil society. The range of different sized groups means that by 
continuing to focus on only two main types of structure policy makers are failing to 
take into account the broad range of needs of a modern civil society.  
 
As my research has shown from examples of policies used overseas, there is much 
more that can be done to provide for CCGs in New Zealand in the areas of 
incorporation, management planning, and conflict of interest. The experiences of 
some of the smaller groups that I interviewed show how better mechanisms need to 
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be put in place to encourage the establishment of formal group structures. By 
encouraging the use of alternatives to the common structures of incorporated societies 
and charitable trusts, such as umbrella group structures, policy makers could make 
the incorporation process substantially less complicated for smaller groups, and 
prevent them from having to go through the incorporation process individually 
without the need for major policy reform. Secondly, it would be wise to amend the 
Incorporated Societies Act as discussed above to allow smaller groups to incorporate 
with only five or seven members as in Australia. These two options would provide 
much better opportunities for CCGs to become incorporated and to protect their 
members from the liabilities faced by unincorporated groups again without the need 
for substantial amendment to the current legislation. Thirdly, clarification of the 
charitable position of CCGs that have incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act is 
also essential as it would prevent CCGs from having their charitable status challenged 
in the courts. Because the common law position on whether or not CCGs are 
charitable in New Zealand is not clear it may be worthwhile for the position to be 
defined in the Charitable Trusts Act in much the same way as section 5 of the 
Charities Act 2005 defines what qualifies as a charitable purpose. 
 
The final point that is important to cover is in regard to conflict of interest. The 
importance of this topic can be demonstrated by the concerns that the groups that I 
interviewed had about conflict of interest and also by the examples I have discussed 
from both the New Zealand CCGs that I interviewed where conflict of interest has 
been a concern, and from the overseas case studies cited in the literature. The conflict 
of interest issue is one which is very hard to avoid in New Zealand because of the 
small size of the country. What is not so hard to avoid is allowing a potential conflict 
of interest to lead to a serious issue for a CCG. My research has shown that further 
training for members of CCGs, particularly those that are involved in the 
management of the group, is essential to ensure that members who may have a 
potential conflict are able to identify the conflict at an early stage so that it can be 
managed appropriately. Creating an online tutorial for CCGs such as that which is run 
by the Land Trust Alliance in the United States could help CCG members to 
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understand their obligations before the issue arise. The other point that is important to 
emphasise here also is that even without additional training CCGs can limit the 
potential for conflicts of interest to create an issue by having a conflicts of interest 
policy that sets out the duties of members to declare interests and whether the interest 
means the member should step down from the decision or from the board.  
 
2. Land Management 
As discussed in Part Three much of the legislation that CCGs are required to operate 
under was formulated at a time when it was unlikely that Parliament had considered 
the large role that community groups would play in the management of both publicly 
and privately owned land. As the involvement of CCGs in land management has 
increased there has been little amendment to legislation to provide for them. 
Therefore one of the key changes that this paper has shown to be necessary is the 
amendment of conservation legislation to take into consideration the increased role 
that community groups now play in the management of both publicly and privately 
owned land and resources. Amending legislation such as the Conservation Act and 
the Reserves Act to take into consideration the role of CCGs in the management of 
publicly owned land may not only help to clarify status of CCGs in the management 
of land but could help to remove barriers to restoration. For example, if a general 
allowance is made to allow CCGs to charge an entry fee to members of the public 
who visit the site it may allow CCGs to recoup some of their costs. This may allow 
the group to undertake further work without the need to apply to government agencies 
for further funding. 
 
There has also been a general lack of willingness on the part of policy makers to 
interfere with private property rights in order to preserve environmental features.  
Therefore few inroads have been made in New Zealand legislation to allow CCGs to 
have a greater level of involvement. While mechanisms such as QEII covenants are 
somewhat effective at achieving improved ecosystem protection on private land they 
rely heavily on the goodwill of landowners therefore do not necessarily target highly 
valuable ecosystems that should be conserved if New Zealand‘s biological diversity 
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is to be maintained. They also fail to allow direct involvement of CCGs in the 
protection of private land. Policy reform in this area is vital to ensure that those 
ecosystems that are not already safeguarded are maintained and protected in 
perpetuity for the benefit of future generations and to ensure that the legislation that 
CCGs operate under takes their interests into consideration. It would be worthwhile 
amending statutes like the QEII Trust Act to include an option for CCGs to be the 
holder of a covenant as has occurred in the United States with conservation 
easements. This would help to ensure that covenants are maintained and enforced in 
the long term and would give CCGs greater control of the conservation outcomes on 
the land that they put their time and effort in to managing. It would also give CCGs 
the option of directly approaching and negotiating with landowners to covenant areas, 
whereas under the current mechanisms little scope is available for such interactions.  
To provide a protective backstop regulation should be used in conjunction with the 
less invasive mechanisms as there will always be at least a small number of 
landowners whose properties contain ecologically significant sites who will not react 
unless there are regulatory sanctions are in place.
695
 However if regulation is to be 
effective it is essential that measures are put in place for it to be enforced. 
 
Another important issue that my research has raised is the way that economic factors 
can create boundaries to ecosystem restoration. Firstly, because the cost of 
conservation is one of the major deterrents for restoration activities taking place on 
private land it is important to increase the use of economic incentives to encourage 
private landowners to become more involved. As the examples I have cited from 
Australia show, economic incentives can increase the number of landowners willing 
to undertake conservation work on their land.
696
 In parts of New Zealand where rates 
relief is not widely used it would be useful for councils to develop a rates relief 
scheme to complement conservation. Where rates relief would be ineffective or 
additional funding is required it would be worthwhile to introduce a conservation 
bidding programme as used with success in Australia. Secondly, because funding is a 
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major issue for CCGs it would also be useful to develop a revolving scheme such as 
those used internationally. Similarly, by making low cost loans available groups may 
be able to access money to undertake urgent work where a group cannot wait for 
longer term fund raising. Having a revolving land purchase scheme where land is 
purchased covenanted and sold would also result in increased protection without the 
government having to invest money in the land in the long term while ensuring that a 
CCG working on the land has adequate reassurance that the land is protected. 
 
In Part Three, my research has also shown the importance of altering land use zoning 
so that it is more favourable to ecosystem restoration. As can be seen with the 
example of the Waipa peat lakes inappropriate land use zoning can have a dramatic 
impact on the success of restoration projects. If a CCG is to undertake work on land 
where there is a zoning issue such as that in Waipa it can be exceedingly difficult for 
them to successfully achieve their aims. By modifying land use zones surrounding 
restoration sites some of the major barriers to restoration can be removed. It may also 
be worthwhile developing conservation land use zones in New Zealand similar to 
those used in Brisbane. Alternatively district councils could make provision for green 
zones in their long term planning so that fragments of native ecosystems are protected 
from development as cities and towns continue to spread. As I have discussed 
previously such provisions can help in the development of green corridors that allow 
species to travel between larger ecosystems. 
 
3. Additional Recommendations 
One of the other points that kept coming up throughout my research was the lack of 
readily available information about the law and how to go about dealing with 
responsibilities under the law. In this regard I think that it is essential that there is a 
place that CCGs can go to for cheap legal advice in the form of a community law 
centre or similar so that lack of legal advice does not unduly restrain the work of 
CCGs. From my discussions with CCGs it appears that an online forum through the 
internet, where information can be stored and experiences can be shared, would be 
another appropriate step towards ensuring that CCGs have access to legal 
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information. This would also help to reduce the large amount of time that groups 
currently spend locating the information that they need from the wide variety of 
different locations where the information is currently available. 
 
Finally it is important to note that CCGs can themselves have an influence on the 
policy process and groups must remember that in taking action to make the needs 
their group known a CCG can help to improve the situation for all CCGs in the area. 
As demonstrated by Randolph‘s diagram in Part One there is a reciprocal relationship 
between civil society and the state therefore it is important that CCGs do not always 
wait for top down action to be taken. Through political pressure and collaboration 
with government CCGs can assist in the development of policy that works for them, 
and as mentioned above, it is important for CCGs to make their needs known to 
decision makers so that provision can be made for them during planning and decision 
making phases.
697
 It is harder to bring about change once the laws, policies, or plans 
are already in place.
698
  
 
C. Concluding Remarks 
Working within the current legal framework has been no easy feat for many of New 
Zealand‘s community conservation groups. They must be commended for their 
perseverance and should be rewarded by New Zealand‘s government through the 
implementation of changes to New Zealand law to help make restoring ecosystems 
less difficult. Choosing to adopt recommendations based on overseas experiences as 
outlined in my conclusions above would be one step towards creating an improved 
legal environment within which CCGs can operate and help to remove some of the 
barriers that the law currently creates. 
                                                     
697
 Randolph, supra n 40 at 6. 
698
 Barton, supra n 51 at 100. 
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